University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1995

Theodor Adorno's "political deficit".
Michael D. Parkhurst
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Parkhurst, Michael D., "Theodor Adorno's "political deficit"." (1995). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February
2014. 1950.
https://doi.org/10.7275/he9h-h316 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1950

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

THEODOR ADORNO'S 'POLITICAL DEFICIT'

A Dissertation Presented
by

MICHAEL

D.

PARKHURST

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
February 1995

Department of Political Science

© Copyright by Michael D. Parkhurst 1995

All Rights Reserved

THEODOR ADORNO'S 'POLITICAL DEFICIT

A Dissertation Presented
by

MICHAEL

D.

PARKHURST

Approved as to style and content by:

Eric Einhorn, Department Head
Department of Political Science

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My most heartfelt thanks go to the people who sustained
me spiritually and intellectually over the last seven years,

especially Marjorie Abel, Mark Reynolds, Bruce Saxon, Martin
Courchaine, and Renee Heberle.
I'd like to thank my parents for the support and

generosity they've always shown me.

I

would like to thank

my committee, and the teachers who exemplified for me the

practice of theory.
Finally, in a most non-Adornian gesture,

I

to dedicate this to two institutions, with whom

pleasure and genuine privilege of working:

iv

would like
I

had the

the GEO and UWW.

ABSTRACT

THEODOR ADORNO'S 'POLITICAL DEFICIT'
FEBRUARY 1995

MICHAEL

D.

PARKHURST, B.A., REED COLLEGE

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos

This dissertation explores what some critics have

called the 'political deficit' in the work of Theodor
Adorno; his harsh criticism of late capitalist society seems
to demand some explicit discussion of oppositional or

revolutionary politics, but Adorno refuses any consideration
of political strategy or tactics.
I

trace Adorno'

s

'deficit' through his analyses of the

economic, psychoanalytic, and cultural dimensions of

contemporary society, to show that much of his work can be
taken as an implicit argument for the irrelevance of any

imaginable form of 'politics,

and for the practical

'

impossibility (in the present) of revolutionary politics in
any meaningful sense.
In the middle chapters of the dissertation,

I

discuss

what Adorno sees as the still potentially liberatory moments
of art and theory, given that praxis has fallen into an

indefinite period of hibernation.
The final chapter attempts an immanent critique of

Adorno'

s

foreclosure of meaningful politics, arguing that
v

a

renewal of critical theory will depend upon

a

more thorough

commitment to the interdisciplinary program Adorno and his
Frankfurt School colleagues attempted.

Specifically, social

theory needs to connect the insights of political economy to
cultural analysis and attention to the constitution of

subjectivity
Finally,

I

suggest some non-Adornian avenues for

a

renewal of critical theory, emphasizing two moments whose

political significance has been neglected by both first- and

second-generation critical theory.

First,

I

argue we need

to rescue the dialectic of desire and recognition from

premature Hegelian harmony, to understand the importance of

intersubjectivity for any 'progressive' political project.
Lastly,

I

argue that critical theory would do well to

incorporate some sustained attention to the meaning and

practice of solidarity, as the positive cohesion necessary
to sustain a political movement.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iv

ABSTRACT

v

Chapter

INTRODUCTION
I.

1

VALUE, DESIRE, AND REASON: THE EROSION
OF SUBJECTIVITY
A.

Value: State Capitalism

&

the End of

Liberalism
B.
C.

II.

B.
C.
D.

E.

III.

Autonomous Art as Praxis
The Culture Industry and Praxis
A "Politics Industry"
Monopolies and Markets in the Culture
Industry
The Death of the Political Subject

THE PRACTICE OF THEORY
A.
B.
C.
D.

IV.

Desire: the Obsolescence of the Ego
Reason: The Obsolescence of Ideology

AESTHETIC THEORY AND PRAXIS
A.

B.
C.
D.
E.

15
31
55

73
7 6

84

95

104
Ill

118

Theory as Praxis
Individuality and Critique
An Ethic of Negation
The Limits of Philosophical Praxis

DESIRE AND SOLIDARITY: RESUSCITATING POLITICS
A.

13

A Message in a Bottle
Excursus: Hegel and Civil Society
Rediscovering Politics
Renewing Critical Theory
Recognition and Solidarity

BIBLIOGRAPHY
vii

119
124
139
153

163
167
171
183
188
201

INTRODUCTION

In the twenty-three volumes of Theodor Adorno's Gesam-

melte Schriften, there is none titled "Politische Schriften M

;

politics seems not to figure very prominently in his

work.

At the same time, virtually every paragraph he had a

hand in is informed by a sophisticated and critical parti-

sanship

— in

the very best sense:

Adorno never allows the

reader to forget that even the most recondite topics are

bound up in a "damaged" state-of-af fairs which must be

understood as historical and therefore (potentially) corrigible

.

This infamous pessimist asserts over and over again

that a post-scarcity Utopia is a technical possibility.

industrial revolution and the advent of

a truly

The

global

economy have made it possible to dispense with the stick

with which humanity has threatened itself from time immemo
rial
It cannot be denied ... that in the increasing degree of
satisfaction of material needs, in spite of their deformation by the social apparatus, the possibility of a life

without indigence is incomparably more concretely possible
Even in the poorest lands, no one would need
than before.
to go hungry anymore.
1

That people starve under capitalism is for Adorno a fully

sufficient (if hardly exhaustive) indictment of the irrati
nality of the disenchanted economy.

1

While he was no enthu

siast of technical "Progress," he argues

(as

Marcuse and

Murray Bookchin would after him) that exchange relations
under mature capitalism bar the way to a qualitative break

with the history of material scarcity.
In other words,

however much some readers would like to

rescue Adorno from what they see as an unfortunate Marxist
residue,

2

the Utopian ostinato in all his work can not be

ignored; the demand for a radical reconfiguration of social

relations can not be discreetly excised without doing violence to Adorno.

Any such attempt to make Adorno 'respect-

able' not only does a disservice to the diversity and vital-

ity of Marxist intellectual traditions, but makes it impos-

sible to make sense of Adorno

'

s

work.

On the other side of this divide are the leftists who

would like to revoke Adorno 's socialist credentials.

Adorno

has been chastised by even his most sympathetic critics for
his "political deficit."

Fredric Jameson may be the only

major commentator who doesn't at some point reach for the
Theses on Feuerbach to cudgel Adorno.

down to pessimism,

"mandarinism,

"

Whether it is put

obstinance, or simple

forgetfulness, Buck-Morss, Jay, and Rose

— to

say nothing of

Habermas and various Marxists and post-marxists

— have

all

found themselves confessing that there is something missing
from Adorno:
tance

a

theory of power, of revolution or resis-

:

Although Adorno staunchly rejected the accusation
that he was really an apolitical aesthete, it is
2

hard to avoid the conclusion that there was what
many of his German critics liked to call a 'political deficit' in his theory.
For when Adorno
spoke of power, it was always in terms of a pervasive and diffuse domination that transcended any
identifiable political realm. 3

While the substance of this criticism is an important
part of a fair assessment of his legacy, this chorus of

rebuke

— that

Adorno is not Lenin, nor even Marcuse

— has

shed

little light on the theoretical basis for Adorno 's "lack,"
and less on how one might take up the question of "politics"
or resistance, knowing what Adorno knows.
It is unlikely that Adorno simply forgot to address

politics in his work.

If we can also discount the possibil-

ity that Adorno felt he had nothing interesting or important

to say about political matters, then we are left to consider

why he would refrain from any significant work on the state,

revolution, organization, etc.

The main thread of this dissertation is an exploration
of this 'political deficit'

in Adorno 's work.

I

am critical

of attempts to dismiss Adorno for this 'failure,' and
the strongest case

I

I

make

can for a reading that shows the 'poli-

tical deficit' to be an attribute of contemporary society as

much as of Adorno 's theoretical standpoint.
At the same time,

I

argue that there is a kind of

'deficit,' or gap, between his theoretical aspirations and

his political conclusions, and

I

point out the moments where

the dialectic stalls in Adorno 's work.
3

In a nutshell,

I

want to show that there is a logic

behind Adorno's refusal to speculate upon political practice,

that this logic is flawed, and finally that it is

possible to retrace Adorno's analysis in a way that lives up
to its highest theoretical intentions without being led into

the same political dead-end.

Chapter one explores the dimensions of the various
'political deficits' that have been attributed to Adorno.

This chapter begins to reconstruct the hole where politics
'ought'

to be, with a recapitulation of his critique of late

capitalism, structured around his deployment of economic,

psychoanalytic, and philosophical analyses.

Chapter two discusses the powerfully depoliticizing

operation of the culture industry, as well as the 'withdrawal'

of politics into autonomous art.

This completes the

description of a 'totally administered' society in which
politics has no bearing whatsoever on the basic processes of

domination
Taken together, these first two chapters establish
Adorno's own implicit response to the objection he has

neglected politics:

to put it as starkly as possible,

is nothing left to neglect.

there

Adorno's work deeply problema-

tizes the basic assumptions of both liberal and Marxist

political theory.
More than anything else, this is because the subject is
dead.

Adorno and his colleagues in the Frankfurt school
4

attempt to weave together an analysis of the trajectory of

twentieth-century capitalism with a psychoanalytic account
of the formation of subjectivity.

Adorno becomes convinced

early on in his career that the qualities of autonomy and
reflection, which any hope for a rational, meaningful politics takes for granted, are being systematically undermined
by late capitalism.

Industrial modernity kills off both the

citizen and the proletariat.
The failure of Marxism's practical challenge to capitalism,

symbolized in the most unmistakeable terms by the

success of Nazism (as well as the perversion of the Soviet
experiment), leaves a profound political vacuum in the
world.

Adorno can take no comfort in the defeat of Fascism

(nor would the collapse of official Communism cheer him),

because the victorious society has become a mockery of its
ideals of freedom and justice.

What remains of the political impulse to praxis, in

world seen as utterly hostile to
three.

In this chapter,

I

it,

is the focus of chapter

elaborate on Adorno 's conception

of the practical dimension of critical theory.

argues that Adorno'

s

a

This chapter

work is best understood in the context

of the highest ambitions of the Enlightenment, read through

the lens of Marx's critique of capitalism.
It is here,

in the gap between the political situation

that Adorno describes, and the only practical avenues for

5

resistance that he is able to endorse, that the 'political
deficit' of his analysis is most poignant.
I

point out in the first three chapters moments where

Adorno's analysis fails to live up to its own standards.
chapter four,

I

In

attempt to outline some possible Adornian

ways out of Adorno's political dead-end.

Ultimately,

to challenge his narrative of a dramatic,

irreversible Fall

I

want

from (merely really bad) liberal capitalism which he uses to

bolster his critigue of (catastrophically bad) contemporary

capitalism
Crucial to this project is a re-examination of political economy and psychoanalytic theory.

In addition

I

turn

to moments in Hegel (whose work was a major source of inspi-

ration and provocation for Adorno) which point beyond the

solipsistic trap Adorno falls into.
the Hegelian narrative,

I

The role of desire in

argue, points the way to a theory

of solidarity which would move Adorno's analysis beyond its

allergic recoil from collective action.
My own critigue of Adorno's 'deficit' also includes his

failure to take mediating institutions of late capitalist

society (everything between the crippled particular and the
mad universal) seriously enough.

His very sophisticated

work on aesthetics allows culture (broadly speaking) to
straddle the Marxist divide of base/superstructure.

But

political action is granted much less leeway in Adorno, and
is implicitly assigned a purely epiphenomenal status.

6

I

argue, again turning to Hegel for support,

that Adorno fails

to recognize (or theorize) the powerful constitutive element

of political involvement.

Any attempt to give an account of "Adorno

1

s

thought" or

"major themes in Adorno" has to contend with the systematizing impulse he criticized relentlessly; like Nietzsche,

Adorno makes one aware that the will-to-summarize is a willto-power

.

It is not my intention to offer a compact Michelin

guidebook to 'The Philosophy of

T.

w.

Adorno,' nor to pro-

duce a "more accessible" digest which would displace the

original texts.

(Nothing would measure the success of this

project better than the degree to which it sharpens the
reader's thirst for Adorno 's own work).
If we are to take Adorno 's invocations of the fragment

and the anti-systemic seriously, we must be extremely wary
of "reconstructing" Adorno 's philosophy.

What Max Pensky

says of Aesthetic Theory applies to any attempt to grapple

with Adorno:
A reconstructive approach ... risks inflicting on
the text precisely the violence that Adorno himself so skilfully deploys against itself: it would
reinscribe a will to completeness within the deliberately fragmentary, hence in effect ruining
the ruin by rebuilding it, and violently returning
Aesthetic Theory to the family of idealistic stunmeasure-tag-and-release theoretical projects it

disowns

4

7

While the discussion of this dissertation does wind
through what

I

take to be the major themes in his work (even

"ordering" these themes under three headings), it does so
not in a cartographic spirit that registers the lay of the
land from on high, but rather in the pursuit of one (rather
big) question: what happened to politics?

Still,

I

may

arguably be even more tempted than the cartographer to
smooth over tensions and contradictions on behalf of narrative momentum.

Alternatively, one could latch onto the seductive

metaphor of the constellation, and situate Adorno's various
themes and polemics relative to the gravitational fields of

"identity," "mimesis," etc.

One might in this fashion

succeed in maintaining tensions and aporias that would be
forcibly reconciled by a "reconstructive" approach.
I

have avoided this, perhaps only because the metaphor

comes a little too easily to mind, and can only be realized

without trying to force the discussion into a constellation.
What

I

have tried to do instead is read and re-read Adorno's

text with an ear out for what is said

not said

— about

— and

much more often

"the political" without any geometrical or

astrological template in mind.
The orderliness of my presentation reflects, not so

much a systematizing impulse on Adorno's part (nor on mine),
but rather the systematic character of the totality he

criticized.

At the same time, one of the central claims

8

I

make in the first chapter is that one cannot pry Adorno's

philosophical insights (which are in some sense certainly
the most impressive side of his work) away from his economic,

psychological, and cultural analyses (which are not

uniformly successful).

Like any project which sports a first and last page,
this one would masguerade as an organic, complete project;

certainly it is far from that.

There are two obvious ave-

nues for extending the reach and significance of the work

I

have done here.
The first suggests itself in recent readings of Adorno
as a kind of proto-postmodernist

.

Adorno's relation to

theorists like Derrida, Foucault, and Baudrillard, will be
one of the major concerns of the next stage of this project.
I

am particularly wary of is the tendency to show that

Adorno is a precursor of, say, Derrida, in a way that suggests that postmodern theory supersedes Adorno.

At least as

important as his consonance with some 'postmodern' themes,
is Adorno's non-identity with postmodernism.

The other project which will play a prominent part in

later work is a thorough encounter with Jiirgen Habermas.
The weight of Habermas' writing hovered over my dissertation

from the very outset; in large part,

I

began this as a

contribution to the attempt to remind contemporary theory
that Habermas and discourse ethics are not the alpha and

9

omega of "Critical Theory."

Without perhaps intending it,

Habermas has (at least in the United States) eclipsed the
first generation of critical theorists to the point that it
is not uncommon at all to find books published of the vari-

ety Critical Theory and Such-and-Such which utterly lack any

substantive mention of Horkheimer or Marcuse or Adorno.
This is not a brilliant excuse for ignoring Habermas,

who is after all one of the major commentators on the work
of his former mentors, and

precisely those terms.

I

have tried to include him on

There is still a palpable necessity

for someone to directly address the continuities and discon-

tinuities between the critical theory pursued by Adorno et
al

.

and the project of Habermas.

In this context,

it made

theoretical and practical sense to keep the focus on Adorno s work
1

This is why Adorno

1

s

colleagues in the Frankfurt School

Horkheimer

get rather short shrift as well.

1

s

name recurs

mostly in discussion of collaborative works with Adorno like

Dialectic of Enlightenment (and

I

take their claim to have

fully collaborated at face value

—

I

make no attempt to sort

out which sentences 'belong' to which thinker).

others appear in passing.

In truth,

Marcuse and

the delineation of the

differences in emphasis within the Frankfurt School is
fairly adequately accomplished in the most notable overviews
of critical theory.

5

10

This is an opportune moment to mention the extraordi-

narily fine level of the secondary literature on Adorno, to

which

I

am afraid

I

have hardly done justice.

My work would

not have been possible without the trail-blazing scholarship
of Gillian Rose, Susan Buck-Morss

Jameson.

,

Martin Jay, and Fredric

They hardly exhaust the list of writers whose work

was useful to me, and the traces of many others can be found
in my footnotes.

sometimes,

I

As solitary as this project has felt

would like to think it is really a kind of

indirect and obscure collaboration with the discontinuous

community of readers who have found it hard to dispense with

Adorno

11

"Is Marx Obsolete?" trans, by Nicolas Slater, Diogenes,
Winter
64,
1968, p. 8.
1.

This trend is most visible among those that want to
2.
claim Adorno's critique of identity as a kind of postmodernism avant la lettre.
See e.g., Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (New York: Routledge, 1992), chs 1-2.
.

3.

Martin Jay, Adorno,

Press,

(Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University

1984), p. 86.

Max Pensky, "on Zuidervaart s Adorno's Aesthetic Theory," presented at the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Psychology, Boston, 1992.
4.

1

5.
See Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History
of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 7 923-1 950, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1973), and David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

12

CHAPTER

VALUE

,

I

DESIRE, AND REASON: THE EROSION OF SUBJECTIVITY

Adorno's 'political deficit' is no simple thing.

His

work has been criticized from different quarters for embodying a whole series of distinct political failures,

which we can distinguish two broad strands:
his engagement with politics,

a

among

critique of

and a disappointment with the

level of political analysis one can extract from his work.

Marxists and other radicals have always been disappointed
with Adorno.

His focus on abstract philosophical issues,

his pessimism,

and his lack of interest in concrete politi-

cal struggles add up,

in the minds of more than one critic,

to a utopian rhetoric which hardly masks Adorno's fundamen-

tal departure from the Marxist project.

1

Adorno's refusal

to endorse or encourage the student movement of the 1960s

only cemented his reputation in this respect.
Even critics who do not expect Adorno to take up

a

place on

the barricades have found his analysis of society and poli-

tics lacking; Gillian Rose is perhaps the most eloquent and

trenchant critic to argue that Adorno fails to give us an

adequate "theory of socio-political action."
This chapter and the next will demonstrate that Adorno was
not ignoring politics, and did not forget
his

'pessimism'

is not an idiosyncrasy,

1

3

'the Revolution'

but the reasoned

conclusion of his analysis of the impact of late capitalism
on the psychological roots of resistance to domination.

We

need to recognize in Adorno a subtle (if not completely

satisfying) negative political theory; not

socio-political action,

1

theory of

'a

but a theory of socio-political

inaction
We assume for the moment then,

that the

'political

deficit' might lie in the world at least as much as in

Adorno.

Our task then,

is to follow the lines of Adorno'

critique of late capitalist modernity, and to retrace the
logic that carried him into a blind alley from which revolution became too problematic to speculate upon.

I

begin with

the working hypothesis that Adorno had compelling reasons to

decline any discussion of "strategy and tactics" of resistance,

even where his own argument most calls out for it.

In later chapters

I

will argue that the momentum of his
For

analysis need not carry us into the same blind alley.
now,

we need to know how Adorno got there.

To learn anything from Adorno'

s

'deficit'

we must be

able to trace its provenance through the three dimensions of
Adorno'

s

radical critique of capitalist modernity:

cal economy,

psychoanalysis, and ideology.

politi-

Careful atten-

tion will show that in each of these spheres Adorno'

s

work

is centrally concerned with the erosion of the bases of

resistance:

civil society,

the individual ego,

and critical

thought all appear as endangered (if not extinct) prerequi-

1

4

sites of a just and free society.

Taken together, the

critique of value, desire, and reason announce the end of
both liberal and revolutionary politics, and the obsoles-

cence of political theory attached to a rational, autonomous

subject

A.

Value:

State Capitalism

&

the End of Liberalism

Marx's critique of capitalism is evoked
rated

— at

wrote.

not elabo-

important junctures in nearly every text Adorno

Adorno clearly held onto several Marxist tenets as

indispensable analytic principles:
of

— if

capitalism as

a

totality

(unequal) exchange; exploitation and class; commodifica-

tion and commodity fetishism; the tendency toward central-

ization and monopoly; the pernicious consequences of the

division of mental from manual labor; and the notion that
relations fetter forces of production.

While these concepts

are more often cited than developed and critiqued,

it would

be a mistake to assume that political economy was peripheral
to Adorno s project.
'

As with other traditions that he draws or comments

upon,

Adorno nearly always presumes a familiarity with the

basic arguments of Marxism, and is more interested to "apply" these arguments in his enquiries into philosophy and

music than to delve very deeply into economic categories
themselves.

While Adorno is willing to critique and re-work

1

5

certain philosophical categories from Marx (most notably

dialectics and materialism), the workings of political
economy are more or less taken for granted.
The economic dimension of Adorno

unexplored territory.
devotes to Adorno

'

s

'

s

thought is fairly

The few pages that Gillian Rose 3

appropriation of Marxian political

economy are unfortunately unusual in their depth; more
typically, Adorno

'

s

frequent references to exchange are only

discussed in reference to the critique of identity theory,
and nothing much is made of his scattered, shorthand cita-

tions of the market, unequal exchange and the division of

labor
This lack of interest in political economy is no small
matter; economic assumptions are not only critical to Adorno

'

s

discussions of art and culture (as I'll demonstrate

next chapter), but essential to understanding anything of
his neglect of politics.
I

will discuss Adorno

'

s

appropriation of Marxian no-

tions of commodif ication, exchange, and the division of

labor in appropriate contexts below (in relation to the

culture industry, the critique of identity, and the status
of theory,

respectively).

into Adorno'

s

At this juncture,

"political deficit" through

class and crisis theory in Adorno

'

s

a

I

want to delve

consideration of

political economy.

The capitalist economy figures in Adorno first and

foremost as

a

total system of exchange based on the univer16

sal fungibility of goods.

As we will see in a moment,

the

Marxian analysis of exchange value as the commensurabili
ty
foisted upon everything in a capitalist economy prefigures
Adorno's critique of identity-thinking.
One of the most momentous implications of exchange is
the social reduction of human activity to labor power.

Adorno indicates that he follows Marx's analysis of unequal
exchange and exploitation:
it is through exchange

[Tausch] that non-identical
individuals and performances become commensurable
and identical .... From olden times, the main characteristic of the exchange of equivalents has been
that unequal things have been exchanged in its
name, that the surplus value of labor would be
appropriated 4

Nor could he ignore that generalized exploitation entails
the division of society into classes.

Adorno is certainly "unorthodox" in his treatment of
class.

If the theme of class struggle is relatively subdued

in Adorno it is not because the objective contradictions

analyzed by Marx have melted away; on the contrary:
The process of increasing social rationalization,
of universal extension of the market system, is
not something that takes place beyond the specific
social conflicts and antagonisms, or in spite of
them .... Society remains class struggle, today just
as in the period when that concept originated .... Screened from subjectivity, the difference
between the classes grows objectively with the
increasing concentration of capital.

What makes Adorno hopelessly revisionist with respect
to class is not that he challenges the bifurcation of soci-

1

7

ety into owners and producers

— indeed

Adorno at times offers

extremely subtle and nuanced "class analysis"

— but

that he

refuses to automatically accord to the proletariat the pre-

ordained role of savior of humanity.
Marcuse's lead in looking for
the women's movement,

a new

Nor does Adorno follow

revolutionary agent in

the third world, or the ghetto.

we have the first indications of Adorno

'

s

Here

"political defi-

cit."

The most obvious and doubtless most substantial obstacle to championing the working class as the agent of revolu-

tionary change was its capitulation to
fascism.

Still,

— or

support for

no doubt there were Marxists who made the

arduous dialectical effort to maintain their faith in the
proletariat; and even before 1933 Adorno seemed not to have

shared the enthusiasm of some of his colleagues.

The easi-

est (and thus most suspicious) way to account for this would
be to put it all down to congenital "Mandarinism"

(a

diagno-

sis that is equally applicable to some privileged Marxists

who cultivated a romance-f rom-a-distance with the proletariat)

.

I

am not inclined to reduce Adorno

's

skepticism toward

the identical subject-object of history to autobiography
for one thing,

this dissertation would be superfluous if we

could be satisfied with a determination that Adorno was
simply an elitist who refused to dirty his hands in practical politics.

It would be far more interesting and useful

18

to trace the correspondences between Adorno

'

s

refusal to

privilege self-conscious class struggle and his diagnosis of
the conditions begging for Revolution.

have an adequate sense of Adorno

'

s

Only then would we

attempt to pursue revolu-

tionary theory without a revolutionary subject.
If it is possible to read out of his discussions of

ideology in the "totally administered" society a kind of
'declining significance of class'

thesis,

it is not because

there is no proletariat, but that class-consciousness is

somehow short-circuited.

Clearly Adorno balks at the link

Marx supposes between the objective conditions of workers
and their consciousness.

While Adorno accepted the notion

that the proletariat embodies in some sense the universal

interest in liberation, he could not share Marx's (or Lukacs

'

)

confidence that recognition of this interest followed

logically from experiential political economy.

For these

reasons, Adorno argues in the important essay "Reflexionen
zur Klassentheorie

,

"

that the concept of class must be re-

tained but re-thought:
Retained: since its ground, the division of society into exploiters and exploited, not only survives undiminished but increases in force and
Altered: because the oppressed ... cannot
solidity.
experience themselves as a class.
The exact nature of this obstacle to class consciousness is
one of our central concerns here, and a thorough account

necessarily has to wait on explorations of Adorno'

s

psychoanalysis, ideology, and the culture industry.
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work on

A close reading of these themes in Adorno will show

that he believed that Marx's assumptions about class con-

sciousness have been made obsolete by decisive changes in
the economic and the libidinal regimes of late capitalism.

The opaqueness of the proletariat to itself kicks one
leg out from under the conceit that revolution is a histori-

cal necessity; the other leg is crisis theory:

the notion

that capitalism will be undone by its own contradictions.

Here again Adorno is a peculiar Marxist, not on account of
his "Mandarin" love of art and philosophy, but because,

in

this case, of the analysis of political economy which he

takes up from Friedrich Pollock:

capitalism has learned to

forestall indefinitely the collapse Marxists expected it

would be brought to.

Pollock's work usually figures in Adorno

'

s

writings as

the passing of "competitive" or liberal capitalism.

The end

of the liberal era is an understated theme throughout Ador-

no

1

s

work;

in typically Adornian fashion,

it is casually

cited in various contexts as if its meaning and significance
were too obvious to belabor.

Adorno

's

comments on liberalism have received astonish-

ingly little attention, which helps to explain why discus-

sions of his politics have often been superficial or nonex-

istent

.
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Adorno's passing references define liberalism in terms
we can relate to value,

reason, and desire:

Enlightenment, and individuality.

the market,

the

The advent of the "admin-

istered world" signals a change in regime in each sphere; as

competitive capitalism gives way to monopoly, critical
thought loses ground to instrumental reason and positivism,
and individuality is eroded at its libidinal roots.

The

supercession of the liberal "free market" threatens the
historical viability of both Reason and the Subject:
The individual has become an obstacle to production.... Economic rationali ty
is incessantly
converting the last units of the economy:
firms
and men alike.... The risks of competition led to
the more productive centralized form of retail
trade represented by the department stores.
The
individual the psychological corner shop suffers
7
the same fate.
.

—

.

.

—

Reading Adorno's terse elegies for the liberal economy
in light of Friedrich Pollock's attempt to define a new

stage of "state capitalism" goes far to explain his inability to situate a meaningful approach to politics in the

administered world.
Pollock's work is usually cited as an important influence on the economic underpinnings of Adorno, but the full

implications of Pollock for Adorno's reading of politics
have not been explored.

Buck-Morss, Jameson, and Jay (to

name only the most prominent commentators) give political

economy very short shrift, and do no more than gesture at
the importance of Pollock's "state capitalism" thesis.
21

More than a gesture is necessary if we are to understand Adorno's skepticism toward the orthodox Marxist faith
in the proletariat,

and his disqualification of every other

candidate for political savior.

Pollock's discussion of modern capitalism emphasizes
the acceleration of the trend toward monopoly that Marx had

identified as intrinsic to the logic of capital.

He argues

that monopoly capitalism, which was understood as both the

logical result and the death-knell of liberal, market-ori-

ented capitalism,

is

itself giving way to a new configura-

tion of relations of production.

Adorno's understanding of

the contradiction between forces and relations of produc-

tion

— and

of the prospects for revolution

— is

decisively

influenced by Pollock's analysis of state capitalism.
The Great Depression demonstrated in dramatic fashion
that capitalism could not contain the contradictions it

generated.

Like any economic crisis, the Depression accel-

erated the centralization and amalgamation of capital in an

ever-narrower circle of firms; at the same time it marked an
important readjustment of the relations of production as it
spurred greater intervention on the part of the state.
It is precisely this readjustment of the relations of

production within the framework of capitalism that concerns
Pollock.

The configuration Pollock labels "state capital-

ism" signifies a step beyond monopoly capitalism (and there22

fore beyond the analysis of Marx):

a shift toward an inte-

grated, planned economy, whereby mechanisms of centralized

control take precedence over the local calculations of

individual capitalists:
The market is deposed from its controlling function to coordinate production and distribution.
This function has been taken over by a system of
direct controls.
Freedom of trade, enterprise and
labor are subject to governmental interference of
such a degree that they are practically abolished.
With the autonomous market the so called economic
laws disappear.

This does not mean the end of capitalism per se, since

capital still profits from the exploitation of labor; however,

profitable enterprise is constrained by the political

directives of central planning.
Pollock's analysis shares with much of the Frankfurt

School's work

a

response to fascism that emphasized the

continuity between capitalist business-as-usual and the Nazi
seizure of power.
er as well,

For Pollock,

and for Adorno and Horkheim-

fascism exposed the crisis of liberalism in its

collapse of the already eroded separation of public from
private spheres.

This kind of total mobilization was seen

as the prototype for every late capitalist society.

10

Pollock's discussions of state capitalism are confusing

because he fails to distinguish clearly between at least
three different aims.

The fully developed model that Pol-

lock presents in the "State Capitalism" essay is meant in

one sense as an ideal type, which no existing system may
23

fulfill in every regard; the model is meant to describe
trends that can be identified in any capitalist economy

(including the Soviet Union).

In another sense,

Pollock is

clearly attempting to come to grips with the economic foun-

dation of Nazism as a distinct social development.
as a socialist,

Finally,

he argues against the conviction that a

planned economy is not possible or practical, and seems
rather enthusiastic about the supersession of liberal capitalism

.

This confusion is illustrated by Pollock's distinction

between "democratic" and "totalitarian" versions of state
capitalism:

democratic state capitalism seems to refer

sometimes to

a

purely descriptive ideal-typical category,

11

sometimes to developments in really existing non-Fascist

economies (e.g. the New Deal), and sometimes to the utopian
prospect of

a

planned economy oriented around

free men in a harmonious society.

1

the needs of

Needless to say, it is

difficult to imagine that Adorno shared Pollock's enthusiasm
for better living through bureaucracy.

The political implications of state capitalist central-

ization and rationalization are enormous.

The potential for

managing crises offered by planning allows capital to forestall indefinitely the destructive contradictions of capi-

talist accumulation.

In this respect,

Pollock's work repre-

sents a major "strategic withdrawal" from the Marxist certi24

tude in the inevitable and immanent collapse of the capitalist economy.
In addition,

the conditions addressed by the "state

capitalism" thesis not only made it necessary to recognize
the resiliency of the prevailing exploitation, but also

establish,

through the integration and amalgamation of

communications industries, the conditions for

a

radical

expansion of the possibilities of "planning" consciousness;
in effect,

Industry

Pollock anticipates the theses of "The Culture

.

Finally,

Pollock's analysis forecasts an interweaving

of political and economic power along Nazi lines, culminat-

ing in essentially state-directed monopolies

— or

a

polity

owned and operated by a handful of giant conglomerates.

And

this was not an invention of the "National Socialists":

what both Pollock and Adorno saw as the death of liberalism
was well underway before the triumph of fascism,

in the

erosion of the market under "monopoly capital."
While Adorno indicates that social relations are barring the way to a qualitatively better life,

the explosive

power implied in Marx's metaphor of 'fetters' has been

mysteriously drained away.

Adorno is not hopeless; but what

hopes he harbors do not spring from the economic contradictions of late capitalism.

As Giacomo Marramao puts it:

The Marxian laws appear ... to have strangely lost
their object and with it the medium of their pracWith the "freezing" of the
tical verification.
real dialectic, critical thought appears damned to
25

the exile of contemplation for an unforeseeable
future.
Even as Adorno's theory holds to Marxian
orthodoxy, it still cannot allow it to become
effective in the new form of the capitalist organization of domination.

Marramao criticizes Adorno for neglecting "the socializing process of labor" in the factory in favor of a fixation with reification which leads him to lose sight of "the

antagonistic totality."

real,

to Marramao,

What is required, according

is a reconsideration of "the weakness of the

link with praxis as the immanent limit of the theory it-

self," and insight into "the bursting forth of the qualitative dimension." 14

Leaving aside for a moment the limits of theory

Adorno was acutely aware of

— Marramao 's

— which

critique of the

political economy of Adorno's critical theory is noteworthy
for what it gets wrong, what it gets right,

misses entirely.

and what it

The complaint against reification is

directed at the image of society, in both Pollock and Adorno,

as

totally integrated and dominated under state capital-

ism; what Marramao ignores is that Adorno's analysis went

well beyond Pollock's schema of a consolidation of economic
and political power to consider

— as

we'll see directly

psychological ramifications of state capitalism.
invocations of

a

— the

Adorno's

totally administered society are grounded

more upon the erosion of resistance at the individual,
libidinal level than on Pollock's early theory of
elite.

a

power

Moreover, Marramao chides Adorno for losing sight of
26

the proletariat— but it is precisely the integration of

unions and the "workers' movement" into the political-economic apparatus that most clearly illustrates Adorno

'

analysis
Still,

this doesn't exempt Adorno from the criticism

that he ignores actual production, and that whatever 'relax-

ation of the fetters'
out,

(Pollock's phrase) the elite can work

the fundamental antagonism of capitalist accumulation

is played out in the production process day after day.

could object on Adorno

'

s

One

behalf that he was not a political

economist, and that it is unreasonable to expect him to

study everything under the sun.

But the pacification of

people wounded and warped by late capitalism was one of his
central concerns; that people not only live with capitalism,
but reproduce it, cannot be adeguately explained without

attention to the site which most directly ought to provoke
resistance (and which in some ways is more amenable under
15

state capitalism to resistance)
Finally,

— the

workplace.

the most interesting thing about Marramao

'

discussion of Pollock and Adorno is that he does not examine
their historical narrative of the decisive shift from com-

petitive/liberal exchange to monopoly /state capitalism.
Adorno attaches a great deal of theoretical freight to the
notion that the market glorified by liberal theorists has
been superceded under state capitalism.

Apparently, no one

writing on Adorno has thought to ask (much less document) to
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what extent such market relations ever defined an economy,
or whether twentieth century capitalism is actually less

competitive than liberal capitalism.

I

suspect that "liber-

al capitalism" was not generally quite so liberal,

and that

state capitalism is a bit more complicated than Pollock has
it.

If such suspicions could be substantiated

— that

the

economic and political elites were never as distinct as
liberal theory would have us believe; that the state has

always been deeply involved in the economy and vice versa;
that monopolies and cartels have always been an important

part of capitalism; and that important sub-sectors of the

economy are still mediated by competitive exchange relations

— we

would have to take

a

hard look at Adorno's radical

distinction of liberal from postliberal politics.

But this

is a question to be taken up once we have a clearer notion

what those terms might describe.
A more nuanced analysis of the economy,

which would

take into account the dynamic and hybrid nature of production and distribution, and would say something meaningful

about the impact of industrialization and imperialism on
late capitalism, would have served Adorno better than the

simple schema he borrowed from Pollock.

1

The problems with Adorno's deployment of 'liberal'

capitalism go far beyond bad economic history.
of a historical

'break'

The notion

between liberal and post-liberal
28

capitalism is

a

major problem with his theorization of

contemporary capitalism; Adorno (and Horkheimer) are seduced
by the oldest political-historical
a

trope known to the West:

lament for Yesterday, the better to throw the shabby

reality of today into sharp relief.
Certainly, Adorno knows better than to set up twentieth

century capitalism as
'liberal*

a Fall

from the relatively Edenic

capitalism of the nineteenth century; the horrific

reality of capitalism's adolescent years is still fresh and
vivid enough, not only in the writings of Marx:
'

indeed,

the

satanic' mills and factories of the Industrial Revolution

are one of the most important themes in the arts and Geist-

eswissenschaften of the time.

And as we will see, at every

point where the reality of the previous economic-psychological regime is at issue, Adorno emphasizes the incomplete and

deeply compromised character of liberal capitalism's accom-

plishments

.

But a narrative of the Fall from grace is never really

interested in historical fidelity to the past; the point is

how much worse today

is

than yesterday.

Unfortunately, this

is precisely the function that the comparison between

eral'
ings.

and 'late'

capitalism usually plays in Adorno'

s

'lib-

writ-

This may seem outlandish until we establish in the

next section the crucial role this narrative plays in the

erosion of subjectivity and agency.
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The narrative of the Fall is not a momentary lapse in

Adorno's critique of capitalist modernity, unfortunately.
Like his friend Walter Benjamin (whose influence may be

legible in Adorno here more than anywhere), Adorno's writings are adamantly backward-looking.
in the following chapters,

As will become clearer

Adorno is fixated by the hypothe-

sis that a decisive historical moment of possibility was

passed, not to be recalled by any human effort.

This fixa-

tion on the cusp between an exploitative, but still somehow
vital,

capitalism and the trajectory that carried us past

the brass ring of Revolution into 'totally administered

society'
cit.

is one of the decisive fixtures of Adorno's

'defi-

1

All that aside for the moment, we should not casually

discard the basic political thrust of Adorno's appropriation
of Pollock:

that the integration and amalgamation of eco-

nomic and political elites puts the liberal "public sphere"
in serious jeopardy.

And while Pollock's forecast for the

containment of recurring economic crises has proven much too
optimistic, capital has been able to insulate itself fairly

successfully against the political aftershocks of crises.
This means,

if we are to take Adorno seriously,

17

that

the consolidation of state capitalism signals more than a

reprieve for Capital:

the death of the liberal economy

marks the obsolescence of liberal politics
30

— and

of revolu-

it's enough to make one nostalgic for Weber's iron
cage,

which at least had room for "responsibility" and "clarity."
What distinguishes Adorno
of the individual'

'

s

jeremiads against 'the end

from other critics of modern "mass soci-

ety" 19 is his attempt to theorize the economic and libidinal

roots of the "totally administered society" while avoiding

blaming the victims

— even

as he shows how subjects are bound

to domination by their own desire.

This section will show how the revolutions in economic

integration, centralization, and planning, which tend to

eliminate the mediating force of the market, are accompanied
by a loss of psychological mediation:

virtually obsolete.

the ego is made

Taken to its logical conclusion, Adorno

argues that as exchange and commodif ication colonize the

domain of the ego, the sphere of psychology is made practically inconsequential.

In the essay "Sociology and Psychology," Adorno argues

that sociological and psychological analyses deal with two

distinct spheres; no 'grand unified theory' can bring them
to the same theoretical plane.

Thus the logics of exchange

and libido cannot be read in terms of simple correspon-

dences, but must be translated from one sphere to another.

This would suggest, and in fact Adorno presents, two

distinct narratives of the end of individuality, one from
the side of the universal

(a

sociology of self-interest and
32

exchange) and one from the side of the particular (the

psychology of renunciation and repression).
narratives are linked, but not in

a way

These two

which can be repre-

sented in the spatial terms of base and superstructure;

Adorno describes the 'internal' reality of the individual as
a

'monad,'

which recapitulates the social forces which

constitute it without being reducible to them, and which
must be studied 'from the inside.'
no

'

s

20

We will take up Ador-

scandal from the 'outside' first.

The erosion of the nodal point between society and

desire

— the

ego

— grounds

Adorno

ments of modern society.

'

s

most apocalyptic assess-

If the ego is the interface be-

tween the "inside" and "outside" worlds, then it has to be

understood as

a

historical

— i.e.

perishable

— formation.

A

change in the environment of the psyche which no longer

encouraged ego formation around

a

coherent reality principle

would jeopardize the ego's ability to manage the instincts,
and conceivably dissolve the ego altogether.

A close read-

ing of Adorno demonstrates that 'the end of the individual'

springs from just such

a

change:

The shift from liberal,

competitive capitalism to state capitalism.
There are indications throughout Adorno

'

s

work that the

individual as a social project had just begun to flower
under liberal capitalism, and that this project has stalled
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indefinitely with the triumph of fascism and the "admi
tered world"

Individuation has never really been achieved.
Self-preservation in the shape of class has kept
everyone at the stage of a mere species being.... As it progressed, bourgeois society did
also develop the individual.
Against the will of
its leaders, technology has changed human beings
from children into persons.

Horkheimer and Adorno take liberal economic theory at
its word,

arguing that individuals sustained the competitive

economy by pursuing their "self-interest" in the marketplace.

Again,

an extended,

this is a topic which does not benefit from

definitive treatment by Adorno, but there is no

doubt that individuality depends for him on the development
of the market:

The individual owes his crystallization to the
forms of political economy, particularly to those
of the urban market.
Even as the opponent of the
pressure of socialization he remains the latter'
most particular product and its likeness. What
enables him to resist, the streak of independence
in him, springs from monadological individual
interest and its precipitate, character ....[ H is
decay must itself not be deduced individualistically, but from the social tendency which asserts
itself by means of individuation and not merely as
its enemy.
]

This passage evinces,

in Adorno s typically compact form,
'

the critical elements of his account of the liberal economic

and libidinal regimes.

The market fosters interest as the

modality of the liberal subject:

market relations demand

certain capacity for calculation and autonomy, and
ular kind of self-consciousness.
34

Thus,

a

a

partic-

according to Adorno,

the social action that characterizes liberal capitalism lays

the groundwork for critique,

conscience.

in the form of reason and

Finally the economic momentum of liberal capi-

talism which, as we have seen, eventually eradicates markets,

threatens to make interest, reason and individuals

obsolete at the same time.
Self-interest is effected through and bounded by equivalence.

A market presumes and enforces commensurabili ty

while liberal theory wilfully discounts the rebound of

market operations

assessment

— onto

— the

abstracting force of calculation and

human subjects, Marx's translation of

liberal self-interest into labor power expresses the fate of

individuality that Horkheimer and Adorno recount in Dialectic of Enlightenment:

Not only are qualities dissolved in thought, but
men are brought to actual conformity. The blessing that the market does not enquire after one's
birth is paid for by the barterer [der Tauschende], in that he models the potentialities that
are his by birth on the production of the commodiMen were
ties that can be bought in the market.
given their individuality as unique in each case,
different to all others, so that it might all the
more surely be made the same as any other.

Thus the opaqueness of liberal self-consciousness lies
not simply in its inability to grasp its own dependence and

embeddedness

,

that self-interest is "pursued only on the

terms laid down by society and by the means provided by

society

— hence

an interest tied to the reproduction of those

terms and means."

24

The critical point for Adorno is that
35

self-interest has little to do with the self; self-interest
is really nothing but the internalization of universal

compulsion, embracing individuals precisely on the side of
their uniformity and commensurability (concretized as labor
power):

"It is only because,

to survive,

they have to make

an alien cause their own that there arises that appearance
of reconcilement." 25

Self-interest displaces the self,

making individuals ever more commensurable as exchange value
colonizes the social totality.

The self is sacrificed to

interest (to sheer self-preservation), and particularity

surrenders to the bad universal of necessity.
This critigue of self-interest as the social mode of

renunciation is linked by Horkheimer and Adorno to the

domination of nature.

The self is founded on the suppres-

sion of non-identity within and without; it is constituted
in opposition to external and internal nature.

Self-inter-

est conflates self-preservation with freedom, and the subject is reduced to purely instrumental terms,

without an end.

to a means

Like Odysseus, we must continually deny

ourselves to save ourselves.
One striking thing about this account of subjectivity
and the market is the way in which Horkheimer and Adorno

'

own language brings gender to the fore, while their analysis
is barely cognizant of the most conspicuous

linking subjectivity to gender.

implication of

The Hegelian link between

autonomy and civil society, which Adorno and Horkheimer
36

appear to endorse, carries some heavy baggage for women.

Women are denied— explicitly by Hegel, and implicitly in

Horkheimer and Adorno

'

s

analysis

— even

the rudimentary and

crippled individuality promised by liberal market society to
the extent that they are sequestered in the family.

There are passages in Adorno

'

s

work that demonstrate

some awareness of 'the woman question' and patriarchal

oppression,

26

but these themes are not elevated to the

prominence Adorno
return to Adorno

'

'

s

s

own work seems to demand. 27

We will

treatment of gender when we examine the

psychoanalytic side of individuation, and the interplay
between gender, authority and intersub jectivity

If self-interest operated on the basis of an impover-

ished instrumental rationality, at least it allowed (or

required) some thought

— the

conscious side of the ego is

nurtured to the extent that liberal capitalism still requires calculation and appraisal.

So while the "Culture

Industry" essay emphasizes the fragility and pain of indi-

viduation
However, every advance in individuation of this
kind took place at the expense of the individuality in whose name it occurred, so that nothing was
left but the resolve to pursue one's own particuThe bourgeois whose existence is
lar purpose.
split into a business and a private life... at odds
with himself and everybody else, is already virtu28
ally a Nazi ....
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The rudimentary individuality fostered by liberal capitalism
was still no small accomplishment.

Horkheimer and Adorno

emphasize later in the same book that this compromised and

antagonistic individuality fostered

a

kind of moral and

intellectual autonomy which is endangered under state capitalism

:

[T]he conscience consisted in the devotion of the
ego to the outside world, in the ability to take
into account the true interests of others .... When
the big industrial interests incessantly eliminate
the economic basis for moral decision ... reflective
thought must die out.
The soul, as the possibility of self-comprehending guilt, is destroyed. 29
In their respect for the spiritual and cultural accom-

plishments of bourgeois Europe and emphasis on what was lost
in the transition to industrial modernity,

som of the narrative of the Fall

I

we see the blos-

criticized above.

Adorno

and Horkheimer adopt here one of the favorite themes of the

great German critics of modernity from the generation before
them (Tonnies, Simmel, and Weber,

to name three),

who saw in

the triumph of industrial capitalism the dehumanization and

calcification of human relations.

Like these writers,

Adorno and Horkheimer could mourn the passing of bourgeois
society because what they saw replacing it threatened to

destroy the limited but real gains of liberal capitalism.
The liberal regime organized around the judgments and actions of individuals in civil society involved a measure of
freedom,

albeit one which was entwined with a capitalist

economy, and ultimately "a mockery of true freedom, an
38

expression of the contingency of every individual's social
fate." 30
The entrepreneurial subject, wedded to self-interest

and bound up in the dialectic of enlightenment, falls far

short of a subjectivity that would do justice to itself and
to objectivity,

nostalgia.

and in itself would hardly merit pangs of

The new libidinal (and ethical and political)

regime heralded by the eclipse of the liberal economic
regime, however, threatens to efface not just the virtues

proper to competitive liberal capitalism, but individuality
itself
Eventually, Adorno argues, the role allotted individual

decision-making no longer serves the reproduction and accumulation of capital.

The eruption of fascism,

far from an

inexplicable lapse into barbarism, merely revealed what late

capitalism had in store for even this fragile and faulty
liberty:

The individual has become an obstacle to
.Economic rationality. .is
production.
incessantly converting the last units of
the economy, firms and men alike.... In
the era of great business enterprises
and world wars the mediation of the
social process through innumerable monThe subjects of
ads proves retrograde.
the economy are psychologically expropriated, and the economy is more rationally operated by society itself.
.

.

.

The modality of the liberal subject

— interest — turns

out to be a fetter under the monopolistic conditions of late

capitalism.

State capitalism makes the ego

thought and individuality per se
39

— obsolete.

— and

with it

Ultimately the central question in Horkheimer and

Adorno's analysis of fascism— how (in Adorno

'

s

words) "the

children of a liberal, competitive and individualistic
society" could be enlisted in a movement which "flagrantly

contradict [s

]

their own rational level and the present stage

of enlightened civilization" on behalf of "aims largely

incompatible with their own rational self-interest 1,32
turns out to be a trick question.
in a "liberal,

— thus

We are no longer living

competitive, and individualistic" society;

the fact that "the members of contemporary masses are at

least prima facie individuals" belies the structural trans-

formation of the economy and its psychological repercussions

.

It was to trace those repercussions that Critical

Theory turned to psychoanalysis.

If the "external" narra-

tive of the end of the individual reveals a society in which

individuality is increasingly obsolete
'real'

—a

world in which

individuals would simply be out of place

nal" narrative is meant to show that,

lete model,

— the

"inter-

like any other obso-

individuals can be discontinued.

The same

structural changes in the economy that threaten to collapse
the division between civil society and the state were seen
by Critical Theory to radically undermine the mediating role
of the ego

— which

in turn threatens individuality at its

roots and paves the way for the "totally administered society."
40

The calamity of fascism, along with what one might call
the historical refutation of the Lukacsian model of class

consciousness, lent

a new

urgency to the attempt to wed the

insights of psychoanalysis to

critical theory of society.

a

As various members of the Frankfurt School recognized,

Freud's psychic geography and geology could be indispensable
for elaborating the relation of economics to politics.
is because Freud gave Horkheimer,

Adorno

— keys

Marcuse, and Fromm

This

— and

which might unlock the black box of the indi-

vidual psyche, the interface between base and superstructure.

Most importantly, Freud's work gave Adorno and the

other critical theorists
an 'internal'

a way

as well as an

to articulate domination as

'external'

phenomenon

— to

ex-

plain how individuals are not merely passively subordinated,
but actively engaged in their own domination

— without

re-

course to simplistic accusations of "false consciousness."

Adorno 's use of psychoanalytic concepts has received
more attention than his appropriation of economics, but not

much more.

Martin Jay, in

a

chapter entitled "The Fractured

Totality: Society and the Psyche," offers only

pages on Adorno

'

s

33
appropriation of Freud.

similarly devotes about
the Individual.'

34

a

a

handful of

Gillian Rose

dozen paragraphs to 'The Theory of

No one has really successfully taken up

an exhaustive account of Adorno
sis.

41

'

s

deployment of psychoanaly-

Admittedly, Adorno does not make this easy.

His treat-

ment of Freud is unfortunately similar to his appropriation
of Marx:

too often he takes up theses or concepts from

their work without any considerable attention to how they
fit into the larger conceptual apparatuses of their authors.

This is not generally acknowledged in the most important secondary literature.

Gillian Rose, for instance,

claims that Adorno defended

a

"strong, orthodox interpreta-

tion" of Freud, on the basis of his critigues of Talcott

Parsons, Karen Horney, and Freud's own later works.
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It is

true that Adorno sought to ward off any attempt to develop

correlations between psyche and society that substituted
sociologized psychoanalysis (or
gy)

a

'psychoanalytic'

a

sociolo-

for the fundamental "clash of psychic forces," viz.,

the conflict between id and ego."

However, while Adorno

deploys several elements of Freudian theory prominently in
his discussions of declining individuality,

attribute to him

a

it is hard to

"strong, orthodox" appropriation of

psychoanalysis when he never mentions the Oedipus complex
(nor associated concepts like fear of castration),

and

exhibits little interest in the early years of childhood,
37
which to Freud were decisive for all that follows.

The appearance of Freudian terminology in Adorno

'

discussions of consciousness, desire, nature, etc., always
operates within a broader framework in which orthodox psy42

choanalytic theory is not the central focus.

Thus the

account of "projection" in Dialectic of Enlightenment 38 is
part of the constellation Horkheimer and Adorno develop

between nature, mimesis, and subjectivity, and the critique
of the superego is woven into a discussion of Kant,
-

freedom,

and conscience. 39
.

Adorno'

s

hybrid of Marx and Freud, then, aimed at

playing selected insights from each against each other, not
at a total synthesis of the two revolutionary thinkers.

I

would suggest that Freud's work had several attractions for
Adorno, which moved him to draw on Freudian concepts without

embracing psychoanalysis in all its arcana.
Like Marx, Freud developed a theory aimed at a world

defined by antagonisms and contradictions; Freud's refusal
to posit any ultimate harmony or relaxation of these contra-

dictions was perhaps the most attractive aspect of his work:

The greatness of Freud consists, like all radical
bourgeois thinkers, in letting such contradictions
remain unresolved and disdaining to pretend a
systematic harmony when the subject itself is
40
torn

The Freudian turn hinges on the psyche as
text,

a

social

open to subtle and suitably devious interpretation.

Adorno turned to psychoanalytic concepts to read the individual as the intersection of consciousness and the conditions of production

— concepts

which might illuminate the

success of fascism as well as the evaporation of opposition
43

under state capitalism.

This gave Adorno a way to discuss

the psychological ramifications of social and economic

dynamics which could avoid the base/superstructure problems

which plagued orthodox Marxism.
In addition,

Freud's emphasis on the unconscious, and

on the central role of sexual drives in mental life, prom-

ised a radical break with the Cartesian model of subjectivity,

which posits

a

disembodied rational faculty looking down

upon mere objectivity. 41

At the same time,

Freudian theory

allows Adorno, as Gillian Rose has noted, 42 to shift attention from a theory of alienation (from some putative spe-

cies-being) to individuation as a process
is difficult and uncertain,

and even sabotage.

—a

process which

and vulnerable to interference

Freud displaces the self-sufficient,

God-given subject of liberal theory with an emphasis on
subjectivity as an achievement, an achievement moreover
which is not transparent to consciousness, and is still
riven by the antagonisms between nature, desire and con-

sciousness

.

Finally,

it also gave Adorno a way to approach suffer-

ing and renunciation which did not coat them in the syrup of

'necessary evil.'

While Freud does, especially in Civiliza-

tion and Its Discontents

,

practically justify them in terms

of social and cultural accomplishments,
the reality of pain and sacrifice,

he never diminishes

nor does he posit

a

happily-ever-after in which these things will be transfig44

ured or beatified.

Moreover, psychoanalytic theory gave

Adorno a language which could make socially- and self-inflicted suffering and renunciation legible.

The crux of Adorno

1

s

"internal" analysis of the erosion

of subjectivity is the subversion of the mediating force of

the ego.

Under the libidinal regime proper to liberal

capitalism, social imperatives are translated onto the

psychological dynamic through the ego, which internalizes
social standards of necessity and propriety. 43

This sub-

contracting of domination is replaced under state capitalism
by a more direct regime of conformity,

which hinges on an

end-run around the ego in which regressive traits of the id
are enlisted directly on behalf of domination.

For Adorno, as for Freud, successful individuation

hinges on the ego, which constrains and transmutes the

polymorphous anarchy of desire to conform to the prevailing
reality principle.

In one of the few attempts to develop a

sustained critical commentary on Adorno

'

s

appropriation of

Freud, Jessica Benjamin has argued that Adorno tied individ-

uation to the internalization of authority.

According to

Benjamin, Adorno assumes a process of ego formation tied to
the Oedipus complex,

subject

— the

thority:

ego

— is

in which the internal authority of the

modelled on the nearest external au-

the father.

45

Benjamin's otherwise very fine work is hampered by

presuming Adorno relies on an Oedipal model of the ego, and
by loosely associating Adorno with Horkheimer's ambitious
(but deeply flawed)

theory of the family. 45

While Horkheim-

er developed his account of the family in the period when he

was collaborating most intensely with Adorno, and one can

find occasional references 46 in Adorno that suggest some

sympathy for Horkheimer's theory, the family simply does not
figure that prominently in Adorno.

Adorno generally focus-

ses more attention on the ways in which the mediating force
of the contemporary family is weakened by the larger (eco-

nomic and cultural) environment.
In this respect,

Adorno arguably pushes women farther

toward the margins of analysis than either Freud or Horkheimer.

At least in the work of the latter two men,

the

role women are assigned and the essentialist assumptions

each makes about gender are relatively out in the open for

criticism.

And while Horkheimer and Freud may be easy to

ridicule for their visions of women and motherhood, their
analyses of gender and authority are attempts to grapple
with a critical aspect of domination

Adorno simply undertheor ized

— patriarchy — that

Freud and Horkheimer carica-

.

— pre-eminent
non-identity — gender

ture gender relations, but in Adorno

anti-

essentialist and champion of

too often

simply doesn't register.

46

While it is not implausible to connect the leitmotif
of
erosion of individuality with a transition from internalized

authority to sheer conformity, Benjamin does not substantiate that connection; nor does she offer a citation from

Adorno's own work which directly links individuation with
internalization.
in this regard,

There are a few passages one might look to

47

but it is not the Oedipal father figure,

but generalized "social coercion" that is the focus of

Adorno's discussions of internalization.

While this rela-

tion to external authority is important, particularly for
the ethical and political dimensions of the eclipse of the

liberal regime,

internalization does not play the constitu-

tive role Benjamin attributes to it.

Benjamin nonetheless does establish the two central
moments of Adorno's psychology:

that resistance and domina-

tion are both tied to the ego, and that the mediation of

domination through the ego is replaced by a regime of sheer
conformity, under which both resistance and thought atrophy.

What the liberal economy made possible, according to

Horkheimer and Adorno, was an environment in which the ego
could subdue the explosive,

insatiable id on behalf of

limited but reliable gratification in an environment defined
by scarcity.

48

In a passage which suggests individuation is

founded not on internalization, but on its virtual opposite,

"projection," it is the demands of this environment, not the
47

Oedipal conflict, which account for the decisive characteristics of the liberal subject:
By learning to distinguish between his own and
extraneous thoughts and feelings under the force
of economic necessity, a distinction is made between without and within, the possibility of distancing and identifying, self-awareness and the

conscience

The ego serves as a principle of organization which
faces both inward and outward: not only "mastering" desire
on behalf of reliable,

long-term gratification, but also

"testing" reality, honing its cognitive grasp of the world
on behalf of the reality principle's regime of gratification.

50

This cognitive side of the ego, which Adorno and

Horkheimer seem to presume is the instinctual foothold for
resistance to domination, is strengthened by the agency the
market requires of individuals, the capacity for calculating
and assaying.
The ego faces potential threats then on two fronts:
from the "inside," in its own contradictory and opaque

relation to the id, and from the outside, in changes in the

environment of the subject which undermine the ego's capacity for judgement and agency.

Adorno deftly shows that the boundary Freud meant to
define with the distinction between id and ego cannot hold,

because of the irrationality of renunciation under prevailing conditions:

The ego is supposed to be both, qua consciousness,
the opposite of repression, and qua unconscious48

ness, the repressive agency itself.... To be able
to assert itself in reality, the ego has to understand reality and operate consciously.
But to
enable the individual to effect the often senseless renunciations imposed on him, the ego has to
set up unconscious prohibitions and to remain
largely confined to the unconscious .... The ego's
cognitive activity, performed in the interests of
self-preservation, has to be constantly reversed,
and self-awareness foregone, in the interests of

self-preservation

Thus the ego's "mastery" of desire is founded on renun-

ciations and restraints that are opague to the self, and it
is "constantly taxed beyond its own powers" and vulnerable

to falling back into the unconscious as ego-libido.

52

The "external" threat to the ego comes from what we

have already examined as the advent of state capitalism.

It

is not immediately apparent that state capitalism eliminates

the need for calculation and judgement that Adorno and

Horkheimer link to the market under liberal capitalism,
since post-liberal capitalism retains at least the appearance of markets.

Adorno argues, however, that

a

kind of

domestication of the economy takes place under state capitalism which radically pre-structures economic life so that
the sphere for individual judgement and decision-making

which had nourished the ego contracts until:
In a highly socialized and rationalized society
most situations in which decisions are made are
pre-determined and the rationality of the individual ego is restricted to choosing between minIt is invariably a question of no
ute options.
more than minimal alternatives ... and 'realism'
amounts to being good at making this kind of deci53
sion
,

.

49

Thus one of the central themes of "Sociology and
Psychology"
is the diminution of the domain of psychology
in the face of

objective social imperatives, until the self becomes at
best
a wildlife preserve of idiosyncracy and
irrationality, and
at worst "no more than an interference and is repeatedly

being overruled by the far more powerful imperatives of the
rational faculty, the embodiment of objective social processes

,

,
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If the total economy governs behavior,

to content itself with misbehavior.

psychology has

Taken to its logical

conclusion
The subject is separated into the inner continuation of the machinery of social reproduction and
an undissolved remainder which, as a mere preserve
powerless in the face of the wildly expansionist
'rational' component, degenerates into a mere
curiosity

The ego, which under liberal capitalism seemed to represent
to Adorno a node of rationality (albeit one-sided and bound

up with the dialectic of enlightenment) not reducible to
'the machinery of social reproduction,'

finds itself under

state capitalism facing an unholy alliance between this

machinery and the id:
total, standardizing society arrests all
differentiation, and to this end it exploits the
primitive core of the unconscious. Both conspire
to annihilate the mediating ego; the triumphant
archaic impulses, the victory of id over ego,
harmonize with the triumph of society over the
individual
A brutal,

50

Benjamin has drawn attention to the critical theorists'
acceptance of the Freudian view of the id as inherently and
incorrigibly antisocial and, if left to its own devices,
destructive.

While this is complicated by the fact that the

ego is itself in some sense a "quantum" of libido,

Benjamin's criticism is
the ways Adorno

'

a

think

valid one, and indicates one of

(and Horkheimer s

s

I

'

is insufficiently critical:

)

appropriation of Freud

by following the traditional

interpretation of desire as inherently destructive and
selfish

— something

which must be "tamed" and "socialized"

Adorno and Horkheimer validate the longstanding defamation
of gratification as private and infantile.

While Freud's

naturalization of desire did disrupt and scandalize the
Christian discourse of sin and carnality, his own depiction
of desire, which Adorno did not challenge in any significant

respect, reinforces the discourse of renunciation and disci-

pline which warns us away from gratification with epithets
like "barbarism" and "immaturity."

Discontents

,

In Civilization and Its

we receive this message in the starkest and

simplest terms:

civilization is renunciation; gratification

belongs to infants and savages, and we ought to grow up and
get with the program.

Adorno in some isolated passages offers hints that this
slander of gratification is itself part of the spell.

He

even implies that pleasure is the standard of rationality

51

and an essential part of liberation, arguing that Freud,

in

his "revulsion for pleasure and paradise,"

rejects the end... which alone could prove the
means, reason, to be reasonable:
pleasure.
Once
this has been disparagingly consigned to the repertoire of tricks for preserving the species, and
so itself exposed as a cunning form of reason,
without consideration of that moment in pleasure
which transcends subservience to nature, ratio is
degraded to rationalization. Truth is abandoned
to relativity and people to power.
He alone who
could situate utopia in blind somatic pleasure,
which, satisfying the ultimate intention, is
intentionless has a stable and valid idea of
7
truth.
,

But these testimonials to sensuality and gratification

— what

Martin Jay calls "the hedonistic impulse in Critical
Theory" 58

— are

in fact part of the culture of denial:

the

pleasure Adorno praises in these instances is very clearly

situated in the "beyond," in
by exchange.

a

world "no longer" dominated

Gratification is set utterly off limits to us

here and now, since there can be no gratification that is
"In a false

not complicit and perverted by the totality:

world all hedone is false."

59

Adorno sees pleasure in terms of
cy,

a loss of distance,

a

lapse into immedia-

and of sense-of-self

;

the Christian

opposition of flesh and spirit is revived within the Marxian
horizon of salvation.

Pleasure in this world always amounts

to a premature reconciliation with the world,
to unity with the bad totality.

joins with the Church,

60

a

In bhis respect Adorno

the State and the Boss,

Marxists, and admonishes us to get back to work
52

capitulation

and with most

— even

as he

demonstrates with unrelenting clarity the wounds we inflict
on ourselves and on the world through discipline and denial.

Even the aesthetic, which plays a critical role in Adorno

precisely because it eludes (partially) the demands of

productivity and utility, has more to do with work than with
pleasure

61

The status of pleasure goes to the heart of Adorno'

"political deficit."

In some ways,

Adorno is at his most

"radical" and "Marxist" in his refusal to endorse anything
less than the total transformation of society, even as his

own work seems to deny the likelihood of such a transformation.

Any half-measures, any compromises are necessarily

complicit with the world as it is, and the unswerving critic
will refuse any measure that falls short of the whole.

Nothing falls farther short of the whole than short-term
gratification.

If pleasure is always a lapse into

(false)

reconciliation, then desire can never be subversive, because
it wants to be bought off.

Adorno

'

s

suspicion of gratifica-

tion runs parallel with Marcuse's analysis of "repressive

desublimation

,

"

in which a certain amount of socially sanc-

tioned and channelled gratification strengthens the overall

regime of renunciation.

If gratification is equated with a

relaxation of vigilance,

a

f orgetf ulness

of purpose and ego,

then Adorno will always side in spite of his "hedonistic

impulse" with Odysseus against the Sirens, the Lotus Eaters,
and Circe.
53

However,

there is another side to the problem.

As long

as society continues to enforce renunciations which cannot

be rationally justified,

back'

but must be effected 'behind the

of subjects, desire retains an explosive potential.

The scope of repression, almost by definition,

is much more

socially significant than repressive desublimation

.

We will

take this up in the next chapter as it arises in Adorno's

work

— under

sumers'

the heading of "spite"

— in

the context of con-

response to the culture industry.

It is not hard to see how Adorno came by his reputation

as a pessimistic,

sche,

even defeatist social critic; like Nietz-

he seems to have set himself up intentionally for

ridicule and misinterpretation with breathtakingly broad and

unconditional aphorisms.
But we have yet to describe what might be the grimmest

side of Adorno's work.

If the economy has made individual

reckoning and planning obsolete, and "the appropriation of
mass psychology by the oppressors" has replaced the dialectical processes described by psychoanalysis with a mode of

heteronomy that makes "false consciousness" look almost
guaint,

the role of critical thought

— even

thrown into the most serious jeopardy.

its existence

Worse yet, it ap-

pears that reason has played a central role in its own

extinction

54

— is

£L

Reason:

The Obsolescence of Ideology

The obsolescence of thought parallels the obsolescence
of the subject.

There is an "internal" account of the

decline of thought, taken sub specie individuationis
of which is anticipated in what we've already seen.
is also an "external" account,

,

much
There

which culminates in Adorno

'

argument that the time of Ideologiekritik has passed, that
state capitalism has outgrown the legitimating narratives of

bourgeois ideology.
As we have seen,

Adorno argues that state capitalism

simply takes over the planning and reckoning functions that

were once left to the individual.

It seems a stretch to

argue from an atrophy of economic calculation to the abolition of rationality and thought per se
the state capitalism thesis
no

— is

— at

But the point of

.

least in the hands of Ador-

that the economic model of

(

trans action colonizes
)

every realm of contemporary society; exchange penetrates
even the spheres apparently most distant from economic life.

The "totally administered society" is meant to describe
a

situation in which industrial capitalism reaches in prin-

ciple across the entire horizon of human activity.

Whether

spontaneity or thought are possible any longer is not the
critical question in Adorno'

s

work:

his argument is that

The obsolescence of the ego

they have been made obsolete.

signifies the ultimate extension of this
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— the

social ratio

operates through and in spite of individuals, not at their
behest
The rationality operative in individual behavior
is, in fact, far from being lucidly self-aware;
it
is largely the blind product of heteronomous forces ...

.

The economic sphere embodies a kind of rationality that

opens the way to jettisoning the heavy baggage of subjectivity,

insofar as that is possible:
The truly contemporary types are those whose actions are motivated neither by an ego, nor,
strictly speaking, unconsciously, but mirror objective trends like an automaton.
Together they
enact a senseless ritual to the beat of a compul63
sively repetitive rhythm.
.

.

,

In this context thinking becomes dysfunctional

than one

(in more ways

)

Once thinking becomes subjectively obsolete, its objective function decays as well.

In Adorno s closest approach
'

to the domain of political theory,

he argues that state

capitalism no longer needs to rely on the ideals and putatively universal values with which liberal capitalism always
met criticism.

While ideology in

a

kind of local sense has

some continuing relevance (as we'll explore further in the
next chapter (in delineating
to the culture industry),

account of itself,

a

"politics industry" parallel

in the larger sense of society's

it has been discontinued along with the

thought that would ask for such an account.
56

The legitimat-

ing function ascribed to ideology on the classical model no

longer depends upon the rickety and always problematic

scaffolding of bourgeois ideology, which, if it persists at
all,

only does so because no one has bothered to tear it

down yet.
This,

it goes without saying,

is not "progess."

Ador-

no's provocative thesis (which has not been given the atten-

tion it deserves in the secondary literature) is that the

gap between bourgeois ideals and bourgeois reality, from

which social and political theory drew better than two

hundred years of nourishment, has been abolished:

not by

realizing those ideals, but by allowing them to expire.
Adorno's account of the end of ideology hinges on the
ability of the status quo to masquerade as reality tout
court.

In terms which acquire a new resonance with the

expiration of Communism, Adorno argues that the legitimating
function once played by bourgeois ideals is displaced by the

self-evidenct character of

a

totality pervasive enough to be

invisible, which obviates any questions about the justice or

propriety of the whole:

Unfreedom is consummated in
that tolerates no "outside"
might be broken. The world
only ideology, and mankind,

its invisible totality
any more from which it
as it is becomes the
its component.

This is what makes positivism tantamount to fascism in

Adorno's eyes:

positivism is nothing more or less than

a

prohibition on alternatives, an injunction to content one57

self with the world as it seems to be.

Adorno

's

ire,

in fact,

Positivism draws

because it converges with the larger

social tendency to displace old fashioned ideology

— because

it threatens to transmogrify from a particular school of

modern philosophy into modern common sense.
The end of ideology goes hand-in-hand with the extinction of the entrepreneurial subject which Adorno and Hork-

heimer associate with the liberal economy and, necessarily,
the subject of the liberal polity.

While Adorno never carried through the parallel, the
individual is not only the psychological equivalent of the
corner store, but of the self-legislating citizen.

The

erosion of individuality can be seen as the merger of two
senses of "the private":

the "private" sector of production

has thoroughly colonized the internal,

personality.

"private" side of

If the liberal economy cultivated a mode of

individuality that threw the subject back upon his own
resources,

it also nourished a sense of individual ends

which were not reducible to those of the Church or the
State.
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What one might see as the greatest political accom-

plishment of liberalism
politics,

— the

containment and redefiniton of

such that the human ends of individuals were

insulated (to some extent) from the public sphere which was
now said to serve them (at the same time it served the ends
of the collective in the form of the state)
58

— thus

collapses

under the success of the liberal economy and its demonic

offspring, state capitalism.

Adorno's narrative of the eclipse of competitive capitalism strongly implies not only the displacement of a

subject with some capacity for political life by one which
is merely subject to the demands of the system,

contraction of the public sphere.

but also the

It is clear enough that

the erosion of mediation Adorno describes in both the eco-

nomic and psychological realms shatters the liberal model of

politics and citizenship.
The one thinker more than any other who stands at the

cusp of this disaster is Max Weber.

Weber, as several

commentators have noted, 66 tries to save the best intentions
of liberal political theory for a decidedly post-liberal

society.

The fundamental political insight of Weberian

political thought is one side of precisely the erosion of
politics becomes virtual-

agency that Adorno rails against:

ly a branch of mathematics with the reduction of individuals
in modern democracies to the empty identity of the fran-

chise.

In modern nation-states,

driven by rationalization toward

which Weber believed were
a

more or less universal

franchise, electoral politics becomes essentially
of administered demagogery:

a

question

modern political parties devel-

op out of the imperatives of electoral victory in mass

democracies:

the efficient corralling of votes.
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While Weber would not have endorsed Adorno's dire

pronouncements on the end of individuality, his narrative of

rationalization and bureaucratization implies

a

diminution

of the sphere of individual agency with strong echoes in

Adorno's work.

Once the manipulation of political life

becomes an industry, the scope for political action and

discourse that would interest Adorno disappears.
the liberal political project

— namely

Moreover,

the mediation of

individual will and collective policy, of legitimation and

consent

— also

becomes utterly obsolete once the individual

which liberalism always took for granted falls under the
same strictures of mass production as Fords and Frigidaires.
A forced reconciliation with the collective has become
a

standard feature, and whatever real tension persists

between the individual and society (which liberal theory and

practice was founded upon) is contained on all sides by
various subsidiaries of the politics industry.

Obviously state capitalism as second nature can only
present itself as first nature to the extent that it can

occupy the entire social horizon:

that is,

to the extent

that it can render resistance and dissent invisible.

other words,

In

the seamlessness of the whole depends upon the

failure of (among other things) Marxism.
This is a failure Adorno takes for granted, and however

much his work looks forward to a resuscitation of praxis, it
60

is

virtually certain it will not resemble the Lukacsian

proletariat's.

More than anything else, the debate over

Adorno's Marxism/non-Marxism has been fueled by the lack
of
an extended,

explicit treatment of the historical failure of

revolution.

If there is an autopsy of the revolutionary

moment in Adorno, it is not in the notorious first paragraph
of Negative Dialectics, but in the fiber of Adorno's work
all the way through Aesthetic Theory.

Typically, Adorno

offers not a theory of revolution, but

a

of non-revolution

—a

disguieting theory

negative "Reification and the Con-

sciousness of the Proletariat."
The major theorists of communist revolution,
Lenin,

Lukacs,

including

and Luxemburg, presume a link between the

proletariat's collective experience of exploitation and
alienation, and its understanding.

The proletariat has a

kind of privileged cognitive "standpoint" (one that it pays
for dearly) by virtue of its position in production, and in

Lukacs particularly,

68

it can come to a clearer and deeper

understanding of capitalist society than the bourgeoisie
because it has an essential interest not in reproducing, but
in overturning the prevailing relations of production.

In

effect, most Marxists see the proletariat as in some sense

"outside" bourgeois society (or at least with one foot in
and one foot out),

and connect its cognitive privilege to

this "outsider" status.
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Whether it constitutes itself in opposition to capitalist exploitation and oppression,

times,

as Marx suggests at

or,

comes to realize the potential for new relations of

production through its experience in an increasingly socialized process of production,

the proletariat must also come

to recognize itself as a class if it is to make anything of

this cognitive privilege.

Adorno's work, which is largely conceived as an effort
to account for the "miscarriage" of "the attempt to change

the world," can not be read as a simple revision of revolu-

tionary Marxist theory.

His is not an account of the fail-

ures of particular proletarian movements in the West:
an autopsy of the revolutionary subject.

it

is

In the course of a

tenacious sociological and philosophical genealogy of fascism,

the Frankfurt School,

and Adorno above all, problem-

atized most of the basic assumptions of revolutionary Marxist theory.

His adoption of Pollock's economic analysis of monopoly,

which severs the revolutionary whiplash some Marxists

expected from economic crises,
icant of his heresies.

is probably the least signif-

More importantly, his work shows

that the proletariat is no longer (if it ever was) "outside'

capitalist society; that consciousness per se, much less
class consciousness,

is far from a given;

"liberation" is itself by no means
lematic concept.
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a

and finally,

that

transparent or unprob-

This,

a

radical questioning of the prerequisites and

meaning of "revolution," is what establishes Adorno as a
social theorist who cannot be ignored.

establish him as such.

Or rather,

ought to

If Adorno has gone virtually unno-

ticed by political theory, at least in the United States,
one can attribute this to more than his intentionally de-

manding and difficult presentation; 59

three distinct as-

pects of the "political deficit" that has been associated

with him help to account for the obstacles his work has

encountered in American political discourse.
First of all, a significant part of Adorno'

s

"political

deficit" is owed to his critics, whose analyses sometimes
fall far short of the thoroughness and nuance required.

By

far the most common fault is to take some part for the whole
of Adorno' s thought;

most notoriously to read "The Culture

Industry" without Aesthetic Theory, or even without the rest
of Dialectic of Enlightenment

would like to credit with

a

But even writers whom one

.

more complete acquaintance,

Habermas above all, have proven capable of astounding feats
of misinterpretation.

However,
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the "political deficit" is not entirely a

figment of the imaginations of unsympathetic critics; in
some important respects, Adorno

'

its own theoretical aspirations.

s

work does not live up to

Critics are not completely

off the mark to demand of him more properly political analy-

63

sis than he delivers.

Gillian Rose once again offers the

most astute summary:
Yet Adorno's emphasis on the formation and deformation of the individual did replace any further
definition of the macro-factor, the form of domination.
He might at least have detailed the mechanism by which power has become diffuse but omnipotent, and how that change is related to change in
the organization of production.
Ideology, domination, and reification are simply eguated with each
other, and the individual is not satisfactorily
reinserted into the socio-political context. 71

It is important

to note that the demands Rose makes

upon Adorno are meant as an immanent critique:

the thrust

of Adorno's own analysis seems to require an explicit and

nuanced articulation of power, ideology, and resistance.
the extent that Rose's critique is on the mark,

To

it is hard

to claim Adorno as a "political theorist."

One of the obstacles to a clear explication of all this
is the deep ambiguity of the word

'politics.'

No doubt one

of the things that complicates a discussion of "Adorno's

politics" is the discursive explosion of the meanings of
'politics'

since the 1960s.

In some senses,

critical

theory's focus on culture and psychoanalytic concerns anticipated this (and made some of their works 'required reading'
then

)

Adorno's work is manifestly "political" without having
the slightest interest in the strategic topics that animate

liberal or Marxist political thought.
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His work is invalu-

able for showing the political charge that runs through all

philosophy; like Nietzsche, Adorno draws our attention to
the exclusion and suppression involved in every conceptual-

ization,

the no-saying and yes-saying that cannot be disen-

tangled from thinking.
And this is precisely where the controversy over his
'political deficit' crops up:

how might a politics that

caters to nonidentity be linked to more mundane political

concerns like improving the living conditions of women and
men?

As we will see,

Adorno himself shows how the blindness

of thought to its own domination of nature (including its

own nature) is deeply intertwined with class domination and
the institution of property.
In this sense,

Adorno and his colleagues were blind-

sided by the eruptions that punctured the ostensibly pacified and harmonious regimes of the Cold War.

Any attempt to

embrace Adorno for New Left projects had to stumble over the
ways in which 'politics'

in his work seems to be stripped of

its sociological side and made into a kind of physical

medium beyond the intervention of those it envelopes.

His

analysis of late capitalist society seems to systematically
deny any meaningful 'political' action; there are no subjects that appear capable of politics,

and no political

space in which any such subjects could pursue an end to

domination
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One could argue that Adorno

'

s

not-inconsiderable accom-

plishment was precisely to destabilize and problematize the
project of political theory.

Indeed,

the reason

smuggled

I

the rather looser term "social theorist" into a paragraph

above was to account for figures like Marx, Nietzsche, and
Freud, who are clearly not doing "political theory" in the

sense we ascribe to thinkers like Machiavelli
Hegel.

,

Rousseau, and

In trying to bring the legacy of these not-politi-

cal-theorists to bear on late capitalist society, Adorno
implicitly demonstrates that our political concepts, most of

which were brought to maturity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, are made deeply suspect by the reality of
the twentieth century.
his,

In this respect,

Adorno foregrounds

and our, political "deficit" in a way which has much

more to tell us than the work of political theorists like
Rawls and Nozick.
This is not least because much contemporary political

theory is still wedded to assumptions about subjectivity
that Adorno believes are no longer sustainable.
full context, Adorno'

s

Seen in its

work deeply problemat izes not only

contemporary political theory, but contemporary politics.

72

At this point however, we have only half the story of

the suffocation of politics.

In the next chapter,

I

turn to

Adorno 's account of the culture industry, and of the provocative notion that politics has withdrawn into aesthetics.
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CHAPTER II

AESTHETIC THEORY AND PRAXIS

Adorno saw the collapse of revolutionary praxis in both
East and West in the formative years of his career as a

missed opportunity which could not be willed to return.
That he did not see any credible challenge to capitalism
"after the attempt to change the world miscarried" should
not mislead one to the conclusion that Adorno had given up

hope for practical intervention.

pessimistic

— or

realistic

— about

It is true that he was

the prospects for any

serious threat to the encompassing systems of domination in
the foreseeable future.

This notion of a (temporary) inca-

pacitation of practical struggle is the ground of Adorno

'

claim that praxis has taken refuge in aesthetics:
The feigning of a true politics here and now, the
freezing of historical relations which nowhere
seem ready to melt, oblige the mind to go where it
need not degrade itself ....[ I t is to works of art
that has fallen the burden of wordlessly asserting
what is barred to politics .... [P]olitics has migrated into autonomous art, and nowhere more so
than where it seems to be politically dead.
]

The riddle of the migration of politics is one of the

major themes of Adorno

1

s

monumental attempt, in Aesthetic

Theory and elsewhere, to do justice to the complex dialectic
of art and society.

That Adorno chose to devote himself to

this project with such intensity in the last years of his
73

life has sometimes been seen as an indicator of his 'poli-

tical deficit'

— as

a "strategic

withdrawal into aesthet-

But Aesthetic Theory is not a retreat or withdrawal;

ics."

according to Adorno, the project of social transformation
has been driven into the realm of autonomous art.
Any account of that exodus also has to grapple with the

dialectical poor relation of autonomous art:

Adorno

industry."

culture

—a

'

s

the "culture

critique of mass-produced 'popular'

critique which is more subtle and meticulous

than a glance at the polemical essay in Dialectic of En-

lightenment suggests

— mirrors

at every important point his

analysis of autonomous art; the two spheres must be understood together.
The relevance of Adorno

'

s

work for contemporary Ameri-

can politics is clearest in his account of the culture
industry, which in its emphasis on the predominance of mass-

produced culture and on the lapse of opposition is aimed
squarely at the United States as the epitome of Western

democracy

Adorno does not offer much to substantiate his argument
that politics

— in

the broader sense of the vital struggles

over the power relations that structure society— has with-

drawn into the crevices of society.

It seems to me that

be
Adorno takes the dormancy of anti-capitalist praxis to

obvious.

the
Two historical developments are critical here:
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manifest failures of the Soviet experiment, and the disaffection of the working classes in the West with revolutionary parties

— most

dramatically the swing of German workers

from socialism to Nazism.

What these dismaying developments share is the gap

between theory and praxis, between intellectual and material
labor,

that is one of the themes of Adorno

'

s

work:

There is much to indicate that a knowledge crippled temporarily, at least, in its possible relation to practical change is not a blessing in
itself either.
Praxis is put off and cannot wait;
this is what ails even theory. 3
So long as theory finds itself "cr ippled

.

.

.

in its

possible relation to practical change," politics verges on
one-dimensionality.

Under contemporary conditions, Adorno

argues, praxis subsists in marginal enterprises like philos-

ophy and modernist art

— precisely

because these enterprises

are so manifestly impractical.

This chapter is meant to demonstrate how and why

Adorno

'

s

aesthetic theory privileges autonomous art as

alongside critical theory, to which we'll turn in the next
chapter

— the

locus of credible praxis in the wake of the

miscarriage of resistance.
I

will argue that Adorno

1

s

elaboration of the inherent-

ly political logic that links capitalist exchange relations

and artistic content is a fruitful and impressive attempt to

develop a Marxian aesthetic theory on behalf of the project
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of freedom.

Unfortunately, Adorno's laudable intention to

ground aesthetics in political economy did not devote sufficient attention to that foundation:

the critical distinc-

tion of "autonomous" from heteronomous art, which relies on
this (faulty) political economy,

is untenable.

This does not invalidate the general direction of

Adorno's aesthetics, but it does require some extensive

rethinking of his conclusions, and

I

will offer some

thoughts in this direction to conclude the chapter.

A.

Autonomous Art as Praxis

Adorno's account of autonomous art as praxis hinges on
the dialectical relationship between the "autonomous" and
In pitting these moments

the "social" aspects of art.

against each other, Adorno is arguing against both the

common bourgeois notion of art as a rarified realm somehow
apart from and above society, and against its consignment by

vulgar Marxist theory to

a

"superstructural" reflection of

basic economic contradictions.
The social relevance of art is rooted in its autonomy
from society, as much as its autonomy is rooted in society.
On one level, art's autonomy denotes the historical emanci-

pation of art from the demands of religious and mythic
signification; in the bourgeois era art is 'left to itself
to pursue the elaboration of its own immanent laws of devel76

opment.
no,

Within each branch of the arts, according to Ador-

there is a dynamic relationship between artists and the

tradition they work within and upon.

Much like philosophi-

cal problems which are taken up, reworked, made obsolete and

rediscovered, the development of aesthetic form constitutes
the basic project of art.

The concept of form occupies a central place in Aes-

thetic Theory, and it is the crux of Adorno
as praxis.

'

As one might expect with Adorno,

s

defense of art
"form" is not a

simple determinate concept, but one that needs to be placed
in the context of the dialectical character of art works.

From the point of view of autonomy,

form designates the

arrangement of elements within the constitution or composition of the art work.

It is the shaping power which medi-

ates the social material art draws upon for its "content."

Obviously this does not take place in some pristine
realm uncontaminated by social reality; the very fact that
art is allowed to be 'for itself
by society.

is prescribed and defined

The formal development of art is not some

freewheeling and whimsical play of invention, nor does it
follow some predetermined logical progression.

The aesthet-

ic order imposed by form is not external to or indifferent

toward its material.
as Adorno puts it,

content."

4

Artistic problems are social problems

"aesthetic form is a sedimentation of

Artistic production,

77

just as much as industrial

production,

is

grounded in

a

specific set of social rela-

tions and embodies the contradictions of those relations:
The unresolved antagonisms of reality reappear in
art in the guise of immanent problems of artistic
form.
This, and not the deliberate injection of
objective moments of social content, defines art's
relation to society. The aesthetic tensions manifesting themselves in works of art express the
essence of reality in and through their emancipation from the factual facade of exteriority. 5

Adorno's discussion of aesthetic praxis is no less

complicated than the dialectical accounts of form and autonomy on which it relies.
ly,

Without oversimplifying too gross-

one can discern three distinct but closely interdepen-

dent claims for autonomous art's praxis, having to do with
art works as social texts,

the exemplary mediation of sub-

ject-object relations by form, and the exemption of autonomous art from economic utility.

Adorno argues that the autonomous work of art embodies
an implicit critique of the contradictions of the society

from which it draws its material.

Works of art are social

texts both because they are produced within a specific

social and historical situation and because artistic problems (like philosophical ones)

obscure they may seem
society.

— embody

— no

matter how recondite or

the antagonisms of their

What Adorno says here about music applies to

autonomous art in general:
[Music] fulfills its social function more precisely when it presents social problems through its
own material and according to its own formal laws-problems which music contains within itself in
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the innermost cells of its technique.
The task of
music as art thus enters into a parallel relationship to the task of social theory. 6

Thus non-discursive works by Schonberg, no less than discursive works like those of Kafka and Beckett, articulate the

unfreedom and domination at the heart of modernity.

The

truth content of autonomous art is distinct from critical

social theory, but no less valid.
The idea that works of art reflect the social antago-

nisms of their environment is hardly a new one; however,

Adorno's argument does not depend on

a

simple model of a

superstructural reflection of fundamental economic contradictions.

The link between the immanent development of

artistic technique and the irrational nature of bourgeois
society is not some notion that art is an epiphenomenon of

prevailing forces of production.

To speak of it as "re-

flecting" social contradictions denies art the autonomy that

Adorno so strenuously defends; the word Adorno himself
sometimes uses is "refraction" which is quite appropriate to
his insistence on the mediating role of form.

This "refraction" and Adorno's alternative to the stale

metaphor of base/superstructure are well illustrated by
art's relation to the domination of nature and the suppression of the object.

Artistic production shares with intel-

lectual and material production the processes of reification
that Adorno discusses at great length in Dialectic of En-

lightenment

and Negative Dialectics.
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In philosophy,

reifi-

cation appears as identity thinking which forces procrustean
concepts onto things and suppresses whatever 'remainder'
will not submit to identification; the analogue of identity

thinking in bourgeois relations of production is the logic
of commodif ication,

things as equals.

the

universal exchange of unequal

While reif ication privileges constitutive

subjectivity at the expense of objects it has disastrous
consequences for actual living subjects, who fall prey to
the conceptual and material domination of nature as they are

reduced to mere instantiations of supposedly universal
categories.

Thus the suppression of what falls outside of

these categories

— of

the "non-identical"

— virtually

defines

unf reedom

This process is played out dialectically in aesthetic

production in the domain of form.

On one hand,

since the

artist and the art work are part and parcel of a society

under the spell of reification, the formal constitution of
the art work seems to share in the domination of nature and
the imposition characteristic of identity thinking.

Form

draws its material from society by wrenching it away from
that society and subordinating it to the imperatives of

aesthetic expression.

But Adorno wants to argue that this

process of dissociating particular elements from the reified
and integrated reality of capitalist society potentially

serves as a model for bringing the object to itself, for

doing justice to the particular and the marginal:
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As the language of both domination and reconciliation, art seeks to revivify the content of what
the language of nature was trying to say to man in
cryptic, almost unintelligible ways .... Works of
art expand the area of domination to the extreme,
not in a literal sense, but in the sense of positing a sphere unto itself which by its very immanence differs from real domination, thus negating
the heteronomy of the latter. 7

The construction of the art work serves as a model for

subverting prevailing identity thinking and prefigures the

reconciliation of the subject and the object, because it is
somehow able to rescue its object from the reified meaning
imposed upon it:

"Aesthetic identity

... is

meant to assist

the non-identical in its struggle against the repressive

identification compulsion that rules the outside world." 8
By subordinating its material to its own formal laws, Adorno

argues,

art is able to articulate the truth of the object

without succumbing to the dialectic of enlightenment.

The

artist uses formal rearrangement and representation to give
voice to what is silenced by reification.
This helps to explain why Adorno would prefer to speak
of art as a refraction rather than reflection of social

reality.

To attempt to faithfully mirror social contradic-

tions directly is to maintain and reinforce the silence of

oppression and suffering.

What Adorno values so much in the

aesthetic is its capacity to 'pull apart' and reassemble the
congealed and reified reality to bring out the truth of that
reality.

Because of the its autonomy, the truth content of

art is able to resist corruption and co-optation.
81

It is apparent then that

'form'

is crucial to art's

praxis both as a social text which represents society's

unfreedom and domination, and as

a

prototype for subject-

object relations which do not depend on domination.

Art's

indictment of unreason and suffering is only possible
through the refraction or mediation afforded by the principle of form.

Form itself performs something very similar to

what Adorno calls in Negative Dialectics "constellation

construction" to emancipate the object from identity.

The

goal of the philosopher's construction of a constellation is
"to use concepts to unseal the non-conceptual with concepts,

without making it their equal." 9

Critical theory and auton-

omous art both aim at an intervention between the object and
the structures that define it; this intervention is carried

out on behalf of the object, with instruments (concepts and

representations) which themselves are important components
of those repressive mechanisms.

In each case,

Adorno argues

that the approach to the object must rely on those instru-

ments without reproducing the domination they embody in

society at large.

In the realm of art,

form breaks the

object out of the objectivity imposed upon it, and in effect
places it in an aesthetic constellation which not only

reveals the contradictions of the prevailing objectivity but
the possibility of freedom which is suppressed in it.

Art can keep alive the promise of freedom only insofar
as it is able to sustain its disengagement from society.
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While its autonomy places art 'above' politics, and thus
makes it culpable as an ideological support of the status
quo,

Adorno argues that it is precisely its aloofness from

bourgeois society which enables it to serve as an implicit
critique of that society.

This is not only because truly

autonomous art is bound to represent, discursively or non-

discursively

,

the unfreedom and domination at the root of

bourgeois society:
Art... is not social only because it is
brought about in such a way that it embodies the
dialectic of forces and relations of production.
Nor is art social only because it derives its
material content from society. Rather, it is
primarily social because it stands opposed to
society.
Now this opposition art can mount only
when it has become autonomous.
By congealing into
rather than obeying existan entity unto itself
ing social norms and thus proving itself to be
art criticizes society just by
'socially useful'
Pure and immanently elaborated art
being there.
is a tacit critique of the debasement of man by a
condition that is moving towards a total-exchange
society where everything is for-other. This social deviance of art is the determinate negation
of a determinate society.

—

—

The social deviance of art
than function

— exempts

— its

allegiance to form rather

it from the social imperative of

usefulness, and at the same time prefigures emancipation
from ruthless utility.

Autonomous art's impracticali ty

embodies the promise of a rationally ordered society which
does not reduce subjects or objects to commodities: "Works
of art are plenipotentiaries of things beyond the mutilating

sway of exchange,

profit and false human needs."
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Thus art, when it holds fast to its autonomy, embodies
a species of praxis that is able to stand just beyond the

grasp of integration.

This helps to explain why Adorno

worked so hard to finish Aesthetic Theory in the 60s; autonomous art becomes for him the haven of the project of freedom in the administered world.

The Culture Industry and Praxis

B.

Adorno

'

s

defense of art as praxis is ingenious and

provocative, but it is bound to appear to some as

redefinition of "praxis."

a

virtual

To assess this redefinition and

its relation to conventional notions of praxis,

it is neces-

sary first to see why the culture industry is disqualified

from this praxis, and why Adorno takes a rather dim view of

explicitly political art.
Adorno'

s

aesthetic theory hinges on the thesis that the

political economy of cultural production affects the aesthetic (and political) content of works.

Adorno argues that

the structural logic of the culture industry tends toward

the promotion of obedience, conformity, and passivity.

The defining distinction between art and the culture

industry is clear enough (although it deserves critical
attention):

the culture industry is an industry, defined by

its ability to sustain an acceptable rate of profit.

Fol-

lowing Friedrich Pollock, Adorno and Horkheimer situate
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contemporary culture in

a new

stage of capitalism marked by

increasingly integrated monopolies throughout the economy.
Not surprisingly,

the heteronomous conditions of pro-

duction within the culture industry have important aesthetic
consequences.

Unlike autonomous art, producers working in

the culture industry are not at liberty to focus on the

immanent artistic problems within their field.
cisely,

More pre-

the cultural combines shy away from sponsoring

aesthetically "advanced" works, and orient their efforts to
promoting and distributing work that will duplicate the
success of the last smash hit.

This,

according to Adorno,

accounts for the most striking aesthetic feature of industrial culture: standardization; the task of the managers of

cultural capital is to produce

a

new product just like the

old that was snapped up most eagerly.

The latest thing must

be just different enough to appear "novel" without disrupt-

ing the formula of familiarity:

Only if it is the same does it have a chance of
being sold automatically, without requiring any
effort on the part of the customer, and of presenting itself as a musical institution. And only
if it is different can it be distinguished from
other songs a requirement for being remembered
and hence for being successful.

—

The products of the culture industry are not only notart,

they are, measured against Adorno'

anti-art.

s

aesthetic theory,

Aesthetic praxis, then, is barred to industrial

culture at every point.

Rather than offering a mediated

critique of social relations refracted through form, indus85

trial culture tends toward a hollow,
real contradictions.

false reconciliation of

The individual detail is not recuper-

ated from the false totality on behalf of a world that would
do justice to non-identity, but reduced to the gimmick which

aims at distinguishing particular products from the din of

virtually identical and intentionally fungible competitors.
Unlike autonomous art, which Adorno argues maintains and

mediates the tension between the universal and the particular on behalf of the unfulfilled promise of reconciliation,
the culture industry subordinates the apparently rebellious

detail to the demands of the bottom line:
the detail remains openly connected with the underlying scheme so that the listener always feels
Any harmonic boldness, any
on safe ground....
chord which does not fall strictly within the
simplest harmonic scheme demands being apperceived
as "false," that is, as a stimulus which carries
with it the unambiguous prescription to subtitute
for it the right detail, or rather the naked
scheme

In this,

the fate of the aesthetic detail corresponds to the

fate of the individual in industrial culture; the "rebel-

lion" allowed to a particular atom serves to sustain our

interest until the inevitable victory of the (false) collective

:

The detail has no bearing on the whole, which
appears as an extraneous framework. Thus the
whole is never altered by the individual event and
therefore remains, as it were, aloof, imperturbAt the
able, and unnoticed throughout the piece.
same time the detail is mutilated by a device
which it can never influence and alter, so that
the detail remains inconsequential.
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While Adorno shies away from developing an aesthetics

oriented around reception (for reasons discussed below), he
does argue that consumption of industrial culture plays an

important role in the maintenance of alienated labor.

By

pre-digesting its material, the familiar and unchallenging
character of the culture industry's products offers itself
as the antidote to the regimentation and duress of work.

The culture industry calls itself entertainment because it

requires no effort:
er."

"The composition hears for the listen-

15

This again is a step backward from the autonomous art

championed by Adorno, which demands (or fosters) an active
and supple engagement.

The entertainment industry virtually

promises not to challenge its consumers, who 'deserve
break today.'

a

But this escape from the rigor of work proves

illusory to the extent that the culture industry is grounded
upon the same heteronomy and standardization of every other

industry

Amusement under late capitalism is the prolongation of work
M echanization has such power
over a man's leisure and happiness, and so powerfully determines the manufacture of amusement
goods, that his experiences are inevitably afterThe ostensible
images of the work process itself.
content is merely a faded foreground; what sinks
in is the automatic succession of standardized
operations
.

.

.

.

[

]

Whereas autonomous art's qualified and complicit exemption from exchange allows it to stand as an implicit rebuke
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to commodification,

the culture industry makes no apologies

for its complete integration with the status guo:

Movies and radio no longer pretend to be art. The
truth that they are just business is made into an
ideology in order to justify the rubbish they
deliberately produce.

Unlike the conservative culture critics who shared his
horror of 'mass culture,' Adorno does not blame the victims;
the culture industry is seen as deeply implicated in the

deepest forces of modernity:

capitalism and rationaliza-

tion.

The star-crossed relation between art and industrial

culture

— i.e.

between truth and demos

— can

be traced through

each of the three spheres we discussed in the last chapter.

Whereas the work of autonomous art is able to shield
the non-identical from identitarian logic, and thus preserve

both the memory of suffering and the promise of utopia, the

culture industry is thoroughly colonized by administration.
The fate of the non-identical in industrial culture is

visible in the subjugation of the detail, which, wrenched
from the force-field of aesthetic form, provides the perfect

alibi for the liquidation of the individual.

The critique of commodification embodied in works of

autonomous art

— themselves

purposelessness

.

commodities

— depends

upon their

This moment of praxis is barred to the

interchangeable products of the culture industry, since they
are assigned a social purpose from the outset.
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In the

subordination of form to formula they directly embody and
reinforce commodity fetishism and the crisis of value.
Finally, we have seen that autonomous art serves as one
of the last bulwarks against the crisis of subjectivity we

analyzed in the previous chapter.

Adorno's deepest and most

compelling grievance against the culture industry is the

contribution it makes to the erosion of subjectivity and to
an authoritarian personality structure.

Adorno's critigue

of the culture industry's impact goes far beyond an asser-

tion that industrial culture promotes passivity and conformity;

in his analysis,

the audience is as much a product of

industrial culture as movies, radio shows, and advertising.
As we will see,
but,

this is not accomplished without resistance;

according to Adorno, it is more-or-less accomplished.
These claims, formulated as provocatively as possible

in Dialectic of Enlightenment

claim

— put

,

are meant to counter the

forward by both defenders and conservative crit-

ics of "mass" culture

— that

people what they want.

the culture industry is giving

The culture industry derives its

alibi of "popularity" from the standardization of consumers

which it mimics in its own products:
Now any person signifies only those attributes by
which he can replace everybody else: he is interAs an individual he is comchangeable, a copy.
pletely expendable and utterly insignificant, and
this is just what he finds out when time deprives
him of this similarity.
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The concept which flickers between the lines here is "labor
power"; this interchangeability is the basis of a society of

"classes" of individuals.

The success of an industry which

"aims at standardized react ions ...[ at

]

a

system of response-

mechanisms wholly antagonistic to the ideal of individuality
in a free,

liberal society," 19 depends upon this identity

foisted upon the majority by the economy.
This is one of the points at which Adorno

'

s

analysis of

the culture industry is most misunderstood; by occasional

references to its customers as the culture industry's "helpless victims," we are inclined to see the audience as wholly

passive and receptive, as if the culture industry were
simply perpetrated upon a senseless and supine population.
But this objection

— that

Adorno neglects the audience's

capacity for resistence and reinterpretat ion
arguments detailing the necessity of

— overlooks

his

process of active

a

appropriation for the success of the culture industry.
Without careful attention to the 'psychoanalytic'
arguments in "The Culture Industry...,"

"On Popular Music,"

and "Fetish Character in Music..." it appears as though the

culture industry establishes its hegemony by fiat, or that
the audience is so debased that it willingly gobbles up what
the culture industry sets before it.

But the consumption of

the culture industry is not so simple.

One of the perennial problems faced by the culture

industry is shoring up the regime of fashion across shifts
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in taste which expose yesterday's enthusiasm to be just

that.

Consumers'

scorn for the outdated,

"corny" hits of

the previous day exposes, according to Adorno,

the ambiva-

lence and spite repressed in the consumption of industrial
culture.
victims,

Precisely because consumers are not "helpless"
the incorporation of the standards and stereotypes

of the culture industry amounts to an arduous process of

self-overcoming:

the culture industry does not simply

"fool" or delude its victims,

it

turns the subject's own

instinctual energy against subjectivity.
This self-overcoming is dictated by the unprecedented

strength of the apparatus:
The ambivalence illustrated by the effect of
corniness is due to the tremendous increase of the
disproportion between the individual and the social power.
An individual person is faced with an
individual song which he is apparently free either
By the plugging and support
to accept or reject.
given the song by powerful agencies, he is deprived of the freedom of rejection which he might
still be capable of maintaining toward the indiTo dislike the song is no longer the
vidual song.
expression of objective taste but rather a rebellion against the wisdom of a public utility and a
disagreement with the millions of people who are
assumed to support what the agencies are giving
them ....
This of course does not imply absolute elimiBut it is driven into deepnation of resistance.
er and deeper strata of the psychological strucPsychological energy must be directly inture.
vested in order to overcome resistance.

Thus,

according to Adorno, the culture industry wins its

hegemony at the price of bad faith and ressentiment
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.

This is the truly grim dimension of the culture industry:

if it were simply an ideological

'veil', one might

cast it aside; but Adorno locates the roots of degraded,

affirmative culture within the instinctual economy of consumers.

The passive connotations of "consumption" fail to

grasp the hazards and effort involved in this continually-

renewed incorporation of the culture industry; the enthusiasm of the most energetic followers of a popular "craze"

expose the mechanism upon which the culture industry's
success rests:
This fury cannot be accounted for simply by the
passive acceptance of the given.
It is essential
to ambivalence that the subject should not simply
react passively. Complete passivity demands unambiguous acceptance.
However, neither the material
itself nor observation of the listeners supports
the assumption of such unilateral acceptance.
Simply relinquishing resistance is not sufficient
for acceptance of the inescapable.
Enthusiasm for popular music requires wilful
resolution by listeners, who must transform the
external order to which they are subservient into
The endowment of musical coman internal order.
modities with libido energy is manipulated by the
21
ego
This may not seem to accord with the theses of the

"Culture Industry" essay, which emphasizes the passive,

effort-less consumption of entertainment, and seems to
attribute the hegemony of the culture industry simply to its
inescapability

— the

victory of monopoly on the side of pro-

duction and distribution predetermines consumption:
The stronger the positions of the culture
industry become, the more summarily it can deal
with consumers' needs, producing them, controlling
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them, disciplining them, and even withdrawing
amusement: no limits are set to cultural proq
of this kind. 22

This emphasis on the domesticated and domesticating nature
of industrial culture is the basis of Adorno

'

s

most provoca-

tive claims in "The Culture Industry...":

The need which might resist central control
has already been suppressed by the control of the
individual consciousness.

One might be tempted to see the repression thesis as a

later "discovery" of Adorno'

s,

but "On Popular Music" and

"The Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening," which develops similar arguments around ambivalence

and spite, were both written before "The Culture Industry...".

One could speculate on the different intentions of

these essays, but in any case the repression thesis is

consistent with the basic thrust of "The Culture Industry.

.. "

and offers

a

more sophisticated account of the

reception and internalization of industrial culture.

Where-

as "The Culture Industry..." is content to gesture at the

parallels between industrial culture and the industrialization of the lives of its consumers,

the other two essays

link this argument to the analysis of the instinctual economy of the psyche,

opening up the black box of heteronomous

sub jecti vi ty
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The goal of the culture industry, according to Adorno,
is

to occupy the ideological horizon at least as scrupulous-

ly as late capitalism dominates the material landscape.

Nothing could be as dysfunctional from the point of view of
the culture industry as a capacity to imagine alternatives;

fortunately the aesthetic logic of industrial culture goes
far to minimize this hazard.

Judgment and thought are not

only disappointed by the products of the culture industry:
they are actively discouraged.

The distraction offered by

industrial entertainment does not really amount to an "escape";

the product consumed not only bears the unmistakeable

marks of the mechanized work-process one hoped to leave
behind,

but more importantly,

the possibility of unre-

strained or unplanned pleasure is systematically foreclosed:
Pure amusement in its consequence, relaxed selfsurrender to all kinds of associations and happy
nonsense, is cut short by the amusement on the
market:
instead, it is interrupted by a surrogate
overall meaning which the culture industry insists
on giving to its products, and yet misuses as a
mere pretext for bringing in the stars.

This "overall meaning" discredits the notion of escape.

The

magic trick which is the culture industry's main responsi-

bility is inculcating the lie that the status quo is the
whole,

that there is no "outside" and no beyond

— but

without

ever bringing to consciousness the idea of the whole, which

(precisely in its presumption of an outside) contains

dangerous footing for critical leverage.

In this respect,

positivism fits snugly with the culture industry:
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a

The new ideology has as its object the world as
such.
It makes use of the worship of facts by no
more than elevating a disagreeable existence into
the world of facts in representing it meticulously.
This transference makes existence itself a
substitute for meaning and right. Whatever the
camera reproduces is beautiful....
Continuing and continuing to join in are
given as justification for the blind persistence
of the system and even for its immutability.
What
repeats itself is healthy, like the natural or
industrial cycle. The same babies grin eternally
out of the magazines; the jazz machine will pound
away forever
The repression thesis brings another dimension to this

argument about the liguidation of alternatives.

In some

essays, Adorno argues that the consciousness of alternatives
is not so much effaced as suppressed:

Not only do the listening subjects lose... the
capacity for conscious perception of music, which
was from time immemorial confined to a narrow
group, but they stubbornly reject the possibility
of such perception .... [T ]hey display the pinched
hatred of those who really sense the other but
exclude it in order to live in peace, and who
therefore would like best to root out the nagging

possibility
The implications of such a suppressed awareness that another
type of music

— and

another type of society

— are

possible

will be pursued in the last chapter.

C.

A "Politics Industry"

This liquidation of the consciousness of alternatives,

with its legitimating power, suggests that a critique of

"politics industry" might run very much parallel to the
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theses on the culture industry.

This part of our analysis

will necessarily be more speculative than what has gone
before,

since Adorno does no more than hint at the parallels

between mass culture and mass politics.
If we are to see politics as an industry,

we must meet

the objection that politics does not produce identifiable

commodities in the way that the culture industry does.
is "consumed" by citzens?

Adorno

'

s

What

basic approach to the

culture industry suggests that the significance of particular cultural commodities is being effaced in favor of corn-

modification as a cumulative social process:
eclipsed by exchange value.

In a way,

use value is

we are sold not so

much a particular unit of culture or satisfaction, but the
ideology of "entertainment"; what we are being sold is the

system itself.

Like pop songs and movies,

the moral of

every election and every party congress is that the system
works

— or

in any case that since it is the only one possible

we must adjust to its imperfections.
If it is possible to trace the political consequences

of commodif ication in aesthetics,

we ought to be able to say

something about the commodi f ication of politics per

se,

even

acknowledging that the political sphere is subject to rather
different imperatives than the culture industry:
is not Washington,

Hollywood

but they are both beholden in critical

respects to Wall Street.
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We can begin with the crux of Adorno

'

s

aesthetics.

In

no small part because it is mediated through the same combines,

political discourse in contemporary capitalism is

subject to the central complaint Adorno brings against

industrial culture:

heteronomy.

We will leave to the last chapter the problem of whether there could be an "autonomous" politics parallel to

autonomous art.

Even without knowing quite what Adorno has

in mind when he alludes to a "true politics"

(in the passage

quoted at the outset of this chapter), it is not difficult
to imagine how the basic features of contemporary politics

disappoint the Adornian project of freedom.

To the extent

that the politics industry has merged with industrial culture to become a rather boring sector of entertainment,

political life becomes a spectacle that, precisely in its
tedium and manufactured irrelevance, wards off participation

.

The politics industry too has an interest in a particular type of consumer,

and works to eliminate the inefficien-

cy of catering to the needs of its consumers by pre-forming

them in accord with its own requirements.

Here Adorno'

analysis of the recognition and acceptance of popular songs
can serve as an indicator of the internalization of the

manufactured political horizon.

The trick of the culture

industry is to get consumers to clamor for the alternatives
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they were going to get anyway,

in a way which leaves as

little foothold as possible for critical thought.
The success of the politics industry's effort to market
its own legitimacy depends,

its status as a monopoly:

coordinated by

a

like the culture industry, on
the marketplace of ideas is

handful of distributors.

Hence the neces-

sity for hype which the politics industry shares with (or

borrows from) the culture industry:

the promotion of an

ideology of free choice between meaningful alternatives,

which obscures the imposition of a mass-produced commodity
whose "variety" is as significant as the presence or absence
of fins on a Cadillac.

In a world where such trivial "di-

versity" is taken as given in every forum of "serious" and

"respectable" political debate, legitimacy can approach the

standard of automation which Adorno

'

s

analysis warns

against
If we pursue in this connection the psychoanalytic

insights of "On Popular Music," we can theorize that industrial politics is not just passively ingested by the populace,

but requires a certain amount of wilful renunciation,

which is accompanied by a violent backlash against any

Utopian suggestions which might expose the price paid by
this self-overcoming.

Our intuitions concerning how Adorno views the interverifisection of art, culture, and politics, receive some
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cation in his critique of consciously political or "committed" art.

While Adorno does not dismiss politically committed art
out of hand, he is suspicious of conscious attempts to

politicize art and make it an explicit vehicle of praxis.
In subordinating autonomy to political "impact",

committed

art fails even to achieve the impact it strives for, and

misunderstands profoundly the nature of the social praxis of
art

The fundamental mistake of committed or "tendentious"
art in Adorno

'

s

eyes is a simplistic conception of the

relations between art and society and between form and
content.

Besides overestimating the importance of the

artist's intentions for the social truth content of works,
art with a message confuses aesthetic praxis with a dubious

attempt at political intervention.

"Political" artists seek

to intervene directly into the social meaning of their

artworks by a more or less sophisticated infusion of
"message"

.

a

But this involves a serious misconception of

art's relationship to political consciousness.

Adorno

argues that the truly revolutionary 'impact' of art is

subterranean and oblique:
The impact works of art have operates at the level
of remembrance; impact has nothing to do with
translating their latent praxis into manifest
praxis, the growth of autonomy having gone too far
to permit any kind of immediate correspon27
dence ....
ds
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The significance and direction of the impact of

work

a

of art have little to do with the subjective intentions of

the artist, but depend rather on the cultural and historical

situation which receives it.

But even in the most favorable

circumstances the social impact of an art work is not likely
to propel people to the barricades,

partly because the

autonomy of art blunts the direct political intentions of an
art work:
If art works have any social influence at all, it
is not by haranguing, but by changing consciousness in ways that are ever so difficult to pin

down.
Any directly propagandistic effect evaporates quickly, perhaps because even works of this
genre tend to be perceived as being ultimately
irrational, with the result that the mechanism
that is supposed to trigger praxis is interrupted
by the intervention of the aesthetic principle. 28

This accords with Adorno

'

evaluations of the works of

s

specific artists, particularly of two of his favorite examples:

Beckett and Brecht.

occasion as Adorno

1

s

Brecht serves on almost every

example of tendentious art.

Adorno

downplays the direct political significance of Brecht
work,

while arguing that Brecht

'

s

's

effort to translate his

political commitment into artistic practice marks

a

signifi-

cant artistic development:
The sententious directness with which Brecht tran
slated such stale gems of wisdom into dramatic
gestures gave his work its uniqueness. His didactic approach prompted him to introduce dramatic
innovations designed to oust the old theatre of
In his plays 'theses'
intrigue and psychology.
are important not for what they say but for what
they do ...

1

00

Beckett, on the other hand

— very

much like Kafka

exemplifies the relentless portrayal of the desiccation of
reality, while maintaining its distance from that reality:

[Beckett's] stories, sardonically called 'novels',
neither provide objective accounts of social reality nor, as is often falsely believed, represent a
reduction of life to a basic human condition .... Beckett draws the lesson from montage and
documentation and other such attempts at discarding the illusion of meaning-constitutive subjectivity.
Reality may be allowed to enter it may
even crowd out the poetic subject and yet we get
a sense that there is something wrong with that
reality

—

—

.

Beckett's art is to Adorno

a

more potent indictment of

society because it is able to "store up the experience" of
the process by which "reality itself becomes lifeless".

What the comparison of Beckett and Brecht brings to the
fore is the role of mediation in artistic production.

Art

that digests its social material and translates it into its

own language

— whether

that be the next step beyond the tone

row in music, or cubism in painting

— represents

for Adorno

true praxis better than the attempt to impose politics on
the artwork from 'outside'.

But this should not be taken to mean that Adorno ex-

pects the work of Kafka or Beckett to be more politically

effective than Brecht or Sartre:
One decisive reason why art works, at least
those that refuse to surrender to propaganda, are
lacking in social impact is that they have to give
would
up the use of those communicative means that
they
If
public.
make them palatable to a larger
do not, they become pawns in the all-encompassing
system of communication.
101

The "message" of art works is virtually doomed to be

'neutralized' or co-opted in its reception.

This is one

reason Adorno wants to distinguish the praxis embodied in
artworks from the political prescriptions they wear.

The

success or failure of aesthetic praxis does not depend upon
the immediate reception of particular works of art, nor on
the intentions of the artist;

thus a great artist with

reactionary political convictions may nonetheless produce
art that according to Adorno is truly radical,

remains faithful to the aesthetic project.

so long as it

The reception of

art works marks for Adorno a moment when the autonomous

sphere of production is all but completely obscured by art
as social fact;

'outside'

society's embrace of art works takes place

of the aesthetic realm:

Neutralization is the price
Once art works are
tonomy.
of cultural exhibits, their
rates.
In the administered
32
becomes universal.

art pays for its auburied in the pantheon
truth content deterio-

world neutralization

Suspicion of communication is
thought.

a

leitmotif of Adorno

'

Rather like Nietzsche, he tends to view communica-

tion as a corruption of truth:

Direct communication to everyone is not a criteriWe must resist the all but universal
on of truth.
compulsion to confuse the communication of knowledge with knowledge itself, and to rate it higher,
whereas at present each communicative
if possible
step is falsifying truth and selling it out.

—

1
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This is not, however, because Adorno dismisses the herd as

infinitely inferior to the intrepid philosopher, but because
in modernity the media of communication are thoroughly

dominated by the culture industry, which regulates in subtle
and not-so-subtle ways the limits of credible and acceptable

discourse
culture now impresses the same stamp upon everything.
Films, radio and magazines make up a system which is uniform as a whole and in every
part.
It need hardly be noted that this holds as true for Face the

Nation as it does for Rambo or Whitney Houston.
This is not all there is to Adorno

nicability.

'

s

critique of commu-

While it is not possible here to do him justice

on this score,

the central point at issue touches directly

on the question of reception.

Both the philosophy and the

art that Adorno most admires demand an engaged, critical

involvement; it cannot be passively assimilated or 'appreciated':

it must be grappled with.

This is behind Adorno

'

critique of the 'enjoyment' of art, and his claim that "What
works of art really demand from us is knowledge or, better,
a

cognitive faculty of judging justly:

they want us to

become aware of what is true and what is false in them."

35

Even aside from their "political" content in the broader sense,

the major theses of the cultural industry can be

read directly onto the political realm.

1
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The commodif ication

of political discourse accompanies

a

centralization and

concentration of the means of communication, whose driving
tendency is to remake its consumers according to its own

specifications.

Not only would challenging or unusual

discourse risk unpopularity (failure in the market), but
might disrupt consumers' unstable, repressed satisfaction
with what is offered them.

The most impressive trick of the

politics industry is to turn the spite provoked by the
broken promise of culture against subjectivity itself; no
doubt this is audible in some of the rabid hostility to
communism, which, even in its historical "perversion," on
some level reminds us of hope we have given up.

D.

Monopolies and Markets in the Culture Industry

Adorno

'

s

effort to link the political economy of cul-

tural artifacts with their aesthetic content and political

content is admirable and insightful, but flawed in some of
its basic presuppositions.

In a nutshell,

Adorno's differ-

entiation of autonomous art from the culture industry depends upon a series of questionable assumptions about markets and competition.

What is needed is an attempt to take

up the general direction of Adorno's social aesthetics on

the basis of a more sophisticated approach to political

economy

1
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The decisive difference between the high bourgeois
era

that nurtured "autonomous art" and the advent of the
culture

industry is premised on Pollock's description of "state

capitalism."

This term was meant, like the arguments of

Dialectic of Enlightenment, to describe tendencies at work
in both the Western "democracies" and the openly totalitari-

an regimes with which they were at war.

talism

Under state capi-

:

The market is deposed from its controlling function to coordinate production and distribution.
This function has been taken over by a system of
direct controls.... These controls are vested in
the state which uses a combination of old and new
devices, including a "pseudo-market," for regulating and expanding production and coordinating it
with consumption.
It

is

the existence of a more "competitive" stage of capi-

talism, which was premised upon a more or less clear separa-

tion of the state from the economy, which secures the strategic position of autonomous art:
Art as a separate sphere was always possible only
in a bourgeois society.
Even as a negation of
that social purposiveness which is spreading
through the market, its freedom remains essentially bound up with the premise of a commodity econoIn so far as, until the eighteenth centumy. ..
ry, the buyer's patronage shielded the artist from
the market, they [works of art] were dependent on
The purposelessness
the buyer and his objectives.
of the great modern work of art depends on the
Its demands pass through
anonymity of the market.
so many intermediaries that the artist is exempt
from any definite requirements though admittedly
only to a certain degree....
.

—

1
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Again, we encounter the suspect appeal to a narrative
of the Fall from more humane, promising times.

It is far

from clear that a nineteenth-century artist's dependence on

exchange left him or her any freer to pursue immanent artistic development than someone producing with the demands of

the culture industry in mind.

The claim that the mediating

role of the market operated in favor of aesthetic praxis

merits skepticism; it certainly astonishes this student of

Adorno to read that the anonymity of the market is the

guarantor of art's autonomy.
In the absence of a close and comprehensive study of

the conditions of production of the modernist masterpieces

Adorno admired, suffice it to say that the necessity of
surviving in the marketplace

— which

certainly never con-

formed to the neat diagrams of liberal economists, least of
all in the sphere of culture

— seems

every bit as much

a

recipe for heteronomy as pleasing Samuel Goldwyn or the

Warner brothers.

Someone writing

a

symphony in the 1820s

seems to work within constraints that are not radically

different from those binding someone writing
the 1970s:

a pop song

in

the work must please one of a handful of possi-

ble patrons.
The decisive difference between art and the culture

industry might be that whereas art is appropriated or bought
by people whose interest is in realizing a profit on further

exchange of the work as an appreciating commodity, the

1
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culture industry commissions works with the explicit intention of re-selling them at a profit.

To the extent that

late capitalism centralizes artistic production in industries, we could speak of the "proletarianization" of art-

workers; certainly this is a description with some applica-

bility to commercial illustrators, composers, and writers.
But this does not seem to be the crux of Adorno

critique.

'

He seems to argue that the monopolization of

production and distribution converges with planning:

that

Hollywood is not radically different than a Socialist Ministry of Culture.

This casual invocation of a new phase of monopoly or
"state capitalism" deserves closer scrutiny.
of Adorno

'

s

The strength

bifurcation of culture along the axis of autono-

my /heteronomy lies in the obvious heteronomy of spheres like
the Hollywood studio system and the popular music industry
(and eventually television),

where it is apparent that

a

handful of conglomerates controlled (and continue to control) the vast majority of the product which is actually

"consumed."

In these spheres

— we

might include the other

two that Adorno addresses in the "Culture Industry" essay,

architecture and publishing

— aesthetic

heteronomy follows

plausibly from the direct, continual supervision of capital
over the products it sponsors.
Is the thesis of "state capitalism" the best approach

to describing the changes in the political economy of cul-

1
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ture?

What actual changes can be identified in the twenti-

eth century mode of cultural production Adorno criticizes?

While production was centralized in
tors of the cultural economy (film,

a

number of subsec-

television), arguably

the critical shift was in the centralization of distribution; Adorno points out that music at least was still pro-

duced in a kind of "handicraft" fashion. 38
This industrial model of distribution means that a

profit-oriented intermediary apparatus stands between producers and consumers.

This monopoly (or at least oligopoly)

obviously aims to realize

a

"return" on its "investments,"

but it is subject to additional constraints:

Culture monopolies are weak and dependent....
They cannot afford to neglect their appeasement of
the real holders of power.... 39
Art and commerce are not congruent, and not only because

there is no guarantee that artistically worthy products

would be profitable; as we have seen,

industrial culture

plays a crucial legitimating role, by accustoming its audience to look upon its renunciation of a real escape as

harmless diversion.
Is there reason to challenge Adorno s claim that mass'

produced culture makes up "a system which is uniform as
whole and in every part"?

a

One could complain that the

"Culture Industry" essay neglects the margins of popular

culture which have not been integrated with industrial
culture

— e.g.

that there are "independent" filmmakers, small
1
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record labels etc.

While Adorno

'

s

argument that the rela-

tionship between art and popular culture in the twentieth
century is very different from that of the nineteenth is

undeniably correct, it is difficult to sustain the sharp

disjuncture Adorno seems to suppose between an earlier
"competitive" era, and a modern monopolistic one.
a

no

mistake to read into this
1

s

part.

It may be

rigid per iodization on Ador-

a

In some places at least,

he clearly presumes

that authentic, autonomous art has not yet perished altoso presumably some space persists which has not yet

gether,

been integrated into the newly centralized economy.
But even if one could show that the giant cultural

combines accounted for only

portion of the films, music

a

and magazines consumed at any particular time, this would

hardly invalidate Adorno

Adorno

'

s

'

s

Broadly speaking,

argument.

analysis of the aesthetics of industrial culture is

likely to hold wherever we find

a

monopoly or guasi-monopoly

at any stage of production or distribution of a particular

class of cultural "goods."

One reason we continue to be

fascinated by the theses of "The Culture Industry..." is no
doubt the correspondance we find between Horkheimer and

Adorno 's inflammatory charges and the shallowness and repetitiveness of contemporary culture.
In the context of "post-Fordist

"

production

— de-cen-

tralized production aimed at continual adjustment to

bewilderingly fragmented series of market-segments

1
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a

— the

critique of industrial culture is arguably even more apt,
since all this "flexible accumulation" takes place at the

behest of an even tighter culture oligopoly than Adorno
lived to see.

When Time-Warner and Columbia-Sony account

for a majority or near majority market-share in every sub-

category of music and film and substantial chunks of television and publishing,

it is difficult to argue that Adorno is

not more relevant now than in the 1940s.

Of course Adorno

was not unaware himself of the apparent diversity of the

cultural market:

Marked differentiations such as those of A and B
films, or of stories in magazines of different
price ranges, depend not so much on subject matter
as on classifying, ordering, and labeling consumSomething is provided for all so that none
ers.
may escape ....
In addition,

the products of the culture industry, whichever

market-niche they are custom-made for, exhibit today exactly
what Adorno decried decades ago:
tion,

standardization, repeti-

plugging, etc.

Beyond this, while Horkheimer and Adorno pointed then
to the culture industry's dependence upon other industries,
in the 1990s the culture industry has moved toward total

integration with other industries, such that the same company that makes movies and records is likely to make stereo

equipment and VCRs

1

1
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E.

The Death of the Political Subject

Ultimately,

I

want to hold on to Adorno

'

s

attempt to

link the conditions of production of cultural goods, their

aesthetic character, and their political character.

think

I

his attempt to mark off a contemporary "monopoly" stage of

capitalism from an earlier "competitive" stage is untenable,
but this does not invalidate the crux of his argument:

that

the modern mass production of culture has had unprecedented

aesthetic and political conseguences
The most provocative claim made by Adorno in this

regard deserves to be taken very seriously:

that the his-

— and at the same time
justice — have been set back

torical project of "the individual"
the projects of freedom and

The dialectic of enlightenment

dramatically in our century.

threatens a dusk much darker than Minerva's owl could have

anticipated

The dearth of "politics" in Adorno can then be ascribed
very directly to the death of the subject.
Adorno,

This is not,

to

some felicitous postmodern insight, but the histori-

cal defeat of both the liberal and Marxist project.

For

both the revolutionary subject and the liberal citizen are
at the threshold of extinction,

analysis credence.

if we are to give Adorno

'

The liberal vision of self-sufficient

and independent political subjects coming together to form

1
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the public was invalidated in both theory and practice by
the industrial-administrative state.

Not long after,

the

revolutionary "identical subject-object of history" fell in
the line-of-battle

— or

simply fell in line

— with

ties of "state capitalism" in the East and West.

the reali-

To Adorno,

National Socialism and the New Deal serve as the capstones
of the same defeat.

While Adorno exagerrates the parallels between the two

capitalist regimes, it is clear enough that he was not

encouraged by what he saw in the United States.

It is worth

pointing out that the hegemony of behavioralism in postwar

American political science seems to confirm Adorno
of the political subject:

1

s

autopsy

finally the political subject can

be grasped by the same quantitative methods of administration,

without recourse to metaphysical constructs such as

justice and freedom.

That Adorno ascribes a species of praxis to autonomous

works of art ought to alert us to the profoundly political
bent of his thinking; art is praxis precisely because politics is not confined to parliaments and parties.
If there is something unsatisfying about Adorno

account of aesthetic praxis,

'

is not that he fails to

it

offer a blueprint for revolution (hopefully we know better
than to expect this of him), but rather that somehow poli-

1

1
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tics

— not

just parliamentary politics,

practical intervention

— does

but any sort of

not seem politically relevant.

This seems to me to be the root of critics' complaints
that Adorno turned away from political commitment.

In his

major works, which are not ostensibly about politics, but
whose constant reference points are nonetheless domination
and resistance,

the most obvious forms of contention over

these go almost unmentioned.

This is all the more vexing since Adorno indicates that

politics does count:
[T]here is no guarantee anywhere that art will
keep its objective promise. That is why every
theory of art must also be critical of art.
Even
in radical art there is as much mendacity as there
is illusory creation of possibilities and thereWorks
fore non-creation, lack of real creation.
of art take an advance on a praxis which has not
yet begun.

This suggests that freedom depends on more than just the

subterranean influence of art and the clarity of critical
theory.

Why then is Adorno so reticent about

'a

praxis

which has not yet begun'?
The argument of this chapter suggests that this reti-

cence is grounded in an assessment of the demise
least hopeless compromise

— of

— or

at

subjectivity which could

a

This would call for a thor-

engage in meaningful politics.

ough re-thinking of the enterprise of political theory, and
I

explore the extent to which Adorno

'

s

to such a project in the next chapter.

1
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work can contribute

Before turning to that however,

I

would like to put to

rest the notion that Aesthetic Theory somehow represents

'strategic withdrawal'

from politics and from praxis.

a

The

argument that Adorno turned away from politics in his later
years to immerse himself in aesthetics not only neglects his

intense lifelong involvement with art; it also relies on a

narrow and shallow conception of what counts as politics.
One would have to reduce politics to government and policy
(or to explicit outbreaks of class struggle)

to read Aes-

thetic Theory as a step away from politics.
It is a grievous mistake to dismiss Adorno as a disil-

lusioned and cranky ex-Marxist.

His "pessimism" was by no

means idiosyncratic or unwarranted, and his analysis of the

interlocking administration of capitalism and culture is
even more trenchant and appropriate in our era of global

mega-media
Finally,

though,

there is a sense in which Adorno too

easily dismisses the relevance of political conflicts that
are still happening.

questions about Adorno
es

— questions

In the last chapter,
'

s

I

raised some

economic and psychological premis-

that hint that perhaps subjectivity is not

quite as infirm as Adorno argues, and that there might
perhaps still be political 'action' worthy of attention.
these first two chapters have argued as stringently as

possible for the existence of

1

a
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political deficit in the

If

world,

Adorno's own limitait is finally time to examine

tions and lacunae.
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CHAPTER III
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY

The appropriate relation between revolutionary theory

and practice has always been one of the most hotly contested

topics in Marxism.

In the rush to criticize Adorno s work
1

as "too theoretical," many critics have neglected his in-

sightful and nuanced contribution to this precisely this
debate.

The "melancholy" tone of Adorno'

s

work,

to which he drives the reader again and again,

the aporias

are all

intimately related to his attempt to grapple with the "theory and praxis" problem in a situation where both seem to

have stalled.
This chapter will situate Adorno

'

s

subtle reworking of

the theory-praxis problem in the context described by the

previous two chapters (the commodified, "administered" world
of late capitalism).

discussion of Adorno

We will be led,
1

s

along the way, into

a

rejection of the strategy of critigue

perfected during the Enlightenment.
A clear account of the political aspirations and strat-

egies of Adorno'
that Adorno

's

this regard;

s

work will allow us to reassess the charge

work falls short of its own expectations in
if Adorno drives critical theory relentlessly

into a dead end, we may still challenge the necessity of the

detours he enforces.

1
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A.

Theory as Praxis

Adorno offers (primarily in Negative Dialectics,) an
account of theory and praxis that promises something more

meaningful than the obvious blandishments about a 'dialectic'

between the two.

His attempt to maintain and even

intensify the lived tension between theoretical and practical opposition to the status quo may be his most important

contribution to Marxist theory.
Adorno'

s

accomplishment was to bring the ritual invoca-

tion of 'dialectics'

to life in a subtle and sophisticated

discussion of theory-and-praxis

.

He is able to demonstrate

that theory has a practical dimension at the same time that

praxis is always infused with theory, all the while insisting that the boundary between the two cannot be wished away.

Yet ultimately Adorno

'

s

rearticulation of the theo-

ry/praxis dialectic disappoints, because praxis (and political intervention in general) remains uninterrogated

.

The

opacity of praxis throws into suspicion the elaborate and

sophisticated account Adorno develops of the contribution of
theory

No doubt with the examples of Korsch and Lukacs (among

others) in mind, Adorno was intransigent in his opposition
to the notion that theory should subordinate itself to the

demands of 'praxis' as interpreted by the Party. But lest we

1 1
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begin to think otherwise, the relation between theory and
praxis is not historically invariable, as Adorno reminds us
in one of the most stunning,

most vexing passages in criti-

cal theory

Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on
because the moment to realize it was missed. The
summary judgment that it had merely interpreted
the world, that resignation in the face of reality
had crippled it in itself, becomes a defeatism of
reason after the attempt to change the world miscarried.... Theory cannot prolong the moment its
critique depended on. A practice infinitely delayed is no longer the forum for appeals against
self-satisfied speculation; it is mostly the pretext used by executive authorities to choke, as
vain, whatever critical thoughts the practical
change would require.
1

Here,

theory,

in nuce

,

is the position Adorno stakes out for

and for himself:

keeper of the revolutionary flame

in a non-revolutionary time,

and heretic railing against

both the devil and a corrupt mother Church.

Adorno would

have us believe that the miscarriage of the Soviet experi-

ment and the defeat of socialism in the West force upon

revolutionary praxis an indefinite period of hibernation.
What makes critical theory critical will occupy our

attention for the remainder of this chapter.

But first, we

should take a closer look at the particular historical

moment within which Adorno self-consciously situates this

ringing defense of theory's independence.
The status of praxis, as Adorno conceives it, is the

explicit backdrop for his discussion of the task of theory.
It is striking that Adorno should open a book published in
1

20

1966

— some

thirty-plus years after the purported decisive

turning point

— with

a defense of theory

addressed to an

orthodoxy no longer on the side of what 'practical change
would require

1

The official enemy of the status quo is explicitly

addressed in another critical passage, where communism is
taken to task for its attempt to domesticate theory for its
own purposes, not least because a politics that would bridle
theory undermines praxis:
The call for the unity of theory and practice has
irresistibly degraded theory to a servant's role,
removing the very traits it should have brought to
that unity.
The visa stamp of practice which we
demand of all theory became a censor's placet.
Yet whereas theory succumbed in the vaunted mixture, practice became nonconceptual
a piece of
the politics it was supposed to lead out of; it
became the prey of power.
The liquidiation of theory by dogmatization
and thought taboos contributed to the bad practice; the recovery of theory's independence lies
in the interest of practice itself.
,

'External'

interference with theory harms not only theory,

but practice itself.

'results'

If the

and boundaries of

speculation cannot be guaranteed ahead of time, then whatever

'practical'

use theory has for revolutionary struggle

will only be manifest if it is allowed to follow its own

internal dictates.

Adorno establishes the pressing need for theory, in the
vacuum created when official Marxism has effectively disowned what he understands to be revolutionary in Marx (and

1
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Hegel).

This dismissal of theory effectively mirrors the

capitalist West's attempt to brand theory as obsolete:
Today, with theory paralyzed and disparaged by the
all-governing bustle, its mere existence, however
impotent, bears witness against the bustle.
This
is why theory is legitimate and why it is hated;
without it, there would be no changing the practice that constantly calls for change.
Those who
chide theory as anachronistic obey the topos of
dismissing, as obsolete, what remains painful as
thwarted.
They thus endorse the world's course
defying which is the idea of theory alone.... 3

These two passages contain,
compact,

in Adorno's typically

ingrown formulations, much of the relation of

theory and practice which this chapter seeks to tease out.

Theory inherits a lonely privilege of resistance from

a

world in which the West has abandoned even the rhetoric of
the liberal Enlightenment,

into a state religion.

and the East has made 'Marxism'

"What remains painful as thwarted,"

the "cast aside but not absorbed," finds a voice not only in
the coded dispatches of autonomous art, but in the dogged

pursuit of a theoretical vocation which does not shy away
from its own contradictions and limitations.

Adorno's defence of the pursuit of theory never allows
the reader to forget the limits of theory,

for a praxis that is more than theoretical.

nor the necessity

Theory does not

pull its truth content out of thin air, and its insights

will not make themselves felt without a practical challenge
to the status quo.

1
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This puts theory in the uncomfortable position of

having to carry on an endeavor that it knows it cannot
consummate; at the same time, the present "uselessness" of

critique can be seen as an opportunity:
Paradoxically, it is the desperate fact that the
practice that would matter is barred which grants
to thought a breathing spell it would be practically criminal not to utilize.
Today, ironically,
it profits thought that its concept must not be
absolutized: as conduct, it remains a bit of practice, however hidden this practice may be from
itself
Of course the notion of a

'breathing spell' comes unfortu-

nately close to 'quietism,' even a reverse-Kautsky ist faith
that the revolution is historically fated to not happen.
In and of itself,

the claim that theoretical work is a

kind of praxis should not provoke much complaint from Marxists,

given (among other things) the importance Marx at-

tached to his time in the British Museum.

But Adorno

'

emphasis on individual critique, which unmistakably comes at
the expense of old-fashioned meditations on the conditions
for collective resistance,

has set off all the fireworks

Adorno anticipates in the Preface to Negative Dialectics.
Adorno

'

s

argument for 'theory as praxis' has provoked

a

fierce response from Marxist critics especially, on the

grounds that Adorno refuses to legitimate or even consider
"real" political struggles in the context of praxis.

Dubiel offers

a

Helmut

particularly unqualified and unsubtle ver-

sion of one popular interpretation of 'theory as praxis':
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This option for a purely theoretical critique
incapable of being joined to political action;
this clear preference given the alternative of
political activism for a self-sufficient critique, represents a self-hypothesization of theoretical work that, because it no longer has a
political addressee, can now be only self-referential.
If the texts of the 1940s still speak of a
(para- )political praxis on the part of theory, it
is only programmatically in the form of philosophical "discourse" or of the culture-critical "maxim" which merely reverberates around itself. 5

——

It would be easy enough to follow Dubiel and assume

that because Adorno had nothing of consequence to say about

praxis (in the conventional Marxist sense), that his notion
of theory-as-praxis must be hollow and self-serving.

But to do so would miss Adorno

'

s

compelling and relent-

lessly self-reflective account of intellectual life after
the 'miscarriage'

of revolution.

shortcomings of Adorno

'

s

This,

despite the real

political analysis, would be

a

mistake

B.

Individuality and Critique

Adorno re-articulates the Enlightenment's faith in
reason for a modernity that has known not only Marx, Nietzsche,

and Freud, but also Auschwitz and Hiroshima.

He

situates very strong claims for the individual's ability to

challenge the truth claims of the collective within

a

dia-

lectical account of subjectivity that recognizes both the
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limits of reason and the embedded and entangled construction
of individuality.

Unfortunately, in the course of Adorno's construction
of a theory of theoretical resistance,

politics in the old

fashioned sense slips quietly out of a side door.

What

Drucilla Cornell has called "the ethical message of negative
dialectics" 6 leaves Adorno with

a

breathtakingly subtle and

trenchant analysis of individual resistance that teeters on
the brink of solipsism.

Adorno saw in the full flowering of the "totally administered society," the bad universality of the Hegelian

system come to life; society composes itself of individuals
whose social and political function is the mere instantiation of universality.
tem,

But society,

like the Hegelian sys-

necessarily fails to achieve the seamless, total inte-

gration to which it aspires, and this is the saving grace of
critique.

The process of individuation through which uni-

versality comes into its own has assumed a form which,
Adorno argues, universality may ignore but cannot entirely
annul
the social process of production preserves in the
basic exchange process [Tauschvorgang the prinThe
cipium individuationis private disposi tion
But in his residue
individual survives himself.
which history has condemned lies nothing but that
which will not sacrifice itself to false identity.
The function of the individual is f unctionless7
ness ....
]

.

,
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.

.

.

The dialectic of self-preservation awakens within individuals,

at the same time that it adapts them to the abstract

domination of the economy,

a

capacity which rebounds on the

false universality of a society mediated by exchange.

It is

this "residue," which is the foothold of thought for Adorno,

and the foothold of hope as well:
it,

"Even if it does not know

the reason of the individual ... is always potentially the

reason of the species." 8

With this, Adorno reclaims for

Marxism the revolutionary moment of the Enlightenment, by
reading Hegel against the grain and recovering the motive
power of particularity which Hegel buries in his rigged
dialectic.

But this "residue" of Reason which survives even

the obsolescence of self-preservation, remains only poten-

tially rational (and critical) until it comes to recognize
itself as bound up in this dialectic of universality and

particularity
Experience and consistency enable the individual
to see in the universal a truth which the universal as blindly prevailing power conceals from
The reigning consensus
itself and from others.
put the universal in the right because of the mere
form of universality .... for the mind to perceive
and to name that side of it is the first condition
of resistance and a modest beginning of practice.
Thought then becomes practice, precisely to the extent
that it grasps the ways in which individuality

universality

— are

— and

true

thwarted, and the constraints on practice

in a regime that would do away with thought.
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Certainly to keep critique alive in the "administered
world" is no small accomplishment.

In a society in which

the general irrationality of prevailing practice has become

blind to itself, maintaining the capacity to recognize that

irrationality is all the more important.

After the 'miscarriage' of praxis, Adorno has to rethink two critical questions that had formerly been answered
by referring to the proletariat's position at the fulcrum of

industrial capitalism.

Whereas earlier Marxists could take

for granted the epistemological privilege of labor, and of
its embodiment of a universal interest in liberation, Adorno

has to account for the status of the 'critical'
in both these senses:

individual

how can an individual have reliable

knowledge of society, and how can it derive a critical
standard by which to judge society?
Adorno grounds critique in the capacity to reflect upon
the dialectical tensions between experience and reason,

subject and object, and particular and universal.

Adorno is able to rehabilitate the notion of "experience" for critical theory by showing how experience is

necessarily social.

Through experience, the subject comes

to know a material that is always already social,

of whether it is recognized as such;

the object of experi-

ence always bears the marks of society.
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regardless

In Adorno's argument,

the damage inflicted by the

administered world (on nature and on reason) is legible in
experience, at least potentially.

The total society is

guaranteed to perpetuate at least one ineradicable reminder
of negativity

— the

experience of suffering:

It is the somatic element's survival, in knowlas the unrest that makes knowledge move, the
unassuaged unrest that reproduces itself in the

edge,

advancement of knowledge.

Negative dialectics is propelled, like Hegel's account of
self-consciousness, by the subjective, felt experience of
negativity.

But Adorno refuses to look forward to a Hegel-

ian supersession (and justification) of suffering in

a

reconciled and harmonious whole; the experience of suffering
retains its critical potential:

Conscious unhappiness is not a delusion of the
mind's vanity but... the only source of whatever
The smallest trace of
hope the mind can have.
senseless suffering in the empirical world belies
all the identitarian philosophy that would talk us
The physical moment tells
out of that suf f ering
ought not to be, that
suffering
that
knowledge
our
different.
things should be
.

.

.

.

The analysis of the culture industry, and Adorno's

comments on the transformation of ideology

may go a long

way toward explaining how this experience of negativity is

dampened or diverted without becoming
of prevailing social relations.

a

reflexive critique

But this leaves Adorno to

explain how some people do come to 'convert'
into critique.
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felt negativity

Here Adorno reverses Lukacs

Class Consciousness:

'

argument of History and

critical perspective on society is

a

grounded not in a negative interest in the status quo, but
in social privilege:

Only a mind which [the administered world] has not
entirely molded can withstand it. Criticizing
privilege becomes a privilege the world's course
is as dialectical as that. 13

—

Elsewhere, Adorno argues that

a

critical foothold is only

accessible with some distance from practice, understood both
as political praxis and as the organized "bustle" of late

capitalism
Only as exempt from the general practice is the
individual capable of the thoughts that would be
required for a practice leading to change. 14
Far from sidestepping the privileged position of the

theorist, Adorno intensifies the tensions and hazards of his

account of opposition in a world that has classes but no

class-consciousness
Under social conditions ... which prune and cripple
the forces of mental productivity [geistigen
Produktivkraf te
it would be fictitious to assume all men might understand, or even perceive,
all things ....
If a stroke of undeserved luck has kept the
mental composition of some individuals not quite
adjusted to the prevailing norms a stroke of luck
they have often enough to pay for in their relations with their environment it is up to these
individuals to make the moral and, as it were,
representative effort to say what most of those
for whom they say it cannot see or, to do justice
to reality, will not allow themselves to see.
]

.

.

.

—

—
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A passage like this makes great fodder for those who would

dismiss Adorno as an old-fashioned "German mandarin."

Adorno himself anticipates this objection, and goes on to
suggest
As for the privileged character which rancor holds
against it, truth will lose that character when
men stop pleading the experiences they owe it to
when they let it enter instead into configurations
and causal contexts that help to make it evident
or to convict it of its failings.
Elitist pride
would be the last thing to befit the philosophical
experience.
He who has it must admit to himself
how much... his experience has been contaminated by
existence, and ultimately by the class relation-

ship

.

His argument here parallels the relation of works of art to

praxis in several critical respects.

Recalling from the

previous chapter the signal features of the politics of art:
art

'pays for'

its mere survival by its apparent irrelevance

and luxury character; this aloofness is precisely what

perspective outlawed in the practical

allows it to encode

a

world; and finally,

it points toward,

but cannot bring into

being itself, another sort of society.
Theory,
by this

just as much as art,

'luxury'

The intertwined themes of alien-

status.

ation and complicity

is put in an odd postion

— not

just reason's own tendency to fall

into its opposite (i.e. the dialectic of enlightement

)

,

but

the real complicity of reason with domination in social

relations

— pervade

Adorno

'

s

work.

The division of mental from manual labor is an important but often overlooked theme in this regard.
130

This ap-

pears not only as the real division of thought from manual
labor in the economy (what we would nowadays call deskilling), but as well in the general obsolescence of

thought (as

I

recounted in chapter I).

Thought is inextri-

cably bound up with privilege and domination; in the guasi-

anthropological sections of Dialectic of Enlightenment,

conceptuality and fixed property, thought and domination,
are defined by

a

rather more intimate relation than the

polar opposition assumed by Aufklarern:
With the end of a nomadic existence, the social
order is created on the basis of fixed property.
Mastery and labor are divided .... The universality
of ideas as developed by discursive logic, domination in the conceptual sphere, is raised up on the
basis of domination in reality. 17
In a class society,

theory becomes

a

thought is identified with mastery, and

privilege of those with 'free'

Negative Dialectics, Adorno reads Idealism as

a

time.

In

response to

the complicity of thought:

Ever since mental and physical labor were separated in the sign of the dominant mind, the sign of
justified privilege, the separated mind has been
obliged, with the exaggeration due to a bad conscience, to vindicate the very claim to dominate
which it derives from the thesis that it is primaand to make every effort to forry and original
get the source of its claim, lest the claim lapse.
Deep down, the mind feels that its stable
dominance is no mental rule at all, that its ultima ratio lies in the physical force at its dispos-

—

Nonetheless, Adorno was not to be moved by the reading
of the Theses on Feuerbach that insisted theory could only
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atone for its complicity by reversing this subordination, by

subservience to praxis.

Aside from the fact that the prac-

tical demands of class struggle are always a matter of

interpretation, this kind of abstract negation of theory's

service to oppression could not satisfy Adorno, who insisted
that the division of mental and manual labor could not

simply be wished away, or abolished by fiat:

it is part and

parcel of modernity.

This brings us back to the question of experience.

To

say that class-consciousness is stunted under late capitalism means that in an important sense, people are cut off

from their own experience.

The culture industry plays a

critical role here, substituting what Adorno sees as

a

prefabricated pseudo-experience.
The model of critique that Adorno refines in Negative

Dialectics depends upon
experience.

a

dialectic between theory and

Theory keeps experience from lapsing into

Lebensphilosophie

,

as it "corrects the naive self-confidence

of the mind without obliging it to sacrifice its spontane-

ity."

19

Experience,

serves to remind thought of

in turn,

its non-identity with the object.

Experience can play a critical role in assisting
thought's own self-correcting capacity because it is not
simply a catalog of events which

a

subject has endured.

Adorno argues that experience is a mode of knowledge which
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is not burdened with the stringency and mediation that

define dialectics.
cluding nature) in

Experience approaches objectivity (ina way

which is barred to dialectics:

"An

aspect of immersion in particularity, that extreme enhance-

ment of dialectical immanence,

must also be the freedom to

step out of the object...." 20
This 'free spirit' operates as a sort of outlaw
thought,

in tandem with a dialectics bound to identity which

works upon the bad totality through immanent critique:
The immanently argumentative element is legitimate
where the reality that has been integrated in a
system is received in order to oppose it with its
own strength.
The free part of thought, on the
other hand, represents the authority [die Instanz]
which already knows about the emphatic untruth of
Without this knowlthat real-systematic context.
edge there would be no eruption; without adopting
the power of the system, the outbreak would
fail.

21

Experience and dialectics both reach for an objectivity
which the reified totality would deny.
'experience'

This defense of

armed with dialectics allows Adorno to reverse
'subjective'

the connotations of

and 'objective' by deftly

showing how the injunction that thought be "objective" is

often

a

cover for policing the bounds of acceptable thought,

and that an openness to 'subjective' experience that yields
to the object "without reservations" can attain an objectiv-

ity denied by the Spell.
In "Subject and Object" and throughout later works like

Negative Dialectics

,

Adorno seeks to push Hegelian idealism
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beyond the hollow transcendence it offered subjectivity at
the expense of real subjects.

Reclaiming the real "tran-

scendental" potential of subjectivity, according to Adorno,
would require grappling with the objectivity of the subject,
and with the ideologies which console the subject with a

story of the mind's omnipotence while mocking its real
unf reedom

The sovereign free subject of idealism neglects its own

objectivity, and in its overestimation of its own power over
the object actually consigns objectivity to the blind domi-

nation of the prevailing system.

Thus the fate of the

subject is bound up with breaking the dialectic of enlightenment:

the spell that imprisons both Reason and Nature can

only be broken if reason ministers to nature.

Not least

because the prevailing instrumental relation to nature
recoils on our embodied, objective selves as the blind
'revenge'

of Nature.

Breaking with the dialectic of enlightenment does not
entail embracing

a direct,

immediate relation to nature.

That would amount (in the terms of Dialectic of Enlightenment) to a kind of atavistic variant on the domination of

nature:

this immediacy still masks a colonizing impulse.

To assume that we can simply ignore what is 'more-than'

natural in ourselves and commune 'directly' with Nature (as
seems to be popular among 'New Age' enthusiasts) is to

impose a vision of the natural on objectivity that is no
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less questionable than the passage by Bacon that open Dia-

lectic of Enlightenment.
er)

is

In short,

Mother Earth (or whatev-

just as much a projection of ourselves (and our

wishes) as Nature-as-plunder

Horkheimer and Adorno make it clear that the way out of
the dialectic of enlightenment has to lead through reason,

not around it.

But it will not be the magisterial transcen-

dental reason of Kant, which reincorporates the subject

object split in the division of phenomena from noumena.

Nor

will it exhibit the cunning of a Hegelian reason which has

already decided what it will find in the object.
would be

a

Rather,

it

reason which keeps the promise Hegel makes in The

Phenomenology of Spirit:

"Scientific cognition

...

demands

surrender to the life of the object, or, what amounts to the
same thing, confronting and expressing its inner necessity."

22

Adorno understands this 'inner necessity' rather differently than Hegel.

Unlike Hegel's dialectic, in which

objectivity serves only as

a

foil against which Geist must

test its ever-maturing consciousness, Adorno'

s

'negative'

dialectic renounces closure and harmony in favor of
lessly passive" approach to the object.

a

"fear-

The construction of

constellations is meant to break particularity out of the
conceptual stockade of 'the particular' at the same time
that it defuses reason's complicity with domination.
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This has dramatic consequences for our relation to
Nature.

In the context of Dialectic of Enlightenment,

the

attempt to "use concepts to unseal the nonconceptual"

amounts to a dialectical self-overcoming of Nature:

if the

dialectic of enlightenment signified reason's unwitting
bondage to fear (and thus its reversion to myth and
ural'

commitment to blind self-preservation), then

a

'nat-

a suc-

cessful negative dialectics would transform the 'nature' of
both subjectivity and objectivity.

Adorno's work suggests

not only a path beyond the subject's carnivorous (merely

natural) relation to the object, but objectivity is at the
same time brought out of its mute 'natural'

silence (into

some almost 'communicative' relation to reason).

Whereas Hegel

'

s

Nature remains sheer otherness even as

the dialectic enfolds it in its larger spectacle (as if

Hegel were doing Nature a favor,

in incorporating his oppo-

sition), Adorno's dialectic recognizes the fear of nature as
a

natural obstacle to nature's own hope for reconciliation.

Adorno overturns Idealism's demotion of nature to one side
of the dialectic

(the outside),

in no small part by remind-

ing the subject of its own materiality, of its intimate and

inalienable particularity in Nature.

Adorno's validation of the critical leverage the particular can bring to bear on the universal represents an

attempt to turn Western philosophy against the grain of its
136

history, on behalf of precisely what that history nearly

always denigrated:
The matters of true philosophical interest at this
point in history are those in which Hegel, agreeing with the tradition, expressed his disinterest.
They are nonconceptuality individuality, and
particularity things which ever since Plato used
to be dismissed as transitory and insignifi23
cant

—

,

This is not simply an admonition to take an interest in the
1

nonidentical

which slips through the net of our concepts;

1

the ash-heap of

'mere contingency'

is the philosophical

expression of the historical fate of actual particulars, as
Adorno

'

s

reading of Hegel reminds us.

the ultimate victor's philosopher:
to the contrary,

doubt,

Hegel, of course,

is

despite his assurances

the outcome of the dialectic is never in

and what cannot identify totally with the progress of

the Weltgeist

,

is afforded by Hegel only the consolation it

can wring out of the ambiguities of the magic verb aufheben
But Hegel only codifies and dramatizes one of the constant

themes of philosophy; even iconoclasts like Marx, Nietzsche,
and Freud are interested (in more subtle ways) in what falls
by the wayside only for what it tells us about what marches

on

Adorno 's attention to philosophical and historical
detritus marks again the impression of Walter Benjamin's
work on Adorno.

Benjamin insisted in "Theses on the Philos-

ophy of History" that 'historical materialism' breaks deci-

sively with the dominant "empathy with the victor,"
1
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but

Marxism up until Benjamin empathizes exclusively with the
eventual victors as much as any other philosophy of ressentiment.

Benjamin's reading of Klee's "Angelus Novus" as

an allegory for history as "one single catastrophe which

keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage... a storm blowing from

Paradise" 25 is more than

a

little 'heterodox'.

This sensitivity to what "fell by the wayside

— what

might be called the waste products and blind spots that have

escaped the dialectic" 26 plays

critical role in Adorno's

a

attempt to short-circuit thought's complicity with positivity.

In Negative Dialectics

,

Adorno suggests that

a

dialec-

tical reason might even heal some of the wounds that rationality,

seduced into the service of domination, has inflict-

ed on the world:

Though doubtful as ever, a confidence that philosophy can make it after all that the concept can
transcend the concept... is one of philosophy's
inalienable features and part of the naivete that
ails it.... But whatever truth the concepts cover
beyond their abstract range can have no other
stage than what the concepts suppress, disparage,
The cognitive utopia would be to use
and discard.
concepts to unseal the nonconceptual with concepts, without making it their egual.

—

Adorno anticipates a knowledge not bound to the imperatives
of the carnivore,

as Peter Sloterdijk has aptly put it,

'knowledge that would not be power.'
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a

Adorno's hopes for

disrupting the dialectic of enlightenment rest upon

a

strin-

gent (and unnatural) openness to otherness (on behalf
of

Nature

)

The reconciled condition would not be the philosophical imperialism of annexing the alien.
Instead, its happiness would lie in the fact that
the alien, in the proximity it is granted, remains
what is distant and different, beyond the heterogeneous and beyond that which is one's own. 29

Dialectics, in this sense, intends to disentangle

reason from domination, to mark the path to a new relation
to nature,

and to ourselves.

Adorno seeks a way to slip the

dialectic of enlightenment, and bring reason out of its
(natural) bondage to fear.

An Ethic of Negation

C.

But while Adorno

'

s

work establishes this self-critique

of reason as an essential task of modern social theory,

this

model of critique seems to validate Marxists' complaints
that Adorno was seduced away from materialism and praxis.
It is not simply that Adorno s work does not explicitly
'

link itself with concrete political constellations; Adorno
Much more

'political deficit'

is not a simple omission.

radically, Adorno'

work seems to close off political ave-

s

nues taken for granted by Marxists and leftists.

He system-

atically (if implicitly) disqualifies political interven-
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'

tions until the 'praxis' he defends is hard pressed to

justify its own persistence.
It is very hard to see how the kind of break with

identity-thinking and with the domination of nature Adorno
envisions could be

a

political project; there are very few

instances of "we" in Negative Dialectics

In the context of the preceding chapters,

Adorno

'

"political deficit" looks less like a deficiency of Adorno
than of the political.

Adorno does not devote much atten-

tion to questions of political strategy or institutions

because what he considers to be the "political" problems of
his time are situated on

a

much deeper level, one which

neither liberal nor Marxist political action can any longer
address
A Marxist politics presupposes some level of class

consciousness and unity, even in the absence of
tionary moment" when the overthrow of capital is

possibility.

But the bulk of Adorno

'

"revolu-

a
a

concrete

work is precisely an

s

account of the short-circuiting of understanding and solidarity, of the recognition of the enemy and the will to

resist

Liberal politics also depends upon

a

subject with the

act
capacity to recognize its interest and the initiative to

upon it,

subjects.

in a terrain contested by other

(formally equal)

With the mass-production of subjectivity, the
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bourgeois citizen assumes, like the sovereign he replaced,

a

purely symbolic, commemorative role in the polity.
Thus Adorno's critical theory represents a radical

departure from the Enlightenment model of political criwhich places its faith in the efficacy of truth and

tique,

reason on the political plane.

The central trope of en-

lightenment critique is exposure:
tice,
a

the revelation of injus-

irrationality, and hypocrisy in the light of reason as

virtually self-sufficient critique.
The trope of exposure is still a powerful political

motive, which persists in some measure in most organized

movements of political resistance.

While the relationship

of the media to politics has turned out to be much more

complicated than the first theorists of mass propaganda
thought,

it is hard to avoid thinking,

"if people only knew

what was going on...."
Both the liberal and revolutionary branches of enlight-

enment politics are beholden to illumination; Marx certainly
meant the exposition of the mechanics of capital, shaken
to inspire

free of the ideological barnacles encrusting it,
a will

to act on newly-acquired truth.

While Adorno's colleagues in the Frankfurt School

operated largely within this orbit of Aufklarung

,

whatever

their doubts concerning instrumental reason or "one-dimen-

sional" society, Adorno's work articulates

a

deep disruptior

between knowledge and action, theory and praxis.
1
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This 'disruption'

is hardly an invention of Adorno s
'

twentieth-century history seems to dispute the Enlightenment's faith in the political efficacy of reason; if not the
first Great War,
terror,

if not the Depression,

if not Stalin's

if not the ascension of Hitler and Mussolini,

then

certainly the concentration camps and the atomic bomb force
some kind of revision of the battle cry sapere aude.

Adorno

's

contention that theory is

a

form of praxis, then,

aims at a kind of illumination that could rehabilitate the

project of Aufklarung in the cumulative shadow of these
events
A critique oriented around exposure no longer seem

viable to Adorno, because political strategies of revelation
aim at a catalytic reaction in a public; the outrageous is

only politically effective if there are people who can be
outraged, and whose outrage has some political repercusThe argument of the last two chapters has made clear

sions.

that the hole where the public ought to be in society has

everything to do with the hole where "politics" ought to be
in Adorno.

Essentially, Adorno argues (fairly consistently from
the late

'20s onward)

that the front door to liberation, and

in fact to positive political change of any significant

kind,

has been indefinitely slammed shut.

The alternatives

then become to abandon any concern for freedom and justice,
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or to find another approach to the edifice of state capitalism

.

Thus it is no surprise that the 'practical justification'

of independent theorizing is addressed precisely to

this problem of finding

proach to praxis.
is,'

in Adorno

a

backdoor or 'subterranean' ap-

As with his account of

'aesthetic prax-

'theoretical praxis' comes to be defined as a

kind of politics-which-is-not-a-politics

,

as a response to a

world where overt political intervention, even more than

explicitly political art, finds itself systematically
thwarted and disparaged.
In effect,

Adorno looks toward a broader notion of

praxis, one which can encompass the indirect and 'subterranean'

impact of works of art and theory.

Like the aesthetic,

speculative theory is defended for developing

a

critigue of

the status quo that is all the more incisive for being

indirect or subterranean.
We already rehearsed much of Adorno

's

suspicion of

political engagement in the discussion in the previous
chapter of his critigue of 'commitment'
tion.

In the realm of theory too,

in artistic produc-

Adorno 's conviction is

that "Real partisanship... dwells deep down"; not in blind

loyalty to the perceived interests of the proletariat, but
(as we'll explore in a moment)

in relentless critigue of

everything that stunts and deforms human life, and poisons
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our relation to nature.

Like

a

work of art, a work of

theory that is able to give itself up to the demands of its

material, Adorno argues,

is intimately related to guestions

of justice and liberation.

What is critical about critical theory has as much to
do with "form" as with content:

as with aesthetic form,

the

project of critical theory is to dislodge particulars from
the relations that suspend them in the present,

to place

them in new constellations that illuminate the possibility
of a different world.

Adorno

'

s

own political project is in large measure to

demonstrate, in persuasive dialectical detail, how thoroughly political theorizing itself is.

This is Adorno'

s

clear-

est link to the original impulse of the Enlightenment:

that

knowledge itself is ultimately intertwined with guestions of
freedom and justice.
The political project of thought as Adorno develops
is

it,

essentially to keep faith with 'the cast aside,' to break

open (in thought at least) the closure which the Spell would
pawn off on us as 'the way things are,' and finally, to

undermine the dialectic of enlightenment by continually

bringing thought to bear on its own limitations.
Keeping faith with what identity has rolled over is not
simply a matter of resisting the victors' devaluation of
what it judges obsolete.

Adorno charges philosophy with the

difficult task of remembering suffering without justifying
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it or aestheticizing it.

Suffering itself discloses both

the genesis and implicit mission of thought:

[Suffering] is the somatic element's survival, in
knowledge, as the unrest that makes knowledge
move... the one authentic dignity it [the mind] has
received in its separation from the body. This
dignity is the mind's negative reminder of its
physical aspect; its capability of that aspect is
the only source of whatever hope the mind can
have.... The physical moment tells our knowledge
that suffering^ ought not to be, that things should
be different.

The spell,
quo,

the artificial naturalness of the status

aims first and foremost to short circuit the protest of

suffering.

Breaking the spell requires

experience, and of history

— reminding

a

resuscitation of

the reader of the

possibilities which are socially repressed by the imperatives of late capitalism:

What dissolves the fetish is the insight that
things are not simply so and not otherwise, that
they have come to be under certain circumstances.... The means employed in negative dialectics
for the penetration of its hardened objects is
possibility the possibility of which their reality has cheated the objects and which is nonetheless visible in each one.

—

The spell denotes the farthest advance of the dialectic of

enlightenment:

the service rationality and thought have

rendered to the perpetuation of irrational domination:
The spell seems to be cast upon all living things,
and yet it is probably not.... The animal species
homo may have inherited it, but in the species it
turned into something qualitatively different.
And it did so precisely due to the reflective
faculty that might break the spell and did enter
By such self-perversion it
into its service.
reinforces the spell and makes it radical evil,
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devoid of the innocence of mere being the way one

Reason plays a critical role in the domination of
nature, both directly as the conceptual Procrustean bed of

identity, and indirectly in the form of technical knowledge
Still, contrary to critics who see Adorno as some kind of

Nietzschean blasphemer against the Enlightenment, 33 Adorno
argues that philosophy is revolutionary in its marrow:
Thought, as such, before all particular contents,
is an act of negation, of resistance, to that
which is forced upon it.... The point which thinking aims at its material is not solely a spiritualized control of nature.
While doing violence
to the object of its synthesis, our thinking heeds
a potential that waits in the object, and it unconsciously obeys the idea of making amends to the
pieces for what it has done.
In philosophy, this
unconscious tendency becomes conscious. 34

The bulk of Negative Dialectics is occupied with the

project of

a

dialectical thought which might grasp objectiv

ity without breaking it,

to make good on the task Adorno

assigns philosophy at the end of Minima Moralia:
The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves
from the standpoint of redemption .... Perspectives
must be fashioned that displace and estrange the
world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear
To gain such
one day in the messianic light.
perspectives without velleity or violence, entirethis alone
ly from felt contact with its objects
is the task of thought.

—
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The 'material' of theory itself draws thought to dialecti

precisely because thought necessarily always fails its own
sense of adequacy:
The name of dialectics says no more, to begin
with, than that objects do not go into their concepts without a remainder .... Dialectics is the
consistent sense of nonidenti ty
My thought is
driven to it by its own inevitable insufficiency,
by my guilt of what I am thinking. 36
.

.

.

.

The logic of identification cannot simply be rejected or

reformed:

"To think is to identify."

To give voice to

suffering and nonidentity, then, will require
to serve objectivity,

a

reason sworn

to continually feel for its own edges

and contradictions.
This is precisely why, much like deconstruct ion

the

,

"matters of true philosophical interest at this point"

become the cast aside, the neglected and repressed.

Derrida and other poststructuralists

,

Unlike

Adorno insists that

the goal remains uttering the unutterable:

Though doubtful as ever, a confidence that philosophy can make it after all that the concept can
transcend the concept ... and can thus reach the
nonconceptual is one of philosophy's inalienable
features and part of the naivete that ails it.
But whatever truth
Otherwise it must capi tulate
the concepts cover beyond their abstract range can
have no other stage than what the concepts supThe cognitive
press, disparage, and discard.
utopia would be to use concepts to unseal the
nonconceptual with concepts, without making it
their equal.

—

—

.

.

.

,

At this point we might return to the question raised at

what does the kind of praxis

the beginning of this section:
1
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Adorno outlines have to do with the old-fashioned Marxist
kind?

His analyses of non-identity and the domination of

nature have been seized upon by several critics, who attack

Adorno for replacing

a

historically grounded materialist

critique of capitalism with a quasi-metaphysical narrative
of man's tragic confrontation with nature.

Mining the pages

of Dialectic of Enlightenment for passages which indicate to

them that the equivalence embodied in exchange grew out of
the prior, more general unfolding of identitarian logic,

these critics see in it a decisive turning away from the

program of early critical theory, into either

a

virtual

relapse into Idealism, or a Nietzschean repudiation of

Reason and the Enlightenment.

Hostile Marxist critics tend to see Dialectic of En-

lightenment as an departure from the Frankfurt School's

ostensible commitment to historically grounded critical
social theory

— in

other words, as an abandonment of Marxism.

Helmut Dubiel offers the most explicit and emphatic version
of these arguments:
[I]n the 1940s, Horkheimer and Adorno depart from
Their theory
the Marxist theoretical tradition.
no longer takes as its object the forms particularly the capitalist forms of social intercourse
by which the human species reproduces itself in
Instead their concern is
appropriating nature.
the world-historical drama of the active OQconfrontation of the human species with nature.

—

—

What is overlooked here is that the discussion of myth,

magic ritual, and mana is continually juxtaposed with the
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operations of the bourgeois economy.

The very subtle, dense

dialectical account of reason and nature that Horkheimer and

Adorno construct in this essay is severely misread if one
misses the links Adorno makes between the the Procrustean

abstraction of conceptual thought and the exchange of commodities.

The homology between identitarian logic and

exchange is central to Dialectic of Enlightenment:

the crux

of both is the forcible imposition of commensurabili
ty upon

heterogeneous, unique particulars.

Philosophy and economy

are both founded on domination.

The precise nature of this link between identity and

exchange is not immediately clear; many passages dealing
with this relation are couched in terms ambiguous enough to
make it difficult to assign "priority" to one or the other;
i

most often, exchange and identity-thinking are simply placed

side-by-side in the paratactical fashion Adorno favored.
i

It would be surprising if it were otherwise;

to explic-

itly take up the question of the "priority" of exchange or

identity-thinking would foreground the kind of base/superstructure problems which Adorno continually tried to displace and suspend.

Adorno had no interest in reducing

identitarian logic to an epiphenomenon of exchange, which we
could therefore afford to ignore (in the certainty that the

victory of the proletariat would solve these sorts of secondary problems).
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Oddly enough, in their eagerness to strip Adorno of his

Marxist credentials, Dubiel and Connerton overlook passages
where Horkheimer and Adorno do try to specify the relation

between indenti ty-thinking and exchange:
Even the deductive form of science reflects hierarchy and coercion. ... the whole logical order,
dependency, connection, progression, and union of
concepts is grounded in the corresponding conditions of social reality that is, of the division
of labor. 39

—

It is hard to imagine what significance one could find in

the guest to privilege exchange over identity, or vice
versa,

given Adorno'

compelling insistence that the two are

s

always already intertwined (and virtually two sides of the
same impulse

)

Arguably, Adorno

'

s

attempt to articulate the brutality

of identification should be seen as a deepening of the

materialist tradition.

One of Adorno'

s

central concerns is

to rescue concrete living particulars from a

'materialism'

that is rather too confident in its grip on objectivity.

Jiirgen Habermas too wants to portray Dialectic of

Enlightenment as

a

theoretical regression or retreat from a

substantial, historically grounded social theory.

His

Theory of Communicative Action develops two of the most
common objections to "The Concept of Enlightenment":

that

the dialectic of myth and enlightenment recounts an ahistor-

ical confrontation between "Man" and "Nature," and that
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various forms of power and exploitation are reduced to

a

vague, amorphous conception of "domination." 40

Habermas' critique is directed not so much at Dialectic

of Enlightenment'

s

ment of Reason.

Habermas at this juncture dons the robes of

deployment of exchange as its besmirch-

the Responsible Adult lecturing the nihilistic Horkheimer

and Adorno, who have clearly spent too much time with that

troublemaker Nietzsche.
and Adorno conduct a

According to Habermas, Horkheimer

kind of imploding critique of instru-

mental rationality, subjecting everything to the caustic
bath of

a

totalizing theory of identity that must corrode

even their own theoretical endeavor.

1

This criticism requires a willful forgetting of Hork-

heimer and Adorno

'

s

explicit purpose in writing Dialectic of

Enligh tenmen t
The point is... that the Enlightenment must consider itself, if men are not to be wholly betrayed.
The task to be accomplished is not the conservation of the past, but the redemption of the hopes
of the past.
How is it that Horkheimer and Adorno fail to convince Habermas that their project is an immanent critique of Enlighten-

ment?

It seems to me that Habermas is so intent on rooting

out any surviving theoretical progeny of the Nietzschean

will-to-power that he utterly fails to grasp the ambition of
Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment:
make good on

a

to

social critique that takes both the Nietzsch-

ean and Marxist challenges to Enlightenment seriously.
151

We have still to cope with the charge that Horkheimer

and Adorno's critique is

'

ahistorical

.

What may irritate

'

both Habermas and Marxist critics more than the alleged

demotion of exchange to one interpretive principle among
several 43 is the apparently casual way Horkheimer and Adorno

deploy concepts like "bourgeois" and "Enlightenment" in ways
which flout the historical specificity we usually attach to
Baldly stated, Odysseus can't really be

them.

al bourgeois,

a

prototypic-

can he?

The relatively literal reading of Dialectic of Enlight-

enment as an attempt to tell the world-historical story of
domination, to narrate the age-old dialectic of myth and

enlightenment, humanity and nature, certainly accounts for

a

large part of the impatience critics have for the Adorno's

deployment of "domination."

It seems to me that it is

absolutely critical to recognize what Eva Geulen describes
as the

"

untimeliness" of Dialectic of Enlightenment

In effect,

44
.

the attempt to map the critique of domina-

tion onto "history" waits in Dialectic of Enlightenment as a

kind of booby-trap.

Remembering what

function of 'liberal capitalism'

I

suggested about the

in Adorno's work,

I

would

suggest that the anti-historical tropes of Dialectic of

Enlightenment are meant to describe the momentum of Enlightenment, of thought itself, and to highlight in the most

dramatic terms its interruption.
152

In this respect,

Dialectic

of Enlightenment has as much in common with History and
Class Consciousness as with The Genealogy of Morals:

the

problem it takes up is the intertwined structural failures
of Western philosophy and society,

and the practical problem

of solving them.
At the same time,

"The Concept of Enlightenment" has to

be seen as Horkheimer and Adorno

the disaster of Fascism,

'disrupture'

'

s

attempt to contextualize

to come to grips somehow with the

in history marked by Hitler,

the war,

and the

camps
The analyses of Odysseus, Juliette, and the culture

industry are meant to remind us that winning the war is not
the end of the struggle against barbarism, and that barba-

rism is not something utterly Other, but something harbored
in the heart of human intelligence long before Nietzsche.

D.

I

The Limits of Philosophical Praxis

have argued that the political project legible in

Adorno 's work represents

a

continuation and

a

refinement of

both the Marxist tradition and of the Enlightenment; certainly Adorno counterposes to this world the real possibility of a world free from the domination of nature and social

domination (his refusal to describe it in positive terms
notwithstanding)
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Adorno's focus on individual resistance, on the
thoughts of people who are not completely under the Spell,
has often been seized upon by Marxist critics to show that
he had abandoned any serious analysis of the conditions for

transformative politics. 45

Adorno is almost uniformly

suspicious of collectivities, and revolutionary action
indeed concerted action of any kind

— finds

no sympathetic

mention in his work.
But the basis for Adorno's oft-repeated suggestion that

"part of the social force of liberation may have withdrawn
to the individual sphere" 46 is not his "deviation" from

Marxism, but precisely the reverse:

Adorno locates the last

residue of hope in individual recognition because he expects

collective opposition to capital to take the form that Marx
predicted.

The failure of the proletariat leaves a politi-

cal vacuum that Adorno refuses to fill by finding another

"revolutionary subject."
I

think Adorno's unwillingness to follow Marcuse in

looking for other subjects whose oppression entails an
interest in radical change is best explained by this commitment to the classical theory of the proletariat as the class

embodying a "universal" interest in liberation.
begins his career at

a

Adorno

point when the tide of militant

socialism has visibly receded, leaving not new opportunities
for resistance and opposition, but a refined and extended

apparatus for domination.

This is as true for the East,
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where the proletariat supposedly triumphed, as for the
West.

47

The belief that twentieth-century capitalism has won a

decisive defeat (for the foreseeable future) over its only
credible opponent, coupled with Adorno

'

s

basic sociological

insight into the "total" organization of social life, even

reaching into the psyche, precluded any sympathy for collective action in the short-term.

Again,

the partial legitima-

tion of the workers' movements in the West only validated
Adorno'

s

reading of a general pacification of the class that

was supposed to make the revolution.
i

:

Self-consciously isolated from any organized opposition
to capitalism,

Adorno (particularly in his later works)

develops a Marxian ethic for anti-Marxian times.

This

oppositional ethic is an attempt to think through the problem of living in a world where

'the whole is false'

and

where
there is no longer beauty or consolation except in
the gaze falling on horror, withstanding it, and
in unalleviated consciousness of negativity holding fast to the possibility of what is better.

This can not be a search for revolutionary purity nor an

otherworldly asceticism, since Adorno is hyperaware of the
skeins of complicity that bind everyone in capitalist society to the status quo.

'Purity'

is simply not an option:

That intellectuals are at once beneficiaries of a
bad society, and yet those on whose socially use1
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less work it largely depends whether a society
emancipated from utility is achieved this is not
a contradiction acceptable once and for all and
therefore irrelevant.
It gnaws incessantly at the
objective quality of their work. Whatever the
intellectual does, is wrong.
He experiences drastically and vitally the ignominious choice that
late capitalism secretly presents to all its dependants:
to become one more grown-up, or to
remain a child.

—

Adorno offers

a

trenchant and poignant analysis of the

meaning of opposition in

a

efface and diminish such.

world which does its best to
The focus of this analysis is not

on revival of class-based politics,

or on anti-capitalist

strategy, but on keeping faith with non-identity and negation in a totalizing web of identity and positivity.

This stance makes some sense if one believes, with
Adorno,

that the psychological basis for class-identity, and

therefore for a meaningful politics, has been eroded beyond
(foreseeable) repair.

'totally administered society'

If the

has indeed made politics practically

'obsolete'

then a

revival of old-style ideology critique is doomed.

Under

these conditions, the task of opposition might mean, as

Adorno
self,

'

s

work suggests, reviving not so much critique it-

but the preconditions of critique:

i.e.

attacking the

calcified facade of a positivity with the insistence that
things could be otherwise

So Adorno pursues theoretical work,

radical negation in

thought, without any rational hope that dialectics alone
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will have any demonstrable 'impact':

theory can no more

make a "revolution" than art works can.
Certainly, however much Adorno might have wanted to

wring out of the notion that "Practice itself was an eminently theoretical concept," 50 he always reminds the reader
that theory alone is not sufficient.

Like aesthetic praxis,

critical theory seems to wait upon some (unspecified) movement to actualize the alternative it holds out.
But it is precisely the ineffable guality of this

"other" praxis, which might intervene in the world in a way

which is barred to aesthetic and philosophical praxis, that

arouses such widespread, palpable disappointment with Adorno
among readers who want to read him as a "political" writer.
This 'other' praxis is assumed to be dormant, and

Adorno unfortunately says virtually nothing about the prospects of resuscitating it.
This is the most substantial criticism that can be made
of Adorno'

s

of concepts:

attempt to show the deep political implications
there are precious few political concepts that

attract his interest.

Adorno

'

s

Indeed, we have reached the heart of

political deficit.

It is not simply that Adorno is at a loss for a concep-

tion of anti-capitalist praxis after the calamity of Fascism.

The political failure of the proletariat, on which

his whole conception of the meaning and mission of philoso-

phizing after the 'miscarriage' of revolution depends, finds

1

57

astonishingly little examination.

The reader of Adorno is

presented, exactly as the infamous passage of Negative

Dialectics would have it, with the "missed opportunity" as

a

fait accompli.

This reading of the political balance-of-f orces

throughout Adorno

'

s

life may be no less plausible than those

of optimistic Marxists who saw in every third world rebel-

lion the death-knell of Capital.
the previous chapter,

Still,

as

I

suggested in

some attempt to rescue political

struggles from the disparaged realm of 'superstructure'

(as

Adorno did with his work on art and the culture industry)
seems all the more urgent when solidarity and collective

action are going out of style.
And of course however much history to this point has

validated Adorno

'

s

'pessimism,' politics did not die off

with the citizen and the proletarian.

The American Civil

Rights movement, growing anti-colonial resistance and rebellion,

and the international eruptionsof the late 1960s

evince a persistence of 'politics'

51

all

that Adorno cannot really

account for.
This would hardly be of any interest,

if Adorno were

just another Old Leftist who clung to dogma that were as

ill-suited to the 'thirties as to the 'sixties.
develops,

But Adorno

in forty years of looking backward at an irre-

trievable historical moment, an analysis of the deeper

deformation wrought by capitalism that makes compelling
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reading nearly thirty years after the 'New Social Movements'

opened a new chapter in the history of 'liberation.'

Adorno

'

s

refusal to connect "praxis" with any post-war

political currents is best seen as a most consistent "Marxist" response to mid-twentieth century events.

What is

frustrating about Adorno 's work is that he seemed to have
the tools to push Marxism beyond its own historical limita-

tions in this respect.

This is precisely what will occupy

our attention in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV

DESIRE AND SOLIDARITY: RESUSCITATING POLITICS

The argument of the previous chapter suggests that

commentators who emphasize Adorno's 'political deficit' tend
to miss the significant political accomplishments of his

lifework, and obscure his contribution (or potential contri-

bution) to contemporary debates over the meaning/role of

political theory.

Adorno's writing demonstrates in an exemplary fashion
the inalienable political dimension,

of every philosophy.

the inner partisanship,

His insistence on the centrality of

the question of liberation, of doing philosophy from the

standpoint of reconciliation, is all the more important in a
time when nobody can say with any confidence what 'revolution' would look like, much less how we might get there.

As relentlessly and systematically as any other writer,

Adorno fixes our attention on the dialectical tension between theory's disengagement from the 'practical' world and
its engagement.

Thought helps to forge both the fetters of

the dialectic of enlightenment and,

if there is to be one,

the key.

Not the least of Adorno's accomplishments is his awareness of the limits of theory.

At best, his work suggests

163

that political theory serves the interests of liberation

best by devotion to its own internally defined problems
(which,

like aesthetic problems, are rooted in the contra-

dictions of their society).

Thus theory itself has a prac-

tical dimension, as a kind of critical analysis that opposes

reaction and domination.
But theory cannot steer, much less replace the 'other'
sort of praxis.

critics of Adorno

Certainly a large part of the response to
'

s

'political deficit' has to be:

exactly do we expect from Adorno?

Political strategy?

Policy recommendations?

for revolution?

A 'plan'

what

Do we really

expect Negative Dialectics to do what 120 years of socialist
praxis (with a much-advertised commitment to various strains
of theory) hasn't succeeded in doing?

Still,

if we are to see Adorno as one of the noblest

heirs to the radical aims of the Enlightenment (as I've
argued), we are liable to run aground precisely on the

question of 'engagement.'

We don't need Marx's injunction

to change the world to feel some disappointment with the

limits of Adorno'

s

political analysis.

To return to the concise barrage from Gillian Rose

quoted earlier:

Adorno 's neglect of social forms diminishes his
ability to offer a compelling analysis of political organization and of relations of power .... Throughout his work^ power in society is
paramount but elusive....

1

64

I

In place of a thorough analysis of the

forces,

1

'correlation of

Adorno gives us an insightful and at least partial-

ly compelling account of the commodif ication of every aspect

of social life under late capitalism, and an analysis of the

erosion of the basic units of both Marxist and liberal
politics
The political conclusions that emerge from a reading of

Adorno seem to verge on quietism, even resignation.

Taken

to its ultimate limit, his emphasis on the death of praxis

would have us believe that no political contest of any

significance could happen, that politics of any subspecies,

whether in the Senate or in Selma, has no relevance to the
deep institutionalized mechanisms of domination.
The critical question that emerges from the preceding

three chapters is:

how necessary is Adorno'

s

unwillingness

to grapple with explicitly political questions of anti-

capitalist organization and strategy?

Adorno 's attempt to skirt questions of politics is
bound to disappoint us to the extent that the political

horizon has not quite collapsed as completely as Adorno 's
account would have it.

However plausible the argument for a

sort of systematic effacement of politics (i.e. capitalism
has proven astonishingly capable of containing political

challenges), there is too much evidence that opposition has
modernnot finally receded to the pages and canvases of the
ist avant-garde

.
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This chapter will briefly recapitulate the ways in

which political action becomes virtually inconceivable in
the confines of Adorno's analysis, and go on to consider the

central question of this dissertation:

might there be an

Adornian path out of Adorno's own political dead-end?
What

I

will suggest as an answer to this is no simple

correction of Adorno's 'mistakes,' nor so much the filling
of a 'hole'

arrogant:

in his work, but something possibly even more

something along the lines of his critique of

Hegel, which seizes upon the theoretical

'best intentions'

of Hegel as a key to critique him from the 'inside.'

This immanent critique will draw on the previous three

chapters to reconstruct the line of thinking that leads

Adorno to such a steep devaluation of the sphere left for
political action under late capitalism; at the same time,

I

will make good on the claims made earlier that Adorno's

analysis does not always live up to its best theoretical
intentions.

This critique will suggest that politics may

have more breathing space left to it than Adorno allowed,
and it will allow us to make some modest suggestions about
the most important considerations for the project of resus-

citating the kind of oppositional subjectivity that Adorno's
analysis seems to wait upon.
Ultimately, the constellation of interest, desire and
agency that Adorno constructs needs to be rethought from the

ground up; the scope of this project allows me only to
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suggest some possible avenues for such a rethinking.
two key maneuvers here will be:

First,

The

to re-examine the

role 'totality* plays in Adorno's work; our basic concern
is

with the status of notions like the 'totally administered
society,

'

and the suffocating sense of enclosure that seems

to warrant Adorno's neglect of political struggles.

Secondly,

I

will argue for the importance of the prob-

lem of intersubjectivity, and suggest that an analysis of
the politics industry that resists the temptation to consign

political activity to the superstructure might extend the
insights of Adorno's work on the culture industry in fruitful ways

A.

A Message in a Bottle

Three main lines of analysis undergird Adorno's dismissal of politics:

that politics has become thoroughly

colonized by the logic of commodif ication; that society is
integrated into a totally administered web of domination,
and that the psychological friction generated by life under
late capitalism is redirected in ways which support the

status quo.
These three reasons correspond roughly to the schema

outlined in the first chapter:

a

meaningful political

dimension to social life is undermined in contemporary

1

67

I

capitalism on the level of reason (the commodif ication of
discourse), the economy (the integration and closure associ-

ated with state capitalism), and desire (the turning of

subjectivity against itself).

The argument about the far-ranging repercussions of

commodif ication is the most compelling part of Adorno's

critique of late capitalism.

It is not simply that nearly

all communication in contemporary society is sponsored by

some economic interest; the marginalizing, silencing effect
of commercialized communication was certainly palpable even

before Adorno.

Content, as Adorno never lets us forget, is

not immune to form.
The implications of this for political discourse are

rather vaster than we can take up here, and are barely

explored by Adorno.

the commodif ication of dis-

However,

course is the key to understanding the political project of

Adorno's texts.

The image Adorno offers of his critical

theory as a 'message in a bottle'

metaphor

— his

is more than just a casual

central propaedeutic intention is to make the

catastrophe of late capitalism real for the reader.

But the

message one pulls from bottles like Negative Dialectics is
not to save the sender, but the receiver.
Thus, Adorno's critique of simple notions of communication, and of the demand for clarity and intelligibility,

reflect a deeply political awareness of the need to break
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through (or sneak around?) the conventions of language in
a
world made of, by and for the reproduction of capital. 2

The commodif ication of discourse cannot be severed from
the invocations of totality that recur throughout Adorno;
we are repeatedly told we live in a 'totally integrated,'

'totally administered,'

domination.*

society, under the spell of 'total

The political implications clearly run toward

the kind of closure of the political realm that Marcuse

elaborates in One-Dimensional Man.

In Adorno 's sociology,

there are virtually no margins, and no 'outside.'

Even the

solitary thinkers with whom Adorno identifies whatever
persists of the revolutionary moment can hardly be said to
be 'on the margins of society,' given the web of complicity

even critical individuals find themselves in.

We are all on

the inside, and the atmosphere is decidedly suffocating.
As

I

suggested in the first chapter, the notion of a

"totally administered" society is grounded in the disappearance of mediation between the individual and society.

The

thesis of "state capitalism" suggests that the political-

economic elite has brought to fruition a kind of negative
image of socialism,

in which the world has indeed become,

Lenin's memorable phrasing would have it, "one office and
one factory."

This sense of the totally administered society is

buttressed by Adorno 's hints that it may run up against an
169

as

internal limit, precisely by doing away with any mediation

between universal and particular:
The universal that compresses the particular until
it splinters, like a torture instrument, is working against itself, for its substance is the life
of the particular; without the particular, the
universal declines to an abstract, separate, eradicable form.

Within the individual subject, this 'compression' takes
place via the subversion of the field of tension maintained
by the ego; ego weakness, as we saw in chapter one,

is a

loss of mediation in within the subject.
Still, Adorno too easily neglects mediation in his own

description of internal and external domination.

He too

easily plays off a lost, mediated 'liberal' capitalism

against contemporary unmediated totalizing capitalism,

without examining that mediation whose loss is so important
to the force of his critique.

Indeed,

in the construction of the entrepreneurial

subject, one finds a fairly superficial discussion of the

mediating institutions and practices Hegel summarized under
the heading civil society, but no attempt to engage either

Hegel or other robust theories of civil society.

Nor does

Adorno take an interest in any Marxist theories of politics
meant to supersede Hegel and liberal theory more generally.
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B.

Excur sus:

Hegel and Civil Society

Adorno can only dismiss the sphere of politics as
thoroughly as he does if his account of the 'end of the
individual'

is compelling.

What makes rational social

action practically unthinkable under late capitalism is

Adorno 's narrative of the liguidation of autonomy in the
passage from liberal capitalism to state capitalism.
first chapter,

I

In the

suggested that this narrative was deeply

flawed; it is time to see what one can make of the insuffi-

ciencies of this critical thread in Adorno 's sociology.
To recapitulate briefly:

Adorno, building on Hegel's

and Marx's account, describes capitalist civil society as a

realm of potential freedom and eguality.

Individuals in a

capitalist market operate in a way which prefigures a rational,

free social life without being able to realize it

within the confines of capitalism.

The replacement of

liberal, competitive capitalism by 'state capitalism'

fore-

closes these glimmers of what a free society would be like.
This transition, which I've argued is decisive for
Adorno'

s

sociology of contemporary life (and especially his

'political deficit'), hinges on three critical moments, all
of which involve the enclosure or 'integration' of social

life into (what would present itself as) a seamless totality.

Economic production based on an 'open' system of compe171

tition between distinct firms is replaced by vertically and

horizontally integrated monopoly.

The autonomy the liberal

market fostered in formally free economic actors is replaced
by obedience and conformity within a socially pre-manufac-

tured role.

Finally, the totality is guaranteed outside the

workplace by an omnipresent and integrated culture industry,
which itself embodies the transition from 'anarchic' cultural production to monopolistic, mass-produced culture.
I

noted in the first chapter that the first of these

three moments in Adorno's narrative is certainly open to
challenge.

The simplicity of this narrative already throws

into doubt Adorno's claim for a qualitative break between
If the second

nineteenth and twentieth century society.
moment

— the

liquidation of economic agency

— were

coherent

and compelling, then it would be incumbent upon me to take
this critique of Adorno's simple economic history much

further
For our purposes though, a re-writing of Pollock's
'state capitalism'

thesis is not necessary.

The sociologi-

cal argument which this suspicious economic story is meant
to guarantee unravels under close attention, and the re-

writing of the relation of agency and subjectivity to economic conditions that

I

will propose is consistent with the

of
modest observations of chapter one about the mixed nature

capitalism before and after Henry Ford.

What I've called

would be
the entrepreneurial model of agency in Adorno
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flawed,

and would not warrant the political conclusions he

seems to draw from it, even if the notion of a qualitative

break between competitive and post-competitive capitalism
could be substantiated.

The moment of incipient freedom and autonomy visible in
the liberal market is attached by Adorno to the individual's

ability (and of course necessity) to sell his or her labor
power in a situation with some level of meaningful choice.
This invites a number of obvious criticisms.
In privileging the classic homo economicus

,

Adorno not

only begs the question of the subjectivity of men who do not

happen to sell their labor power on the market before the
triumph of monopolies, but also throws the status of women
into question.

Not the least of the flaws of the entrepre-

neurial model are the problematic gender implications of a

narrative which comes uncomfortably close to reprising
Hegel's paean to civil society from the Philosophy of Right,

including the latter 's explicit and adamant exclusion of

women from true subjectivity.
Unlike Horkheimer's more ambitious version (which
doubly compounds its gender trouble by explicit reference to

Freud and fatherhood), Adorno'

s

discussions of agency before

and after state capitalism are not explicitly tied to gender

difference.

Adorno neither excludes nor includes women in

his narrative of the 'end of the individual.'
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Still, as

feminist thinkers have long pointed out, such

f orgetf ulness

is hardly ever innocent.

One could conceivably object that, to the extent that
(pace Hegel) some women did work for wages under the 'liberal'

regime, the entrepreneurial model of agency need not be

assimilated to a Hegelian disguisition on the passive,
plant-like gualities of women.

But whether or not one can

read Adorno as 'gender-neutral' is not really the most

important issue here.

One of the fundamental problems with

the entrepreneurial model of agency is its lack of attention
to the specificity of the ways in which gender plays out in

the economy

— something

about which Adorno simply has little

to say.

Another of this model's fundamental problems is its
narrow focus on a particular species of economic rationality.

The focus on market-oriented rationality denies not

only women a capacity for full-fledged subjectivity, but

anyone whose activity is not essentially directed toward the
market.

Thus Hegel guite consistently calls attention to

the civic limitations of people who work on the land:

the agricultural mode of subsistence remains one
which owes comparatively little to reflection and
independence of will, and this mode of life is in
general such that this class has the substantial
disposition of an ethical life which is immediate,
resting on family relationship and trust.

As noted far above, Adorno seems oblivious to the

exclusionary implications of taking homo economicus as a
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model for human rationality per se.

Even though the criti-

cal intention behind his deployment of the entrepreneurial

model of subjectivity is really only focussed on the comparison between liberal capitalism (which fostered it) and

state capitalism (which discontinues it), this only begs the

question of the status of those to whom this model was never
meant to apply in the first place.
The theoretical intention behind the entrepreneurial

theory of agency is one a renewed critical theory would do

well to take up; but Adorno's effort to link what one might
call 'structural' social imperatives (like the market) to
the maintenance of a certain kind of subjectivity gives us
far too incomplete an account of these structural impera-

tives

.

A return to the comparison with Hegel is instructive on
a number of points.

Adorno's account of the market departs

from Hegel's in decisive and revealing ways.

What Adorno

seems to borrow from the Philosophy of Right is the sense of

civil society as a sphere that inculcates a certain level of

rationality.

Adorno identifies (along with Horkheimer)

certain desirable traits with the liberal, competitive

market they assume preceded 'state capitalism':
ty,

rationali-

autonomy, and conscience, even 'character' and 'soul.'

Like Hegel, this economic rationality is seen to nurture the germ

of a more comprehensive, more adequate ratio-

nality, which ought to find its realization in a rational,
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just society which transcends the anarchy and injustice into

which a capitalist economy left to itself would degenerate.
For Hegel, both these moments are secured by mediation
of particular needs and interests in the market:

The aim here is subjective particularity, but the
universal asserts itself in the bearing which this
satisfaction has on the needs of others and their
free arbitrary wills.
In civil society individuals encounter the universal,

in the

guise of the other people whose well-being is entwined with
theirs.

The Reason latent in particular interest makes its

first appearance in the Bildung the market imposes on indi-

viduals

:

Consequently, individuals can attain their ends
only so far as they themselves determine their
knowing, willing, and acting in a universal way
and make themselves links in this chain of social
connexions.
In these circumstances, the interest
of the Idea an interest of which these members of
civil society are as such unconscious lies in the
process whereby their singularity and their natural condition are raised... to formal freedom and
formal universality of knowing and willing the
process whereby their particularity is educated up
7
to subjectivity.

—

—

—

Obviously we should be rather reluctant to assimilate Adorno
to a model of political economy that celebrates the way in

which people are made "links in this chain of social connexions."

Already, there is a subtle difference of emphasis

in the accounts of the link between economic interest and

freedom.

For Hegel, the first hint of freedom is latent in

the interdependence of individuals (which they can not come
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to fully recognize within the bounds of civil society);

the

entry into civil society acquaints men with the (abstract
and still implicit) universal that will eventually blossom

into the fully rational universal of the state.

The educa-

tion Hegel attributes to civil society stems from the way it

brings men together.

Adorno challenges the harmony between the particular
and the universal which Hegel's system guarantees.

While

Adorno recognizes the universalizing power of civil society,
it can only be a bad universal,

a

delusion of harmony which

reaches its apotheosis under the 'integrated' society of
state capitalism.

For Adorno, Hegel's assurance that the

particulars and the universal fit smoothly within one dialectical whole subverts the truly progressive moment of
civil society:

the moment of an independent, oppositional

individuality capable of taking up a critical stance toward
the collective:

The individual feels free insofar as he has opposed himself to society and can do something
though incomparably less than he believes against
His freedom is
society and other individuals.
primarily that of a man pursuing his own ends,
ends that are not directly and totally exhausted
In this sense, freedom coincides
by social ends.
with the principle of individuation. A freedom of
this type has broken loose from primitive society;
within an increasingly rational one it has
achieved a measure of reality.

—

The fragility of this individuality, Adorno makes
clear, lies (dialectically enough) in the way in which
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liberal 'freedom' was forced on the individual by the workings of the capitalist economy:

The process of evolving individual independence is
a function of the exchange society [ Tauschgesellschaft]
.The individual was free as an economically active bourgeois subject, free to the extent
to which the economic system reguired him to be
autonomous in order to function.
His autonomy is
thus potentially negated at the source.
The freedom of which he boasted had a negative side, which
Hegel was the first to notice; it was a mockery of
true freedom, an expression of the contingency of
every individual's social fate. 9
.

.

.

Adorno's discussion of freedom does not really pursue
Hegel's schema beyond civil society.

In "Aspects of Hegel's

Philosophy," he critigues Hegel's "idolization" of the state
as a deus ex machina,

a

suspension of the dialectic neces-

sary to save his system from the antagonisms Hegel himself

had shown civil society incapable of mastering.

Without

mentioning Marx directly, Adorno argues that the apotheosis
of the State which artificially caps the Philosophy of Right

was the only way Hegel could avoid developing the implica-

tions of his own insights into class society into a radical

critique of the not-terribly-rational reality of the capitalist state.

10

This argument

— that

Hegel recoiled at the last possible

moment from inventing Marxism

— is

about all we get from

Adorno on the subject of the Hegelian state.

The last few

pages of my argument here suggest, however, that a deeper

engagement with Hegel's state has important implications for
the question of individuality and agency.
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Adorno argues that Hegel appeals to the state "in

desperation as a seat of authority beyond this play of
[antagonistic] forces." 11

But the legitimacy of the state

doesn't fall from the sky, nor is Adorno quite correct (it
seems to me) to argue that the state is tacked onto the

Philosophy of Right in a 'tour de force':

the state is

implicit from the very beginning of civil society, precisely
in the material interdependence embodied in the market:

In the course of actual attainment of selfish
ends... there is formed a system of complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness, and
legal status of one man is interwoven with the
livelihood, happiness, and rights of all.... This
system may be prima facie regarded as the external
state, the state based on need, the state as the
Understanding envisages it. 12

Hegel's extravagant claims for the state hinge on its

claim to be this implicit universality and interdependence
made concrete and self-conscious.

The state is meant to be

the political community's self-conscious intervention in the

self-destructive tendencies of civil society; it amounts,
Hegel wants to claim, to a collective, conscious self-limi-

tation of individual rights and interests, which is in the

ultimate interest of those particular individuals at the
same time it embodies the Idea of ethical life, of the

"absolute unmoved end in itself."
Hegel admits that one is not likely to find a self-conscious, seamless harmony between the state and its citizens,

and he leaves no doubt where the resolution of any conflicts
179

ought to lie.

Adorno's own critique of the fate of the

concrete particular at the hands of the Hegel's universal
ought to force a radical re-writing of the Hegelian theories
of freedom and justice.

Unfortunately, no such re-writing

is forthcoming in Adorno.

Hegel's construction of the legitimacy of the state
opens the door to a critical standard by which really existing states might be judged; the Enlightenment comes very

close to spelling out its radical political implications in
the Philosophy of Right,

in the dialectical sustenance of

the universal through particulars.
ly,

It is not enough,

real-

for Adorno to point out that suspension of the dialectic

at precisely this point, and draw the (apt) comparison

between Hegel's disingenuous universal and really existing
bad totality.
But this is only to restate the problem that we have

been concerned with here from the outset:

Adorno's convic-

tion is that the facade of autonomous individuality on which
a political theory of rational consensus

(Habermas,

for

instance) hangs its aspirations simply will not support such

weight

We can close this excursus to Hegel, and bring this

question to a head, by recalling Marx's response to the

Hegelian ode to the state.

If the state is not "the actual-

ity of the ethical Idea," but rather primarily an instrument
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of class domination, then the immediate project for Marx

becomes the Aufhebung of both class and the state itself.
This, Marx and Engels insist,

is not to be left to the self-

destructive tendencies within capitalism, but must be taken
up as a collective, political project:
If the proletariat ... is compelled, by the force of
circumstances, to organize itself as a class; if
by means of a revolution, it makes itself the
ruling class, and, as such sweeps away by force
the old conditions of production, then it
will... have swept away the conditions for the
existence of class antagonisms, and of classes
generally, and will thereby have abolished its own
supremacy as a class. 14

As we saw in the last chapter, the very notion of a

collective, political project finds little encouragement or

attention in Adorno.

Adorno shies away from questions of

political organization, leaving one with the distinct im-

pression that there is no such thing as a good collective.
Is there a way to draw Adornian theory out of its own solip-

sism?

In a passage which virtually sums up my previous chap-

ter's account of Adorno 's politics, Adorno seems to nod in
the direction of the (lapsed) ideal of the Philosophy of
Right:

The methexis wrought between each individual and
the universal by conscious thinking ... transcends
the contingency of the particular vis-a-vis the
universal, the basis of both Hegel's and the colExperilectivists' contempt for individuality.
to see
individual
the
enable
consistency
and
ence
as
universal
the
which
truth
a
universal
in the
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blindly prevailing power conceals from itself and
from others.
Unfortunately, Adorno never applies this dialectical account
of a critical engagement with the universal to a discussion

of lesser collectivities.

Martin Jay makes the same point

in Marxism and Totality:

Despite his stress on mediation, [Adorno] made
little real attempt to investigate the concrete
social forces and forms between such an individual
and the totality.
Micrological stress on the
smallest detail went hand in hand with macrological emphasis on the largest whole.
What Adorno
lacked was any analysis of a possible intermediate
level between the collective subject of the idealists and Hegelian Marxists, on the one hand, and
the isolated, defensive individual of the bourgeois empiricists on the other. 16
Jay lays this insufficiency at the door of Adorno'

intense focus on non-identity, and no doubt the fear of

being swallowed up in a collective, any collective, plays an

important role in Adorno
on politics.

Still,

1

s

recoil from concrete speculations

in the dialectical tension palpable in

the passage on the truth a critical individual is able to

"see in the universal," Adorno plants a seed for a theoreti-

cally-informed politics that points beyond simple consent,
to a solidarity that is not identity

— but

allows it to sleep

in what he takes to be the utterly fallow ground of the

totally administered society.
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c.

Rediscovering Politics

Adorno's political deficit may not be incurable after
all.

Greater attention to mediating institutions and prac-

tices, as well as a finer grasp of the antagonisms within

even late,

'state'

capitalism, might show not only that

society is not as 'total' as it wants us to believe, but not
quite as totalitarian as Adorno would have us believe.
Politics, it might turn out, is not quite dead yet.

Perhaps

there are institutions and practices neglected by Adorno
(and Hegel) which are more resilient and significant for

resistance to domination than he could have imagined.
Before we can elaborate on these intuitions, we need to
return to the psychoanalytic narrative, which is perhaps for

Adorno the capstone of the social dialectic of enlightenthe Spell is not something which oppresses people

ment:

from 'above' or 'outside,' but is rooted in precisely the

psychological dynamic proper to an economic system that
rationalizes its irrational obstruction of satisfaction and

welfare
The analysis of anti-Semitism in the last chapter of

Dialectic of Enlightenment is especially pertinent here.
Anti-Semitism, Adorno and Horkheimer argue, is not some
localized, particular 'social problem,' or psychological
'dysfunction'; it is a crucial mechanism in late capitalism
for turning the psychic friction generated by the system
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back against the subject.

Anti-Semitism not only directs

the attention of the exploited away from exploitation,

17

but

also serves as a channel for the aggression and violence
that accrues to the powerless under late capitalism, a

senseless "discharge" of the anger of "blinded men robbed of
their sub jectivity

.

.

.

set loose as subjects." 18

In that sense anti-Semitism is totally irrational:

it

has no intelligible relation to its target, which might well

have been something else:

Gypsies, communists, gays, etc.

At the same time, however, Adorno and Horkheimer insist

there is something particular about the symbolic status of
Jews that calls forth an especially virulent, especially

implacable violence:
No matter what the Jews as such may be like, their
image, as that of the defeated people, has the
features to which totalitarian domination must be
completely hostile: happiness without power,
wages without work, a home without frontiers, a
religion without myth. These characteristics are
hated by the rulers because the ruled secretly
long to possess them.
The rulers are only safe as
long as the people they rule turn their longed-for
goals into hated forms of evil. 19

The image of Jewish "happiness without power" evokes
the prohibited sense of Utopia, and wounds the exploited by

reminding them of what they have been forced to renounce.
We saw a very dialectical reinforcement of renunciation
in the second chapter,

spite.

in the discussion of ambivalence and

Here too, the emphasis was on the recoil of pent-up
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aggression upon anything and anyone who would remind the

dominated what they have been made to give up. 20
In both anti-Semitic aggression and the smash hits
of

the culture industry, Adorno suggests that the constituents
of totally administered societies retain some link to agency

and rationality.

Even when they seem to have been reduced

to lockstep conformity,

there are signs that the sacrifice

of volition and autonomy wrung from them is not completely

effaced.

These considerations lead Adorno in "On Popular Music"
to argue that it would be a mistake to see the conformity of

culture industry 'crazes'

— which

are "examples of much

broader issues of mass psychology" 21

— as

into line or relinquishing resistance.

a passive falling

On the contrary,

Adorno argues
They need their will, if only to down the all too
conscious premonition that something is "phony"
with their pleasure. This transformation of their
will indicates that will is still alive and that
under certain circumstances it may be strong
enough to get rid of the superimposed influences
which dog its every step. 22
Even allowing that the proximity to consciousness of
this wilful subordination to the culture industry leads to
the paradox that "it is almost insuperably difficult to
23
Adorno concludes on a
break through this thin veil,"

surprisingly optimistic note.

In Negative Dialectics,

offers the more familiar Adornian lament (in

a

he

similar

context of wilful renunciation) that "The subjective con185

sciousness of men is socially too enfeebled to burst the
invariants it is imprisoned in." 24

But in "On Popular

Music," we hear a rarer motif:

Even the belief that people today react like insects [i.e. jitterbugs]
and are degenerating into
mere centers of socially conditioned reflexes,
still belongs to the facade.... To become a jitterbug or simply to "like" popular music, it does not
by any means suffice to give oneself up and to
fall in line passively.
To become transformed
into an insect, man needs that energy which might
possibly achieve his transformation into a man. 25

Adorno ends the essay at this point, and does not go on to
consider (here or anywhere else) how one might seek to
defuse the fury that meets any reminder of the Utopian.
The analyses of anti-Semitism and of the consumption of

culture both tend to reinforce the notion that resistance to

domination is marginalized or turned away from its proper
focus;

the anti-Semite trains the rage and frustration

wrought by late capitalist society against the Jews as

prominent 'Others,' and the jitterbug vents the friction of

self-sacrifice demanded by the culture industry on the
antisocial 'highbrows' who balk at the aesthetic and social
travesty everyone else has been compelled to embrace.
But the analysis of spite suggests another line of

argument, which Adorno just barely gestures toward in "On

Popular Music."
ted'

That even the most conformist and 'integra-

subjects are not insensitive to reminders of what they

have been forced to forego suggests that an important part
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of a politics of critical theory would attend to this anam-

nesis of Utopia.

Adorno's frequent invocations of Utopia certainly are
meant as precisely such reminders.

His analysis of late

capitalism as a closed, politically and socially domesticated society reduces this insight to a fairly harmless ritual.

The argument that the costs of conforming cannot be com-

pletely effaced hints that the volatility of 'mass' enthusiasms

— the

potential for backlash

of domination and fraud.

—masks

some consciousness

At the same time, this spiteful

consciousness remembers the promises that were made to it,
and might yet be shown how they were broken.

But breaking the Spell, circumventing spite, can not be

envisioned as a political project within the bounds of
Adorno's theory, since the domain of politics is understood
to be completely woven from the bad totality.
I

Politics, as

suggested above, is left in the sphere of 'superstruct-

ure,

'

as long as the only conceivable collectives are bad

ones

How necessary is this dismissal of politics?

To the

extent that his suspicion of collective identity leaves

Adorno so cold to politics that the defeated proletariat
becomes a kind of excuse to ignore political conflicts

happening around him, Adorno can not be easily made into a
'political theorist.'
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While we need not take 'polities'

in late capitalism at

face value, we ought to challenge Adorno's willingness
to

decide beforehand that politics is no longer politically
relevent, that apparent manifestations of resistance can't

touch the real structure of domination.

A determination to

take up the question of politics after the miscarriage of

revolution, can only do so by departing from Adorno when his

conclusions fall short of the best theoretical intentions of
his work.
In the remainder of this chapter,

I

will sketch what

I

think this involves, with the understanding that this can
only constitute a kind of prospectus for another project

entirely

D.

On

conclude

the

basis

that

Renewing Critical Theory

what

of

Adorno's

I

have

political

written

sociology

here,
is

one

limited

can
by

(among other things) the shortcomings of the analysis of an

integrated, pacified state capitalism.

A renewal of critical

theory would have to situate political conflicts within a much
more adequate vision of the dynamic, antagonistic constellation of contemporary capitalism.

Pollock's theses on state capitalism

markets by planning,

the

fusion of
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— the displacement of

economic and political

— have

elites

a measure of truth, but obviously can not stand

without a thorough re-writing.

It is not possible here to do

much more than gesture at the mountain of Marxist and non-

Marxist work in this area; some common concerns, however, are
impossible to ignore:
ization of markets,

the ever more complete international-

the

inadeguacy of

the

classic Marxist

account of class, the importance of government policy and of
credit

and

finance,

and the

importance

of

intracapitalist

relations
Each of these things highlights the complex, crosscutting

antagonisms and political pressures at work within capitalism.
This

complexity

is

both daunting

and

encouraging:

it

is

certainly not the monolithic, integrated system that Pollock
At the same time, it is some kind of 'system,

described.

1

(if

a system of interlocking systems) and there are no guarantees

that the workings of its antagonisms are preparing the ground
for a post-capitalist, non-exploitative system.

this

Still,

political

to

rearticulate

late

capitalism

attempt

landscape

of

the

will

economic
not

and

force

a

revision of Adornian conclusions unless his account of the

decline of the subject can be shown to be flawed in some
relevant way.
Here again, Adorno's own accomplishments in this regard

need

to

be

extended

and

rearticulated

.

The

question

of

subjectivity and politics could hardly be more relevant in a
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time when politically organized hatred and 'barbarism' seem to
be resurgent nearly everywhere.

The

link

imperatives

conscience
only

a

Adorno

and

— what

very

attempts

individual
I

'

to

draw

between

rationality,

character,

ve called entrepreneurial agency

narrow

range

of

subjects,

economic

and

and

— addresses

makes

poor

a

standard for contemporary individuality, given its exclusion
of

subjects who are not in a position to sell their labor

power in the market.

Critical theory needs a thorough re-

thinking of the problem of subjectivity:

a theory of agency,

labor and desire that can speak to (among other things) the

workings of structural imperatives of sexism and racism on

subjectivity
If Adornian social analysis needs more sociology,

economics,

and more

politics,

likewise can be pushed beyond
psychology.

his

account

its

limitations with

of

more

subjectivity
'more'

There are two moments in Adorno that are critical

to the problem of political consciousness, and yet relatively

undeveloped:

the unsettling force of desire, and the mode of

subjectivity Adorno ascribes to aesthetic understanding.
By and large, Adorno tends to emphasize the ways in which

subjects are bound to domination through their own desire.
But there is more to desire than this; Horkheimer and Adorno

hint at this in Dialectic of Enlightenment:
the
In every product of the culture industry,
permanent denial imposed by civilization is once
again unmistakably demonstrated and inflicted upon
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its victims.
To offer and deprive them of something is one and the same.

The notion of "the permanent denial imposed by civilization,"
in its echo of Civilization and Its Discontents, reminds us of

the

unsettling,

desire.

relentlessly

anti-institutional

side

of

If Adorno presents the totally administered society

as a totality which is not quite as total as it claims,

as a

circle that appears to close but can't quite, then unfulfilled

desire ought to be the most important marker of late capitalism's non-identity with itself.

To

switch

to

the

sort

of

classical

metaphor

Adorno

favors, if our society is as arrogant, efficient and deadly as
the Greeks' greatest hero, might desire not be its Achilles'

heel? 27

There is some persistent ambivalence in Dialectic of

Enlightenment over the relation of desire to the prevailing
totality.

On the one hand, they abhor the kind of mindless,

unmediated pleasure the culture industry seems to offer; at
the same time,

they tend to insist that the culture industry

really can't deliver:
work,

it promises escape from the drudgery of

but in the end reinforces the heteronomous rhythm of

production.

Surely

the

reader

is

bound

to

trip

over

sentence like:

Pleasure hardens into boredom because, if it is to
remain pleasure, it must not demand any effort and
therefore moves rigorously in the worn grooves of
association 28
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a

Horkheimer

and

Adorno

try

to

reconcile

culture

the

industry and desire by emphasizing the extent to which the
former manufactures its customers'
output.

Still

they

admit

that

needs to accord with its

there

is

limit

a

to

this

strategy, since the culture industry can hardly admit what it
is really selling:

The culture industry perpetually cheats its consumers of what it perpetually promises. The promissory note which, with its plots and staging, it draws
on pleasure is endlessly prolonged; the promise,
which is actually all the spectacle consists of, is
illusory:
all it actually confirms is that the
real point will never be reached, that the diner
must be satisfied with the menu.
As long as it seems to offer pleasure and escape, the culture

industry (and its liegelord, late capitalism) is playing with

Desire always comes back for more than it can get, and

fire.

fascism and

revolution both seem to

between

socially

caters

the
to

and

the

preformed needs

'more'

that

take
the

persists

root

in

culture
in

the

the

gap

industry

memory

of

desire

Adorno and Horkheimer argue in almost Foucauldian terms
that the culture industry dampens the critical force of desire
by continually reinforcing the illusion of its own totality

and inescapability

What is decisive today is... the necessity in the
system not to leave the customer alone, not for a
moment to allow him any suspicion that resistance
is possible ... .Not only does it make him believe
that the deception it practices is satisfaction,
but it goes further and implies that, whatever the
state of affairs, he must put up with what is offered.
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Still, Adorno's comments on ambivalence and spite make clear

that this gambit is never entirely successful.

Adorno's 'ascetic' distrust of pleasure (which

I

criti-

cized earlier) is an important part of the awkward status of

desire

and

pleasure

in

Adorno's

stress

on

the

pleasure

causes

him

to

desire.

Here

again,

the

dialectic

unavoidably
undervalue

we

might

enlightenment.

of

complicit
the

look

negative

back

Begierde is the motive force of dialectics:

to

nature

of

force

of

Hegel,

where

it is desire that

set The Phenomenology of Spirit in motion, and desire as sheer

negativity

— as

Geist' s

felt

non-identity

with

itself

— is

ultimately at one with critique.
Horkheimer and Adorno's emphasis on fear as the root of
the dialectic of enlightenment displaces the role desire could

play as the link between central Adornian concepts of nature,

suffering and reason.

A dialectical account of desire that

remembered Hegel (without suspending the dialectic as he does
with women) would have to work along two axes.

Desire has not

only a critical and an affirmative side, but a social dimension that has been overshadowed by its more obvious antisocial

dimension
The affirmative side of desire

is

bound up with what

Adorno saw as its conciliatory nature (as we saw in chapter
I).

Desire seems to be always on the verge of capitulating;

satisfaction,

we usually imagine,

least in the moment).
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is

the end of desire

(at

Even here though, it has to be noted that the relation of

gratification to desire is far from linear and simple.

The

pleasure of gratification does not simply cancel or exhaust
desire; certainly in what Jean Baudrillard calls 'societe de

consommation,
desire.

'

gratification is planned to call forth more

Contentment, a shortage of desire, would sabotage the

whole more surely than any shortage of oil or coal.
This

suggests

refinement

a

thesis:

the culture

studies

{Dialectic

industry,

of

of

the

culture

industry

recent work in cultural

as

Enlightenment'

bastard

s

godchild)

recognizes, constantly mobilizes our discontent in a field of

commodities, in which our half-conscious fetishism takes most
of its pleasure in the lusting after of things more than in

their 'use.'

In this respect, Horkheimer and Adorno deploy a

rather too simple understanding of desire and gratification,

especially in the field of culture.

Adorno 's backward-looking orientation allowed him to look
down upon the culture industry from the beleagured heights of

classical
anymore.

Bildung,

the

option

that

is

hardly

conceivable

Two generations of scholars have now grown up under

a more mature,

and

an

realized, and sophisticated culture industry,

persistence of Adornian

themes

in

works

like

Guy

Debord's Society of the Spectacle is modulated through the

increasing recognition that there is no longer an 'outside'
from which to condemn the culture industry.

Even elitists and

hip avant-gardists can hardly ignore the extent to which their
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aesthetic

judgements

are

just

one more

set

of

thoughtfully provided by the cultural combines.

pigeonholes
And even the

hippest and most erudite, it seems to me, feel the erotic pull
of consumption.

Even political theorists go to the mall now.

All this seems only to confirm Adorno

1

s

suspicion that

the cycle of desire and pleasure work primarily to interrupt

thought and reflection.

Still, thought can hardly be imagined

to emerge from anything else than desire,

demonstrates.

Desire

appears

very

as Hegel elegantly

suddenly

in

the

Phenomenology, early in the section on 'Self-Consciousness';
we

labor

through a thicket of

convoluted meditations upon

perception and self-perception to be ambushed by the conclusion,

"...i.e.

self-consciousness

is

Desire

in

general." 32

Desire commences the analysis of self-consciousness, and is a
turning point in the ontogeny of Reason, because it draws the
subject out of itself, making it conscious of its own nonidentity with itself, and ultimately of its dialectical dependence
on other subjects.

At every step in the analysis of self-

consciousness, desire is the moment of negation that pushes
the subject out of its complacency and drives it to renew its

engagement with the world to discover the truth of itself.
Desire and the self-certainty obtained in its
gratification, are conditioned by the object, for
self-certainty comes from superseding this other:
in order that this supersession can take place,
there must be this other. Thus self-consciousness,
by its negative relation to the object, is unable
to supersede it; it is really because of that
relation that is^ produces the object again, and the
desire as well.
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Self-consciousness,

discovers

object

its

to

continue

needs

it

education.

special

a

Desire

sets

kind

of

mas-

the

ter/slave dialectic in motion, and frustrated desire marks the

irrationality of domination, and makes possible the extended

meditation on freedom,

reason,

and nature that make up the

rest of the Phenomenology.

Here

we

come

upon

discussion of desire:
social ends.

the

second

axis

necessary

to

any

its affinity to both anti-social and

The failure of the master/slave dialectic marks

the point in Hegel's narrative that may be the key to resusci-

tating a critical theory that can speak to politics.

As we

saw in our earlier discussion of the Philosophy of Right, one
of Hegel's great accomplishments is to highlight the irrevoca-

bly social nature of subjectivity and rationality.
the same lesson early in the Phenomenology:

We learn

self-conscious-

ness is a social project, and reason and desire intertwine our
lives, whether we like it or not, with those of other people.

This

insight

tends

to

be

crushed under

the

weight of

the

universal it comes to support, since Hegel, as Adorno put it
so eloquently, was not so much interested in individuals as in

individuality
Still, here as in the Hegelian state, we have the germ of
a

compelling

attempt

to

navigate

the

tension

'inside' and the 'outside' of subjectivity.

both mark

the

point

at

which
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the

I

between

the

Desire and reason

finds

itself

through

mediation with not-I; both find their highest satisfaction in
relations with other people.

One of the central projects of the Enlightenment was to

confirm exactly this congruence,
between mind and body,
common

good.

When

to overcome the opposition

between individual interest and the

Freud

(following

Nietzsche's

manuevers a generation-and-a-half earlier)

similar

revitalized

the

time-honored narrative of the irreconciliable tension between
desire and civilization, he revoked the focus on recognition
and intersub jectivity which lay dormant in Hegel.

Freud's narrative of the internal dynamics of the ego

promises more intersub jectivity than it delivers.
Freud

does

bind

subjects

together

— but

not

Desire in
subjects;

as

Freud's naturalization of desire shifts attention away from

recognition and intersub jectivity

toward the instrumental,

,

amoral impact that subjects have on each other.

His account

of the child's relation to his parents is not about a real

relationship between individuals, but a narrative of impersonal shadow-play going on within every little boy.

Unfortunately,

in

this regard,

34

Adorno chose to follow

Freud rather than Hegel, developing an account of the antisocial nature of pleasure without any of the Oedipal window-

Several

dressing.

critics

have

taken

Adorno to

lacking an appreciation for intersub jectivity

critique

is

undermined

by

his
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reductive

35

task

for

Connerton's

reading

of

the

dialectic of enlightenment, and leads him to argue that Adorno
loses sight of "the notion of the self as socially produced." 36

Habermas criticizes Adorno for a
ness,

'philosophy of conscious-

arguing that Adorno and Horkheimer conflate reason and

'

'instrumental

reason.'

Not

only

is

this

a

misreading of

Adorno, but it is very hard to see how Habermas* own theory of

'communicative ethics' includes any meaningful intersub jective

dimension

37

Only Jessica Benjamin has really given this topic the

attention it deserves,

and even her attempt to move Adorno

beyond his own limitations is hampered by the conflation of

Adorno and Horkheimer

remarked upon earlier.

I

Benjamin does,

however locate the root of the problem in Adorno'

s

indebted-

ness to Freud.
In Civilization and Its Discontents

warrants

,

anti-social desire

explicitly conservative political conclusions;

in

Adorno it serves more to warn us against any conflation of
revolution with

hedonism or

utilitarianism.

forecloses on the most promising source of
energy:

But

it

also

'revolutionary'

the desire for Utopia is only intelligible in the

context of solidarity

38
.

If there is anything that would arouse more suspicion in

Adorno than pleasure and enthusiasm, it could only be collective

enthusiasm and

a

feeling

larger community of people.
the

of

'identifying'

with

some

Adorno is deeply suspicious of

notion of community because he doubts
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that meaningful

community could be founded on the prevailing sort of massproduced,

conformist

subjectivity.

Adorno would argue,

I

think, that there is no hope for community without individuality.

At the same time, Adorno is clearly wary of the coercive

power of every collective.

Certainly this has something to do

with

of

his

interpretation

avenues

the

available to him throughout his life:
route

the

of

Lukacs

Brecht).

(or

of

'solidarity'

he was not about to go

The

argumentation

Negative Dialectics is instructive here:

of

arguments for the

independence of theory and critigues of party discipline recur
throughout the book paired with critigues of identity-thinkand attempts to specify how negative dialectics might

ing,

'unseal the nonconceptual

ness

1

'

with concepts. 39

from contemporary politics stems,

I

Adorno 's 'aloofthink,

from a fear

that any conceivable involvement with politics in this world

necessarily compromises the kind of hard-won and endangered
individuality

he

prized,

and

makes

one

subject

to

"the

insatiable identity principle that perpetuates antagonism by

suppressing contradiction."

40

This may have been, in some sense, a reasonable political

judgment during most of Adorno 's lifetime:

not one beyond

challenge, but it was certainly not a ridiculous assessment,
and looks much smarter with hindsight than falling in step

with the Comintern.
of

a

critical

However, even granting the unsuitability

solidarity

with
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the

major

Marxist

options,

Adorno's justified suspicion of the demands of party politics
slides too easily into paranoia,

and a kind of purism which

would rather lacerate itself for its complicity in domination
than explore affiliations that are not immediately present.

The point here is not to scold Adorno for a personal

failure to find a good spot on a barricade,

question the ways

in

but rather,

to

which his revulsion at the political

options in his field of vision pushed his theory into nearsolipsism.

To recall the opening of chapter two:

may have been driven into aesthetics,

but

its

politics

retreat was

awfully hasty.
As

I

argued

in

the

last

chapter,

the

persistence of

political struggles that do not register on Adorno's radar

highlights his (in this case unfortunate) reliance on surprisingly orthodox Marxist categories.

It is striking that Adorno

fails to consider any form of collective resistance (any form
of meaningful politics) outside of the classical Marxist one.

His approaches to explicitly political questions begin and end

with the conclusion that Communism is "the very relapse into

barbarism which it was supposed to prevent.

Coupled with the critique of the culture industry, which
is meant to expose the claims of pluralist apologists in the

West,

this

grants Adorno leave to ignore conflicts in the

social realm,

and abandon any concern with politics to the

superstructure critical theory ought to have discredited.
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E.

Reco gnition and Solidarity

However much it might seem otherwise at this juncture, we
need not set Adorno beside Nietzsche as a brilliant anti-

political philosopher.

The question of intersub jectivity

of a social dimension to desire allow us

,

and

to push Adorno s
'

analysis in a direction which might maintain the intransigent,

dialectical critique of Adornian political theory,

walling

it

off

from political

engagement

in

the

without
way

that

Adorno does
The Hegelian emphasis on recognition, most especially in
the account of its failure in the master/slave dialectic, lays

out the criteria for real intersub jectivity
that:

Hegelian recognition opens

the

.

door

But not only
to

a

critical

theory of solidarity, which can shift the ground of liberal
and Marxist

thinking about politics,

assuage Adorno'

s

and at

same

time

fear of the collective.

Recognition in the Hegelian sense,
successful,

the

when and if

it

is

defines mutuality in terms that Adorno himself

intimates are the key to defusing the dialectic of enlightenment:

a relationship that does not aim at the subsumption of

the other,

but needs to sustain the other in its alterity.

While Adorno'
relations,

s

writing evinces little hope in intersub jective

these are precisely the terms which he uses

discuss a reconciliation with nature:
Things congeal as fragments of that which was
subjugated; to rescue it means to love things....
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to

The reconciled condition would not be the philosophical imperialism of annexing the alien.
Instead, its happiness would lie in the fact that the
alien, in the proximity it is granted, remains what
is distant and different, beyond the heterogeneous
and beyond that which is one's own. 42

Substitute 'other people' for 'things,' and one has a summary
of "solidarity" that is hard to improve upon.

This model of intersub jective relations is an exemplary
basis,

it seems to me,

and solidarity.

for rethinking democratic citizenship

Understanding others as other people, as at

the same time alike and not the same as oneself,

is the very

foundation of democratic theory and praxis.
Further,

if we challenge the quarantine between reason

and desire, between rationality and the emotions (as Hegelian

theory aspires, unsuccessfully, and as Nietzsche, Freud, and

Foucault

have

theory),

this understanding of solidarity pushes democratic

made

ever more

the

pressing

task

of

social

theory beyond the liberal schema of formal rights and respon-

sibilities.

Ultimately, the Hegelian logic of recognition is

only the dressed-up-in-its-Sunday-clothes version of the logic
of love.

To the extent that twentieth-century social theory has

seen

psychoanalytic

rationalism,
the

project

and

Nietzschean challenges

to

liberal

these have almost always been to cast doubt on
of

an

enlightened

politics.

The

Frankfurt

School's work on fascism and anti-Semitism is a not insignificant case in point.
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Perhaps the less mainstream inclinations of writers like

Reich

and

Marcuse

were

on

something

to

more

promising.

Recognition, understood as a basic emotional need for mutuality,

grounded in our ineluctable connectedness, ought to allow

us to push politics beyond mechanical theories of interest,

and presage an Aufhebung of liberal rights-talk, grounding it
in the living

— but

yet to be realized

— solidarity

of people in

a particular society.

One

could

hardly

imagine

a

better

definition of

the

substance of a positive theory of democracy than solidarity,

understood as an identification with community that sustains
the self without subsuming it.

It also happens to be,

I

would

suggest,

the project of a renewed critical theory, precisely

because:

you can't buy this kind of solidarity ready-made.

Community is more than a natural formation into which one
is 'thrown'; it is a continual problem and project, whether or

not

it

is

consciously understood as such.

For a politics

determined to make good on the wild optimism of the Enlightenment, the form and content of solidarity are really the same;

sustaining

a

political

movement

can

be

nothing

else

than

sustaining democracy.
Liberal political theory's mechanical focus on interest,

obscures the fact that politics changes people.

which might hope at least for some

notions of solidarity,

strategic
this.

43

outbursts

Again,

it

is

Even Marxist

of

enthusiasm,

have

largely

neglected

Hegel foremost among modern political
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philosophers that highlights the constitutive dimension of
political

life: 44

if

consciously recognize

the
in

universal
the

life

that

of

citizens

the

come

to

state ultimately

buries them, we should not forget that it is this encounter

with the universal that makes citizens, properly speaking.
This insight is critically important if we are to rescue

Adornian critical theory from its affinity with solipsism.
Adorno ought to have been interested in political conflicts
around him,
apparatus,'

press

regardless of the
for two reasons.

their

limited,

demands

upon

conventional

very

'unprecedented power of the
The moment a group of people

recalcitrant
attempts

at

authorities,

reform

even

potentially

expose subjects to precisely the sort of structual imperatives
he identifies with liberal capitalism.

Beyond this,

every political space,

even gatherings of

political parties, brushes up against an intimation of genuine
solidarity, and threatens to cathect the social dimension of

desire in ways which can not be foreseen beforehand.
In this respect, nothing could be more salutary for the

cliques in power than the widespread conviction that politics
is meaningless and hopeless, and only people desperate enough

to have no choice but to hope against hope can pose any threat
to their power.

There are a number of conceivable objections to this line
of

argument

around

solidarity
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and

an

insistence

on

the

constitutive dimension of politics; in the remaining pages,

I

will take up some response to the most significant and obvious
ones

One

may

suspect

this

privileging

community

of

and

solidarity of mirroring what has been one of the persistent
shortcomings of

social

theory until very

recently,

and of

radical social theory especially: its fixation on one encom-

passing community,
petty,

which would contain and domesticate the

'partial' differences that sully it.

It is no longer (if it ever were) tolerable to speak this

way;

we know too much now of the costs of suppressing and

subordinating difference, and can look back on a long history
of self-defeating attempts to put aside the concerns of women,
or of blacks, etc. on behalf of the 'larger' interests of the

collective
What is needed now, is rather a theory of solidarity and

collective action that can address the problems of articulation and

coordination between collectives.
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This

project

obviously faces a host of difficulties; there are two suggestions

I

would offer in this direction.

First, it nearly goes without saying, we need to appreci-

ate and be able to speak to the ways in which ideal communities overlap concrete individuals in nearly infinitely complex
ways.

This kind of meta-identity politics is a topic that has

benefited from an avalanche of attention
theory:

46

there cannot be a theory of
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in

recent

social

'working class poli-

tics,'

'lesbian

theories

of

politics,

the

1

or

articulation

'Latino politics,'
of

these

around

but

only

particular

political questions in ways which can negotiate these kind of

cross-cutting identif icatons
Secondly,

I

think we should not forget the Hegelian mega-

collective; if only as the negative universal hanging over the
community.

The world-historical genie that Hegel

tried to

stuff back into the bottle of the nation-state expresses our
real interconnectedness

,

which is becoming ever more impossi-

ble to forget at the same time it seems less and less amenable
to conscious intervention.

This ultimately,

orient

strategies

concrete

political

within

I

think, has to
the

'partial'

communities of race, class, sexuality, and gender

without, it

attempting to dissolve or

'reconcile'

should be

apparent,

these differences in the mega-community.

A possibly more damaging objection comes from the same

arguments of Freud to which this argument was meant in some
sense to respond.

In Civilization and Its Discontents

(explicitly arguing against

a

,

Freud

link between love and socialism)

dons the majestic robes of the Hobbesian hard-nosed Realist to

remind us that a person's neighbor is:
not only a potential helper or sexual object, but
also someone who tempts them to satisfy his aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work
without compensation, to use him sexually without
his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate
him, to cause him pain, to torture and kill him.
Who, in the face of all his
Homo homini lupus.
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experience of life and of history,
courage to dispute this assertion?
Amidst

this

florid

sado-masochistic

will have the

fantasy,

there

is

a

serious social and political argument, as old and honorable as
any in the canon:

that people are not inclined to cooperate,

that a society that takes for granted any measure of goodwill

not

wrung

out

of

its

members

by

the

ultimate

promise

of

violence, cannot be imagined to perpetuate itself.

Freud updates this chestnut for post-Nietzschean modernity:

we all have an inherent,

ineradicable drive to aggres-

sion; we cannot escape or wish away our animalistic, Darwinian

heritage
It is not necessary (thankfully) to embroil a defense of

solidarity in the sprawling controversy over human nature,
competition,

and aggression.

It

seems to me that we don't

need to refute the argument that desire has an anti-social
side, to argue that it also has a 'social' side, and that the

project of a humane politics is self-evidently to cultivate

institutional

cathexes

with

the

side

of

desire

people to one another in non-dominating ways.

that

ties

48

One might object that an emphasis on love and solidarity,

taken even to the point of an endorsement of the transform-

ative potential of mass enthusiasm,

Adorno fears most:

leads directly to what

the dissolution of the individual into the

newly validated "community."
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But

solidarity

not

is

meant

to

connote

the

kind

of

experience that Freud ridicules as the "oceanic feeling" of
oneness with humanity.

It is precisely the conscious engage-

ment with domination and suffering in the society one lives
in,

made real through concrete membership in various cross-

cutting communities.

It

is

an

attentiveness to one's own

complicity in domination as well as a recognition of the ways
in which one's own fate is bound up with people whom one may

have very little 'in common' with.
In political life, solidarity comes into maturity as the

capacity to link the concrete political ends to a critigue of
the bad totality,

and an openness to the unigue pleasure of

common work in the political sphere.
The very fact that no community is hermetically distinct,
that we

are

all

surest

guarantor

Indeed,

I

prisms of a number of
against

a

regress

identities,

to

'mass

is

the

politics.'

think much of the theoretical and practical energy

of a community is devoted,

consciously or unconsciously,

to

understanding and negotiating its relation to the array of
communities it overlaps.

The direst objection against all this will stand as the
last one:

critical,

that it depends upon exactly the kind of conscious,
'robust'

(nearly) extinct.

subjects

that

Adorno

believes

to

be

This is an objection that we cannot dodge

so easily.
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I

suppose my

first

inclination

argue

to

is

that

one

simply cannot assume that really existing subjects are beyond
recall.

This leaves one the equally unpalatable political

options of a Zarathustran retreat to the mountains, or a kind
of hyper-Leninist attempt to compete with late capitalism in
the business of cultural and psychological manipulation.
If Adorno's critique is to mean anything to contemporary

radicalism,

one

left with

is

the

rather mundane Gramscian

realization that the ultimate success of the project is not a
topic for theoretical or practical consideration;

if you'll

excuse an extremely tiresome phrase (the kind Adorno loathed):
one does what one can.

Mostly

because

there

really

isn't

any

choice

the

in

matter; if Adorno's critique touches a person at all, then you
are

left

with

ultimatum:

an

amended version of Martin Luther King's

one can be part of the problem and try to be part

of the solution, or one can simply be part of the problem.

The argument for solidarity suggests an avenue, moreover,

which

will

allow

us

to

put

these

aside

glum

existential

musings which are so ill-suited to political science.
seems

to

me

that

a

renewal

of

the

It

constitutive moment

in

politics is the focus for whatever optimism-of-the-spirit we
might

muster:

political

confrontation

is

educative

like

nothing else.
One

of

the

keenest

examples

of

this

in

contemporary

American politics is middle class grass-roots conflicts with
209

polluters.

No amount of political science is likely to push

the white middle class out of its radical anti-taxism, casual

racism, and 'social conservatism* in the way that a fight with

Monsanto or Dow chemical over what is going into the water
Where

table.

initially
people

Michael

modest

that

capitalism

political

government

the

does

Parenti

not

and

Noam

initiative

Chomsky

can

fail,

an

demonstrate

to

is

not

their government,

apologize

for

putting

profits

that

before

people, and that many things they always believed are simply

not true
But frustration and anger,

political

system,

are

hardly

even open hostility to the

in

short

supply,

evince a very encouraging 'progressive' bent.

and

hardly

If the left has

anything on its agenda in the West, it has to be the cathexis
of the legitimate anger and frustration of citizens across a

wide variety of 'identities' 49 with the felt understanding that
How can the lust for

something entirely better is possible.

Adorno's Utopia compete with the lust for commodities?

How

can solidarity compete with fear and the dialectic of enlight-

enment?
It

seems

to

through politics,

me

that

answer

the

not over or

"around.'

glimmers anywhere in the real world,

to

this

guestion

is

If Adorno's Utopia

aside from Beckett and

Schonberg, it flickers in the mundane solidarity people feel

who are engaged in more or less transformative projects right
now.
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And this is the gigantic contribution of the anarchist,
'infantile'

wing

of

communism:

that

democracy

and

real

egalitarian community won't wait until after the revolution.
My insistence on the importance of solidarity is addressed in

no small part to radical theories that would privilege the

inculcation of class consciousness, or 'correct' theory over
what is sometimes dismissed as peripheral or
fixations.

No

social

movement

any

has

'

superstructural

success

unless

it

engages (enough) people on the level of desire; revolution is
seductive, or it isn't a revolution. 50

What

I

intend by solidarity is not an abstract capacity

for identifying with others;

it does not describe a diffuse

warm fuzzy feeling for 'humankind,'
Rather,

or for

'the oppressed.'

it is the felt and conscious attentiveness to frac-

tious and precarious particular communities

— not

just a shared

sense of responsibility for an organization's 'mental health,
but a collective thirst for utopia that is not cowed by the

mistakes and oversimplifications of past movements
own)

(or

its

.

Nobody describes the unlikeliness of a living egalitari-

anism more thoroughly or trenchantly than Adorno; but it is

precisely here that one can experience, as in no other forum,

wrestling with the problems of autonomy and solidarity, theory
and praxis,

negativity and Utopia,

21

that widen the cracks in

the totally administered society and push back the shadow
the Spell.
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Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science,
1.
Macmillan, 1978), p. 141.

(New York:

This is certainly a critical issue in any attempt to
2.
bring Adorno into contemporary 'critical theory'; a bit more
plainly:
this is the point of attack for an Adornian
critique of Habermas
I can hardly begin to deal with the
greatest living critical theorist within the confines of
this project.
.

V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution, (New York:
International Publishers, 1932), p. 84.

3.

4.

Negative Dialectics

346.

p.

,

Philosophy of Right, trans, by T.M. Knox, (Oxford:
5.
Oxford University Press, 1967), paragraph 203, p. 131. Note
that the inferior geistige status of farmers is literally
put down to their closeness to nature:
in this respect they
are too much like women, in Hegel's view.
One can't help
but wonder about the status of other economic agents not
really 'in the loop' of civil society, especially the
parasitic Junkers.
It is hard to imagine how Hegel could
excuse the rentier classes from the criticisms he makes
here
6.

The Philosophy of Right, paragraph 189, p. 126.

7.

The Philosophy of Right, paragraph 187, pp. 124-125.

8.

Negative Dialectics

9.

Negative Dialectics,

,

261-262.

pp.

262 (translation altered).

p.

(Cambridge, Mass.,

1993), pp.

10.
30.

Hegel: Three Studies,

11.

Hegel: Three Studies, p. 29.

12.

Philosophy of Right, paragraph 183,

13.

Philosophy of Right, paragraph 258, pp. 155-156.

p.

123.

Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto,
International Publishers), p. 31.
14.

(New York:

344.

15.

Negative Dialectics,

16.

Marxism and Totality,

17.

See Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp.

p.

28-

(Berkeley:

213

1984), pp.

174-176.

271-272.

18.

Dialectic of Enlightenment,

p.

171.

19.
Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 199. Actually, one
could make a similar argument about Gypsies, gays, and
communists:
each seems to carry some reminder of the
prohibited Utopia.

20.
See especially "On Popular Music," Studies in
Philosophy and Social Science, no. 9 (1944), pp. 44-48.

21.

"On Popular Music," p. 47.

22.

"On Popular Music," p. 47.

23.

"On Popular Music," p.

24.

Negative Dialectics

25.

"On Popular Music," pp. 47-48.

26.

Dialectic of Enlightenment,

,

p.

47.

95.

p.

145.

And perhaps it is not simply coincidental that Achilles
27.
is brought down by the 'effeminate' Paris, whose unruly

desire started the Trojan War.
28.

Dialectic of Enlightenment,

p.

137.

29.

Dialectic of Enlightenment,

p.

139.

30.

Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 141-142.

A selection from this important early book, along with
31
one from the equally fascinating Systeme de objets, has been
published in English in Jean Baudrillard : Selected Writings
Stanford University Press,
edited by Mark Poster (Stanford:
1988)
.

The Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V.
32.
Oxford University Press, 1977), paragraph
Miller, (Oxford:
105.

167,

p.

33.

The Phenomenology of Spirit, paragraph 175, p. 109.

On psycyhoanalysis and intersub jectivity see Jessica
34.
Benjamin's excellent book, The Bonds of Love:
Psychoanalysis , Feminism, and the Problem of Domination,
Pantheon, 1988).
(New York:
,

See Connerton, The Tragedy of Enlightenment, pp. 75-77;
Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, pp.
388ff.; J. Benjamin, "The End of Internalization," Telos,
35.

214

no.
36.

32

(Summer 1977), pp. 48ff.

The Tragedy of Enlightenment, p. 75.

In fact, I would argue that Adorno s texts presume a
37.
really intersub jective relationship with the reader, in a
way to which Habermas textbook-like contributions are
evidently deaf.
'

1

38.
Interestingly, solidarity appears in a handful of
Adornian sentences, usually in the context of an attack on
Communist-enforced conformity. See, e.g., Minima Moralia,
p. 51, and a lovely sentence evoking "a solidarity that is
transparent to itself and all the living" (Negative
Dialectics, p. 204), which like most of Adorno' s close
brushes with concepts that border on practical politics
hangs suspended in the text, with no elaboration.

—

e.g.:

39.

See,

40.

Negative Dialectics

41.

Negative Dialectics, 205.

42.

Negative Dialectics,

pp.

3-6,
,

141-144, and pp. 203-207.

pp.
p.

p.

142.

191.

One might argue that the theoreticians and politicians
43.
of Third World revolutions are a significant exception to
this:
certainly a public enthusiasm for the continuing
project of revolution made Cuba much harder to dismiss as a
thoroughly authoritarian regime.
In the West, the major
theoreticians with some affinity for the transformative
power of politics would seem to be Luxemburg and Sorel
44.
My thinking about the constitutive power of political
life was sparked by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis' superb
book Democracy and Capitalism : Property , Community and the
Contradictions of Modern Social Thought, (New York: Basic
Books, 1986).
,

This seems to be the intention, suffocated as it is by
their jargon, of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical
Democratic Strategy, (London: Verso, 1985). Even better
than this interesting book is the recent work of Shane
Phelan; see "Interpretation and Domination," Polity, (Fall
1993), and Identity Politics: Lesbian Feminism and the
Limits of Community, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
45.

1989), esp. ch.

4.

Identity Politics, William
Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of
46.

See,

for instance, Phelan,
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Political Paradox, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991),
Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit, Mark C. Taylor,
Altarity, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), and
Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alter ity: a Particular History
of the Senses, (New York: Routledge, 1993).
Adorno's contribution to the guestion of identity is
probably the point of his greatest influence on contemporary
social theory; in various ways, Phelan, Taussig, and Cornell
all acknowledge the relevance of Adorno's negative
dialectic

Civilization and Its Discontents p. 69. Note again,
the friendliest alternative Freud cites is an instrumental,
47.

,

purely external relationship.
In Freud, the only conceivable community is one bound
together in aggression against some 'outside.'
This
argument is premised on the same intersub jective vacuum I
described above:
there can be no positive internal cohesion
in a community since its members do not really relate to
each other as subjects.
48.

Obviously, I am not suggesting that a radical political
strategy ought to (or could!) aspire to the allegiance of
even people in
everyone or almost everyone. But rather:
the 'middle' might be convinced they have more to gain than
to lose from change.
49.

The sympathy of Marcuse and Bookchin for the
50.
libidinally-oriented moment of the 'counterculture' is worth
The most relevant texts here would be
a critical revival.
Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, (Montreal: Black Rose
Books, 1986), and Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1969).

216

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adorno, Theodor w.,
no.

31

(1977), pp.

"The Actuality of Philosophy," Telos,
120-133.

Aesthetic Theory, trans. C. Lenhardt, ed. by G. Adorno
and R. Tiedemann, New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984.
"Anmerkungen zum sozialen Konflikt heute," Gesammelte
Schriften, vol. 8.
"Commitment," trans.
87-88

(1974),

pp.

F.

McDonagh, New Left Review, nos.

75-89.

"Culture and Administration," trans, by W. Blomster,
Telos 37 (Fall 1978), pp. 93-111.
"Culture Industry Reconsidered," trans. A. G. Rabinach,
New German Critique, vol. 6 (Fall 1975), pp. 12-19.

"Democratic Leadership and Mass Manipulation," in
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 20, part 1.
by

D.

"Education for Autonomy," with Hellmut Becker, trans.
Parent, Telos 56 (Summer 1983)

"Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of
Listening," in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. by
A. Arato and E. Gebhardt, New York: Urizen, 1978.

"Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist
Propaganda," in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed.
by A. Arato and E. Gebhardt, New York: Urizen, 1978.

Gesammelte Schriften,
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

(23 vols.),

Hegel: Three Studies, trans, by
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993.

S.

ed. by R.

Tiedemann,

Weber Nicholsen,

"Husserl and the Problem of Idealism," in Gesammelte
Schriften, vol 20.1.
In search of Wagner,

Verso,

trans, by R. Livingstone, London:

1991.

"Individuum und Organisation," in Gesammelte Schriften,
vol.

8.

"Individuum und Staat," in Gesammelte Schriften, vol.
20, part I.
217

Introduction to the Sociology of Music, trans. E.B.
Ashton, New York: Seabury.
"Is Marx Obsolete?" trans, by Nicolas Slater, Diogenes,
Winter 1968, pp. 1-16.

no.

64,

"Messages in a Bottle," trans, by E. Jephcott, New
German Critique, no. 200 (Jul/Aug 1993), pp. 5-14.
E.

F.

Minima Moral ia: Reflections from a Damaged Life, trans.
N. Jephcott, London: New Left Books, 1974.

Negative Dialectics, trans.
Continuum, 1973.

E.

Ashton, New York:

B.

Notes to Literature, vol. 1, trans.
New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1991.
W.

W.

S.

Nicholsen,

"Of Barricades and Ivory Towers: An Interview with T.
Adorno" Encounter, no. 33 (September 1969), pp. 63-69.

"On the Fetish Character of of Music and the Regression
of Listeners," in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed.
by A. Arato and E. Gebhardt, New York: Urizen, 1978.

"On the Historical Adequacy of Consciousness," with
Peter von Haselberg, trans, by W. Blomster, Telos 56 (Summer
1983)

"On Popular Music," (with G. Simpson), Studies in
Philosophy and Social Science, vol. 9, no.
(1941), pp. 171

48.

"On the Social Situation of Music," Telos, no. 35
(Spring 1978), pp. 128-164.

Philosophy of Modern Music, trans. A. G. Mitchell and
W. V. Blomster, New York: Seabury Press, 1973.
The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology,
(Introduction and two essays), trans. G. Adey and
London: Heinemann, 1976.
Prisms, trans.

Press

1

981

S.

and

S.

D.

Frisby,

Weber, Cambridge, MA: MIT

.

"Reflexionen zur Klassentheorie
Schriften, vol. 8.

,

"

in Gesammelte

"Resignation," Telos, no. 35 (Spring 1978), pp. 165168.

218

"Die revidierte Psychoanalyse," in Gesammelte
Schriften, vol. 8.

"Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in
America," trans. D. Fleming et al., in D. Fleming and B.
Bailyn (eds.), Intellectual Migration: Europe and America,
1930-1960, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1969.
7,

"A Social Critique of Radio Music," Kenyon Review,
no. 2 (Spring 1945)

vol.

"Society," trans. F. Jameson, Salmagundi, vols. 10-11
(1969-1970), pp. 144-153.

"Sociology and Psychology," trans. I. Wohlfarth, New
Left Review, nos. 46 (1967), pp. 67-80, and 47 (1968), pp.

"Spatkapitalismus oder Industriegesellschaft?" in
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 8.
"Studies in the Authoritarian Personality" (selections
from The Authoritarian Personality)
in Gesammelte
Schriften, vol 9.1, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975.
,

"Subject and Object," in The Essential Frankfurt School
Reader, ed. by A. Arato and E. Gebhardt, New York: Urizen,
1978.

"Television and the Patterns of Mass Culture," in B.
Rosenberg and D. Manning (eds.) Mass Culture: The Popular
Arts in America, New York: Free Press 1957.
"Thesen

iiber

Bedurfnis," in Gesammelte Schriften, vol.

8.

"Tranparencies on Film," with intro. by Miriam B.
Hansen, New German Critique 24-25 (Fall 1981-Winter 1982),
pp. 187-205.
Agger, Ben, Discourse and Domination: From the Frankfurt
School to Postmodernism, Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1992.

Alford, C. Fred, "Nature and Narcissism," New German
Critique 36 (Fall 1985) pp. 174-192.

Anderson, Perry,
Verso, 1976.

Considerations on Western Marxism, London:

219

Arato, Andrew, "Critical Theory in the United States:
Reflections on Four Decades of Reception," in America and
the Germans: An Assessment of a Three-Hundred-Year History,
ed. by F. Trommler and J. McVeigh, Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1985.

Arato, Andrew, and Eike Gebhardt (eds.), The Essential
Frankfurt School Reader, New York: Urizen, 197 8.

Baudrillard, Jean, For A Critique of the Political Economy
of the Sign, trans, by C. Levin, St. Louis: Telos Press,
1981.

Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, ed. by M. Poster,
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.
The Mirror of Production,
Louis: Telos Press, 1975.

Benhabib, Seyla,
Columbia, 1986.

trans, by M. Poster, St.

Critique, Norm, and Utopia, New York:

Benjamin, Jessica, "Authority and the Family Revisited: or,
a World without Fathers?" New German Critique, 13 (Winter
1978), pp. 35-57.
The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis , Feminism, and the
Problem of Domination, New York: Pantheon, 1988.

"The End of Internalization: Adorno's Social
Psychology," Telos, 32 (Summer 1977), pp. 42-64.

Benjamin, Walter, Illuminations, ed.
Zohn, New York: Schocken, 1969.

H.

Arendt, trans.

Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans.
London: New Left Books, 1977.
Reflections, ed.
York: Schocken, 1978.

P.

Demetz,

J.

H.

Osborne,

trans. E. Jephcott, New

Berman, Russell, Modern Culture and Critical Theory,
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.

Bookchin, Murray, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Montreal: Black
Rose Books, 1986.
Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis, Democracy and
Capitalism: Property, Community and the Contradictions of
Modern Social Thought, New York: Basic Books, 1986.
220

Bowles, Samuel, David M. Gordon, and Thomas E. Weisskopf,
After the Wasteland, A Democratic Economics for the Year
2000, Armonk, NY:
M. E
Sharpe, 1990.
.

Breuer, Stefan, "Adorno s Anthropology,
(Summer 1985), pp. 15-31.
'

"

Telos,

no.

64

Buck-Morss, Susan, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, New
York: Free Press, 1977.

Connerton, Paul, The Tragedy of Enlightenment: An Essay on
the Frankfurt School, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
*
1980.

Connolly, William E., Identity\Difference: Democratic
Negotiations of Political Paradox, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1991.
Cornell, Drucilla,
Routledge, 1992.

The Philosophy of the Limit, New York:

Dallmayr, Fred R., Twilight of Subjectivity: Contributions
to a Post-Individualist Theory, Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1981.
Dubiel, Helmut, Theory and Politics: Studies in the
Development of Critical Theory, trans, by B. Gregg,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985.

Stuart, Captains of Consciousness : Advertising and the
Roots of the Consumer Culture, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976.

Ewen,

Frankfurt Institute of Social Research, Aspects of
Sociology, trans. J. Viertel, Boston: Beacon Press,
Freud, Sigmund, Civilization and Its Discontents
Strachey, New York: Norton, 1961.

,

1972.

trans. J.

Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, trans.
Strachey, New York: Norton, 1961.

J.

"On Narcissism," in The Freud Reader, ed. by P. Gay,
Norton, 1989.
New York:

Freidman, George, The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt
School, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981.

Habermas, Jurgen, Autonomy and Solidarity, London: Verso,
1992.

T.

Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans, by
McCarthy, Boston: Beacon, 1979.
221

n

The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Re-Reading
Dialectic of Enlightenment," trans, by T. Levin, New German
Critique, no. 26 (Spring/Summer 1982), pp. 13-29.

Legitimation Crisis, trans, by
Beacon,

T.

McCarthy, Boston:

1975.

"Theodor Adorno:
The Primal History of Subjectivity
Self-Affirmation Gone Wild," in Philosophical-Political
Profiles, trans, by F. Lawrence, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press,
1983

.

The Theory of Communicative Action, trans, by T.
McCarthy, Boston: Beacon, 1984.

Harvey, David,
MA: Blackwell,

The Condition of Post-Modernity,
1990.

Cambridge,

Hegel, G. W. F
Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans, by T.M.
Knox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
.

,

Phenomenology of Spirit, trans, by A. V. Miller,
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977.
Held, David, Introduction to Critical Theory, Berkeley:
Univ. of California Press, 1980.

Honig, Bonnie, Political Theory and the Displacement of
Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.

Horkheimer, Max, Critical Theory, trans. M. O'Connell et
al
New York: Continuum Press, 1972.
.

,

Eclipse of Reason, New York: Continuum Press, 1974.
Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of
Enlightenment, trans, by J. Cumming, New York: Continuum,
1972.

Hullot-Kentor, Robert,
1989), pp.

"Back to Adorno," Telos, no. 81

(Fall

5-29.

"The Impossibility of Music:
Music," New German Critique.

Adorno,

Popular and Other

From Hollywood to
Huyssen, Andreas, "Adorno in Reverse:
(Spring/Summer
29
Critique
Richard Wagner," New German
1983), pp. 8-38.
Jacoby, Russell, "Towards a Critique of Automatic Marxism:
The Politics of Philosophy from Lukacs to the Frankfurt
(Winter 1971), pp. 119-146.
School," Telos, no.
222

Jameson, Frederic, Marxism and Form,
Univ. Press, 1971.

Princeton: Princeton

Late Marxism: Adorno, or the Persistence of the
Dialectic, London: Verso, 1990.
Martin, Adorno, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press,

Jay,

"Adorno in America," New German Critique 31
157-182.

(Winter

1984), pp.

The Dialectical Imagination, Boston: Little, Brown,

1973

.

Marxism and Totality, Berkeley: Univ. of California
Press,

1984.

Johnson, Pauline, "An Aesthetics of Negativity/An Aesthetics
of Reception:
Jauss"s Dispute With Adorno," New German
Critique 42 (Fall 1987), pp. 51-70.

Kellner, Douglas, "Critical Theory and the Culture
Industries: A Reassessment," Telos, no. 50, pp. 196-206.
Krahl, Hans-Jurgen, "The Political Contradictions of
Adorno's Critical Theory," Telos, no. 21 (Fall 1974), pp.
164-167

Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy : Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, London:
Verso, 1985.
Lenin, V. I., State and Revolution, New York: International
Publishers, 1932.

Lukacs, Georg, History and Class Consciousness, trans.
Livingstone, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971

Lyotard, Jean-Frangois,
(1974), pp. 127-137.

R.

"Adorno as the Devil," Telos, no. 19

Marcuse, Herbert, An Essay on Liberation, Boston: Beacon
Press, 1969.

Counterrevolution and Revolt, Boston: Beacon Press,
1972.

Eros an d civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry Into
Freud, Boston: Beacon Press, 1962.

223

Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, Boston: Beacon

Press,

1968.

One-Dimensional Man, Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.
"Some Social Implications of Modern Technology,"
Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences, vol. 9 (1941),
pp. 414-439.

Marramao, Giacomo, "Political Economy and Critical Theory,"
Telos, no. 24 (Summer 1974), pp. 57-80.
Marx,

Karl, Capital, 3 vols., ed. by
International Publishers, 1967.

F.

Engels, New York:

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto,
New York: International Publishers, 1948.

Marx-Engels Reader, ed. by

R.

Tucker, New York: Norton,

1978.

Mills, Patricia J., Woman, Nature, and Psyche, New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press, 1987.

Mommsen, Wolfgang J., Max Weber and German Politics, trans,
by M. Steinberg, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984.
Nagele, Rainer, "The Scene of the Other: Theodor W. Adorno"s
Negative Dialectic in the Context of Poststructuralism, " in
Postmodernism and Politics ed. by Jonathan Arac,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
,

"on Zuidervaart "s Adorno"s Aesthetic Theory,"
presented at the Society for Phenomenology and Existential
Psychology, 1992.

Pensky, Max,

Phelan, Shane, "(Be) Coming Out: Lesbian Identity and
Politics," Signs, vol. 18, no. 4, (Summer 1993), pp. 765790.

Identity Politics: Lesbian Feminism and the Limits of
Community, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989.

"Interpretation and Domination," Adorno and the
Habermas-Lyotard Debate," Polity, vol. 25, no. 4 (Summer
1993), pp. 597-616.
Piccone, Paul, "The Changing Function of Critical Theory,"
New German Critique 12 (Fall 1977), pp. 29-37.

224

Pizer, John, "Jameson's Adorno, or, the Persistence of the
Utopian," New German Critique, no. 58 (Winter 1993), pp.

Pollock,

"Is National Socialism a New Order," in Studies in
Philosophy and Social Sciences, vol. 9, no. 3 (1941), pp.

440-455.

"State Capitalism:
Its Possibilities and Limitations,"
in Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences, vol. 9, no. 2
(1941), pp. 200-225.
7

Resnick, Stephen A., and Richard D. Wolff, Knowledge and
Class: A Marxian Critique of Political Economy, Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987.
Rorty, Richard, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Rose, Gillian, The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to
the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno, New York: Macmillan, 1978.
Ross, Andrew, No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture,
New York: Routledge, 1989.

Schonherr, Ulrich, "Adorno, Ritter Gluck, and the Tradition
of the Postmodern," New German Critique 48 (Fall 1989), pp.
135-154
Slater, Phil, Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt
School: A Marxist Perspective, London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1977.

Sullivan, Michael, and John T. Lysaker, "Between Impotence
and Illusion: Adorno 's Art of Theory and Practice," New
German Critique, no 57 (Fall 1992), pp. 87-122.
Taussig, Michael, Mimesis and Alterity: a Particular History
of the Senses, New York: Routledge, 1993.
Taylor, Mark
Press, 1987.

C,

Altarity, Chicago: University of Chicago

Thomas, Calvin, "A Knowledge That Would Not Be Power:
Adorno, Nostalgia and the Musical Subject," New German
Critique 48 (Fall 1989), pp. 155-175.

Waldman, Diane, "Critical Theory and Film: Adorno and "The
Culture Industry" Revisited," New German Critique, no. 12
(Fall 1977)
pp. 39-60.
,

225

Weber, Max, Economy and Society, ed. by G. Roth and C.
Wittich, Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1978.

From Max Weber, ed. by H. Gerth and C. W. Mills,
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958.
The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans, by
Shils and H. Finch, Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1949.

E.

Wolin, Richard,

"Critical Theory and the Dialectic of
Rationality," New German Critique, no. 36 (Fall 1985), pp.
23-52.

Walter Benjamin : An Aesthetic of Redemption, New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 1982.
Zuidervaart, Lambert, Adorno's Aesthetic Theory: The
Redemption of Illusion, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.

226

